THE IRAN PUZZLE
One of the Obama administration’s biggest diplomatic ambitions was to establish better relations with Iran, a nation with which the United States has been at odds since the fall of the shah and the rise of a powerful theocratic government in Tehran in 1979. The most important manifestation of that effort was a deal negotiated by the administration and its allies under which Iran agreed to curb its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions.
That momentary thaw, if not the agreement itself, now seems at risk. Partly this is a result of Iran’s barely concealed territorial and political ambitions, which are rightly of concern in Washington. Partly it is a result of President Donald Trump’s fondness for Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Muslim nation, which has led him to demonize Iran, a Shiite nation and the Saudis’ chief rival for regional influence.
A potential flashpoint is looming in Syria. There, Iran and the United States share a common goal of defeating the Islamic State. But they have competing interests, which are growing even as the fight against ISIS seems to be going well and indeed may be approaching the endgame.
Trump administration officials worry that the Iranians, aided by the Syrian president, Bashar Assad, will seek control of enough territory in two adjacent countries, Syria and Iraq, so as to establish a land bridge from Tehran all the way to Lebanon. There they could resupply their Hezbollah allies, thus enlarging their regional influence.
Iran undoubtedly intends to play a larger regional role, and there are reasons to be wary. But the administration hasn’t explained its concerns publicly and there are questions about how it plans to deal with the challenge.
Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Iran has been one of Assad’s chief allies, deploying thousands of Hezbollah and other Shiite fighters and providing other forms of aid to help him beat back Syrian rebels. Iran’s interests in Syria are thus markedly different from its interests in Iraq. In Iraq it has fought ISIS. In Syria, its focus has been on helping the Assad regime.
It is in Syria where the interests of Iran and the United States are most sharply at odds, and in Iraq where they most nearly converge. U.S. and Iraqi security forces have just about driven ISIS from Mosul, a major Iraqi city. In Syria, America is also seeking to crush ISIS, but is doing so in concert with Syrian opposition forces, not Assad, whom it has long opposed.
As in Iraq, the fight against ISIS is going well; ISIS is close to being routed from its headquarters in the city of Raqqa. But the prospect of victory has opened the door to new tensions between U.S.-led forces and Iranian-Syrian forces. That has manifested itself in a series of encounters this month in which the United States shot down a Syrian warplane, came close to shooting down another and downed two Iranian-made drones nearing U.S.-backed troops on the ground. Iran, meanwhile, used ballistic missiles against ISIS targets.
ISIS now controls only about half the territory it once held in Syria, and, as the space shrinks, the various combatants are concentrating on a smaller area, along Syria’s eastern border with Iraq and Jordan and in the Euphrates River Valley, home to oil reserves and water.
Administration officials suspect that Iran is more interested in controlling territory in these areas than defeating ISIS, and that the presence of Iranian and Syrian government forces could impede the U.S.-led effort to finish ISIS off in Raqqa. It could also obstruct American plans to establish outposts in the Syrian and western Iraqi desert so that fleeing ISIS fighters can be killed or captured, thus preventing them from hunkering down and later re-emerging as a threat, these officials say.
Adding to the combustible environment is Russia, the other major Assad defender, which threatened to retaliate to what Washington called its recent “self-defense” moves by treating U.S. planes as targets. Despite this, administration officials, reflecting a president who shares Saudi Arabia’s hard-line antiIran views, seem to consider Iran a bigger problem than Moscow and one that could threaten Israel, Jordan and other allies.
Could Trump stumble into a wider war in Syria? There are reasons to worry. He has yet to offer a comprehensive plan for dealing with Syria, including the diplomacy needed to develop a political solution to end the civil war, which could create a more stable country less vulnerable to extremist groups.
The fear is that Trump’s demonizing of Iran, and his unwillingness to engage its government, could result in a broadening of the American military mission from defeating ISIS to preventing Iranian influence from expanding. This would be dangerous. Iran is a vexing state to be smartly managed, not assumed to be an implacable enemy.