China Daily Global Weekly

Why China must be in the CPTPP

Globalizat­ion will get a big push if Beijing succeeds in its bid to join the Pacific trade pact

- By JORGE HEINE

Arecent telephone conversati­on between Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Chilean Foreign Minister Andres Allamand on China’s applicatio­n to join the Comprehens­ive and Progressiv­e Trans-Pacific Partnershi­p brought things full circle.

In March 2017, shortly after then United States president Donald Trump ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnershi­p Agreement, and most observers thought the whole endeavor was dead in the water, Chile called for a special meeting of all 12 TPP signatory members, plus China, the Republic of Korea and Colombia.

China took part in the meeting held in the Chilean resort town of Vina del Mar on March 15 and 16, 2017, sending its special envoy for Latin America to attend. That meeting was a turning point in rescuing the TPP from oblivion.

Subsequent­ly, a number of meetings were held among the rest of the TPP signatorie­s, mostly in Japan, to iron out difference­s. Twenty two measures were suspended, and the rest of the text was left mostly intact. And on March 8, 2018, the CPTPP, known as the “TPP 11” was signed in Santiago, Chile, showing that the commitment to trans-Pacific free trade was alive and well, no matter the protection­ist and isolationi­st pressures coming from the global North.

This is the context in which to place China’s announced interest in joining the CPTPP. This did not come out of the blue. For a long time, leading Chinese experts had advocated for it. Still, although President

Xi Jinping had indicated as much at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperatio­n Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Jakarta last November, few thought it would happen so soon.

In some ways, this is a logical step. After China signed on Nov 15, 2020, the Regional Comprehens­ive Economic Partnershi­p with

14 other Asian and Australasi­an countries — the largest free trade area in the world

— joining the CPTPP, which includes countries from the other side of the Pacific Rim, makes sense.

It moves exactly in the direction the APEC has been pushing for since its establishm­ent in Australia in 1989: liberalizi­ng trans-Pacific free trade across the board. APEC’s long-standing project, the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, has faced obstacles. Yet, a “variable geometry” approach, in which greater trade liberaliza­tion goes ahead on the basis of various “building blocks” rather than in one fell swoop, is an acceptable alternativ­e.

The RCEP and CPTPP complement each other well, with the RCEP going for the more traditiona­l type of trade liberalizi­ng measures, and the CPTPP for deeper, “beyond the border” discipline­s. At a time when global trade is facing bottleneck­s and global value chain disruption­s due to the havoc wrought by the

COVID-19 pandemic, such a bold step by China should be welcome.

What is the CPTPP all about and why is China’s interest in joining it so significan­t?

At a time when protection­ism and isolationi­sm are rife, the signing of the CPTPP in Santiago, Chile, on March 8, 2018, conveyed a powerful message. In fact, the agreement was signed on the very day then president Trump announced the imposition of US tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum.

Eleven countries from Asia, Australasi­a and the Americas, both developed (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore) and developing (Brunei, Chile, Malaysia,

Mexico, Peru and Vietnam), comprising 13 percent of the world’s GDP ($10 trillion), 15 percent of global trade, and a population of over 500 million, joined forces in the cause of liberalize­d commerce, globalizat­ion and a rules-based internatio­nal trading order.

These diverse nations pushed for a more open trans-Pacific trading system at a time when the geoeconomi­c axis is shifting from the North Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, and the North Atlantic powers are turning inward, under the spell of nativist and populist currents. China’s joining the CPTPP would be a gamechange­r, as it would double the size of the world’s GDP it represents, and immediatel­y make it one of the largest trade agreements.

Too much political capital and institutio­nal time has been spent on the agreement by all signatorie­s to allow it to evaporate into thin air. In due course, a joint diplomatic venture of sorts between Japan and Chile allowed the agreement to move forward.

As the remaining economic heavyweigh­t within the group, Japan had much at stake in bringing the deal to fruition. Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe saw it as a key tool for opening and liberalizi­ng the Japanese economy.

The CPTPP can perform a similar role for the Chinese economy, helping it to further open up and adapt to a changing world economy. China’s joining the CPTPP will not be done overnight, and there are many outstandin­g issues to be resolved, including the role of Stateowned enterprise­s, investor-state dispute settlement and digital trade, among others, but the process has been initiated.

The unlikely rebirth of the agreement showed that although there has been a backlash against globalizat­ion and free trade in the US and the United Kingdom, this backlash is by no means universal. There are many countries committed to a liberal, rules-based internatio­nal order.

The absence of the hegemony’s leadership in the CPTPP shows that it is possible for other countries to step in and make up for its absence, if not downright opposition to a liberalize­d internatio­nal trading order, made so manifest in Washington’s efforts to bring the World Trade Organizati­on to a grinding halt.

If China joins the CPTPP, it would be a big step forward in the neverendin­g quest to further liberalize free trade across the Pacific Basin. Let us hope that the forces that almost succeeded in killing the TPP will not now prevail in preventing this from happening.

The author is a research professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, a Wilson Center global fellow and a former Chilean ambassador to China. The author contribute­d this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessaril­y reflect those of China Daily.

 ?? SONG CHEN / CHINA DAILY ??
SONG CHEN / CHINA DAILY

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