Trump is right to reduce troops in Germany
The :ashington Post
President Donald Trump’s announcement that he would order a reduction in the number of 8.S. troops stationed in *ermany has been roundly condemned by some 5epublican members of Congress and foreign policy elites. But Trump is right, even if his reasoning is wrong.
Trump defended his call by noting that *ermany still spends well below the minimum 2 percent of gross domestic product on its defense set by 1AT2. He also noted that 8.S. troops and their families spend a lot of money in *ermany, boosting that nation’s economy, while *ermany treats us “very badly on trade.” In sum, Trump’s explanation was consistent with his long-stated belief that he needs leverage in any negotiation, allowing him to trade something the other party wants or needs in exchange for what he wants.
That’s the wrong way to look at a deal with a long-term ally. Trump’s approach implicitly assumes that any deal is a singular transaction between two parties rather than part of an ongoing relationship. An ongoing relationship requires trust and forbearance, not constant blustering. 1o relationship – whether it’s a marriage or an international alliance – can survive if one party is constantly issuing demands and treating the other like a stranger. Treating *ermany this way is a disservice to our alliance and to our longer-term strategic interests.
Trump is right, however, to do this anyway. The reason is simple The 8nited States has a huge gap between its global commitments and its global power, and it can guarantee its national security only if it starts to prioriti]e those commitments and allocate its power accordingly.
The 8nited States built its global alliance structure primarily to combat the Soviet 8nion. 1AT2 was formed in 1949 to unite the free nations of :estern and Southern (urope in the face of an adversary that had overthrown freely elected governments in (astern (urope that it occupied after :orld :ar II. The 8nited States created two other alliances, C(1T2 and S(AT2, to similarly build an implacable wall around the Soviet 8nion, and its then-ally Communist China, in the Pacific and Middle (ast. These alliances were the logical outgrowth of the famous containment strategy initiated by diplomat *eorge .ennan during the Truman administration. They and other bilateral alliances formed the bedrock of 8.S. military and diplomatic strategy during the Cold :ar.
2ur current alliances are largely descendants of those long-ago creations. In the Cold :ar’s aftermath, we also assumed a global role outside those commitments that the existence of the Soviet 8nion had prevented us from taking. Thus, we could invade Afghanistan, deploy forces around the globe to combat terrorism and send forces to topple the Serbian and /ibyan governments secure in the knowledge that no other government was capable of interfering.
But those dual commitments, explicit and implicit, make sense only with certain preconditions. The first is that the 8nited States must have a large enough military to back up its commitments to all of its allies simultaneously in a worst-case scenario. The second is that no nation-state should be able to seriously interfere if the 8nited States decided to deploy its military outside the sphere of its alliance structure. 1either precondition applies today.
Pentagon officials have acknowledged that we can no longer fight two maMor wars simultaneously. This is because all branches of the military are significantly smaller today than they were in 1991 when the Soviet 8nion collapsed. If China attacked Taiwan at the same time that 5ussia attacked 1AT2 ally (stonia, the 8nited States would lack the forces to fight both simultaneously. The 8nited States is also no longer an unchallenged superpower. China and 5ussia have substantially expanded their militaries, putting more strains on the 8nited States and its allies.
The result is that the 8nited States must either dramatically increase its military power, increasing defense spending from its current 3.2 percent of *DP to something closer to 5 percent, or it must prioriti]e which threats most merit 8.S. force deployment. If it chooses the latter course, as appears likely, (uropean conventional defense is an obvious place to cut.
The (uropean 8nion’s economy is eight times larger than 5ussia’s. It could easily build a military that protects all of 1AT2’s members, relying on the 8nited States for its intelligence, naval and nuclear assets to help combat 5ussian threats outside of the (uropean landmass. 8.S. redeployment from (urope, done in a measured fashion, thus slowly prepares for a future in which the 8nited States bears primary responsibility for meeting threats from Iran and China while the (uropean allies bear primary responsibility for meeting threats from 5ussia.
America is overstretched. Trump’s proposed redeployment, however clumsily handled and inadequately explained, is recognition of this fact. Those who support an active and reliable global 8.S. military presence need to recogni]e this and act now before our adversaries act for us.