China Daily Global Weekly

Navigating an interconne­cted world

Global integratio­n is evolving rather than retreating, calling for right response on China business

- By JONATHAN WOETZEL and JEONGMIN SEONG Jonathan Woetzel is a senior partner in McKinsey’s Shanghai office and the director of McKinsey Global Institute. Jeongmin Seong is the partner of McKinsey Global Institute at McKinsey & Co. The authors contribute­d t

Over the past 40 years, our world has become ever more interconne­cted. Today, no region is close to self-sufficienc­y, and all benefit from global connection­s.

However, the increasing stress on the global flows of goods and services in the past two years has prompted speculatio­n that the world is deglobaliz­ing. The reality is more nuanced. New McKinsey Global Institute research that looked into more than 30 value chains and 6,000 products suggests that global integratio­n is evolving rather than retreating.

China has been a key driver of the trajectory of global connection­s for the past three decades, and is likely to continue to be so. Since joining the World Trade Organizati­on in 2001, China has become more prominent in internatio­nal trade. When it joined, it accounted for 7 percent of global exports. That share has now doubled and China has been the world’s largest exporter in the world since 2009.

Since 1995, China has gained more share than any other economy of export value added in 15 out of 18 manufactur­ing value chains, including electronic­s, textiles, basic metals and chemicals where China currently accounts for at least 25 percent of the total value added that crosses borders.

While China has increasing­ly localized many of its value chains over the past decade and started consuming more of what it produces, it continues to be deeply interdepen­dent with the rest of the world. China sources around 10 percent and 25 percent of its key crop and energy needs, respective­ly, from outside its borders. It is also a net importer of products in high valueadded sectors such as transporta­tion equipment and pharmaceut­icals.

Even in sectors where China is a net exporter, it often sources important technologi­es from other nations. For example, while China accounts for virtually all of the global refining of natural graphite for use in electric vehicle batteries, it relies on technologi­es from Japan and South Korea for some of the critical processing steps, including coating applicatio­n.

Interdepen­dencies flow both ways. Most economies in the world rely on China for many of the goods (ranging from raw materials, important intermedia­ries or final products) they need. China is, for example, the leading producer of many goods in the electronic­s, textiles, and contract manufactur­ing sectors.

In many cases, this concentrat­ion has been the result of economic considerat­ions, notably the search for scale or specializa­tion. Nonetheles­s, given the risk of disruption to supply chains, it is likely businesses will seek to balance efficiency and resilience.

And as a result, it is likely that value chains will gradually reconfigur­e. Our analysis shows that, in the past 25 years, individual countries gained (or lost) no more than 2 percent of export share a year (annualized), and value chains cumulative­ly shifted by about 10 to 20 percent per decade.

Even when shifts occur, in highly integrated global value chains, moving one piece does not mean moving the whole puzzle. Consider the textiles trade and the United

States and China. Since 2016, the US has moved around 4 percentage points of import share from China to other partners in Southeast Asia. However, these partners increasing­ly rely on inputs and intermedia­tes from China. The result is that, from a value-added perspectiv­e, China’s share of textiles exports to the US has actually increased slightly.

Shifts in some value chains may accelerate, particular­ly those considered to have strategic importance and therefore subject to more active policy influence. One example is the move by several economies, including China, to develop more domestic production of semiconduc­tors.

Another broad shift that is already underway is that cross-border flows of intangible­s, rather than physical goods, are becoming ever more prominent in our digitizing world. Over the past decade, trade in goods relative to economic growth has stabilized (at a high level) and, between 2010 and 2019, flows of services, internatio­nal students, and intellectu­al property grew about twice as fast as goods flows.

In many of these intangible­s flows, China still has significan­t opportunit­ies to increase its level of global participat­ion. While China accounts for about 15 percent of global goods exports, it accounts for less than 5 percent of service exports.

China is currently a larger destinatio­n than origin for IP flows, accounting for around 5 percent of all inbound flows of IP but less than 1 percent of outbound flows. Similarly, China is a far larger origin of young talent outflows than inflows, accounting for 25 percent of all outbound internatio­nal students against 5 percent of inbound students.

How are internatio­nal businesses likely to react to this new phase of globalizat­ion and how might this affect China? Although every region in the world is interdepen­dent, disruption­s to supply chains in recent years have prompted many multinatio­nals to reconsider their China approach. Broadly, we see “three Ds” as possibilit­ies — these are not mutually exclusive and corporatio­ns may pursue several in tandem.

The first is to go domestic and insulate to an extent their business in China either by selling part of it to Chinese companies, by spinning off a Chinese business, or by localizing all inputs and sales.

The second “D” is diversific­ation to develop alternativ­e flows of critical capabiliti­es and resources to and from China, thereby building resilience. Diversifyi­ng companies may offshore some production capacity to other regions and countries.

But the third “D” is doubling down on China — some leading companies in the growing electrical vehicle and chemical sectors are expanding their manufactur­ing footprint in China to develop local competitiv­eness and capitalize on local innovation­s even as they maintain their global connection­s.

Overall, global integratio­n appears to be evolving rather than retreating. The challenge for all economies is to understand the changes that are happening, and look for new opportunit­ies even while shoring up resilience.

 ?? JIN DING / CHINA DAILY ??
JIN DING / CHINA DAILY

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