Quad shows true colors as a budding security bloc

Exercises of warships not littoral to South China Sea pose threat to regional security

The grouping of countries that was established in 2007 known as the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”, or Quad, reminded us of the Napoleonic era alliance known as the “Triple Entente” wherein France, Russia and Great Britain formed an alliance in 1894 to counter Germany, AustriaHungary and Italy, only to ripen as the bloodiest war that mankind witnessed in 1914.

Despite the vague denial that the Quad could later on develop into an alliance similar to other blocs organized at the height of the Cold War, such as the defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and its counterpart in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is understood that it was organized to principally contain the increasing economic and military influence of China.

It is puzzling that the architects of the virtual summit of the United States, Australia, Japan and India refuse to call themselves an alliance, though their joint statement on March 12 is an open manifestation that they stand as a security dialogue among members.

As a budding “security bloc”, the Quad intends to operate in the South China Sea as if to point to China as the source of instability in the region, in the name of wanting “to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, including support for freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and a stronger regional architecture through Quad”.

In reality, it causes many to wonder about the direction of its military and political objectives.

First, the political line of freedom of navigation and to keep open the Indo-Pacific is misleading. Never has there been an instance where the sea lane of the South China Sea has been blocked by China.

Rather, it is the US that first used naval force to impose a naval blockade in the Gulf of Tonkin as pretext to attack North Vietnam.

The four nations cannot cite an instance that China attempted to block the waterway to put political pressure on countries littoral to the SCS, as what the US now does in Cuba and Venezuela in the Caribbean or against Iran in the Persian Gulf.

Second, freedom of navigation has been maintained ever since even by countries that have territorial claims or dispute in the SCS. Despite that, disputes among littoral states in the SCS have always been blamed on China even if it has never interfered to disrupt the freedom of navigation.

China knows that a disruption of the waterway will never work to its advantage or to countries that rely on it as their trade route to the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and on to the Persian Gulf.

Third, the clamor for freedom of navigation by the US is the reverse application of the discredited “gun boat diplomacy” to pursue its foreign policy by applying the conspicuous display of naval power to constitute a direct threat to war on terms not amenable to them.

This indirectly and strangely means that China is prohibited from maintaining a strong naval power in the SCS; that the security in the SCS is now the responsibility of countrymembers even if they have no coastline here.

Fourth, the concept of Indo-Pacific is the Western redefinition of political geography to purposely suit their strategy of seeking to accommodate allies to justify the nomenclature of Indo-Pacific for the formation of a new alliance.

As stated, the geopolitical activities of Quad is confined and limited to the waters from North to South China Sea. The Pacific and Indian Oceans have traditionally been assigned to the main US naval force dubbed as either the Pacific or Atlantic Naval fleet.

What many political analysts wonder is why Quad appears to have singled out China as a competitor of the US and its allies in the region without them formally commencing the Cold War or analyzing their rightful status in the region.

Fifth, the expanded term “IndoPacific” is now being used by the West to technically lock the Westernsponsored alliance into participating in the naval exercise that will soon be institutionalized by Quad with the intention of easing out China as the legitimate and leading naval power in the region, which is littoral, indigenous and integral to the SCS.

Of the original four members of Quad, only Japan, from a geographical point of view is a valid member having a claim over the Diaoyu islands it calls Senkaku. The US and

Australia are located in the Pacific Ocean, but far outside of the SCS.

As a burdensome member located in the Indian Ocean, India’s accommodation is to give the alliance a loose meaning and accord to that country the jurisdiction both in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, and to project the idea that China is geographically and strategically isolated in the new race to dominate the South China Sea.

Sixth, the loose and expanded scope of that Western-invented Quad would then require the alliance to allow vessels, warships and submarines from NATO to navigate and participate in the military exercise in the South China Sea. In fact, the continued presence, patrol and holding of military exercises of warships not littoral to the SCS is the one that poses a threat to the security in the region.

This explains why countries like

China, Indonesia and the Philippines feel tense and uneasy every time the US and its allies conduct a military exercise in the South China Sea; that there is uneasiness because they could sense that the US is again out to gang up on the sale of weapons.

Enticing countries to purchase submarines, frigates, patrol boats, missiles, radars and communications equipment is what predominates their mind and not the security of the region. France and the United Kingdom today stand as top sales agents in this odd race to secure peace through the sale of arms.

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