Xi’s changes took observers by surprise

Corruption was a malignant tumor in the Chinese military. It was so deeply rooted that many observers, myself included, thought it would be almost impossible to eradicate it.

On the morning of Sept 3, 2015, I realized thatPresident Xi Jinping was serious about overhauling the People’s Liberation Army. Before inspecting a grand parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of WorldWar II, Xi, who is also chairman of the CentralMilitary Commission, China’s top defense body, announced that troop numbers would be reduced by 300,000 in the coming years.

I ama military enthusiast. I started following de fen se affairs in primary school, and over the years, I have covered Chinese military news and have become acquainted with many PLA officers, experts and other defense reporters. I hate to admit that despite all of this, I had not heard a single word about the troop cuts before the announcement was made. When I asked other defense reporters about the move, they all gave the same answer: “I didn’t know about it.”

We were surprised by the unprecedented level of secrecy surrounding the move, and I began to speculate that Xi was about to do something big— after all, pushing through a reduction of hundreds of thousands of officers and soldiers would not be an easy task.

However, I was convinced that Xi was the right man to bring real change to the PLA, because he had shown his determination and had also overseen the disciplinary process related to Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, two former top PLA commanders.

Corruption was a malignant tumor in the Chinese military. It was so deeply rooted that many observers, myself included, thought it would be almost impossible to eradicate it. Therefore when Xi deposed Xu and Guo, I was too surprised and ecstatic to notice a significant implication behind their fall — the president was not only excising corruption from the military, but also paving the way for more changes.

Xi’s intentions became crystal clear a few months after the parade. At a meeting attended by top officers in November 2015, Xi said he wanted a smaller, but cleaner and more capable military that would be ready to engage in and win a modern war.

I think most readers know what has happened to the PLA since then, but I can’t help reiterating the changes because I believe they are so and staff officers have been ordered to improve their capabilities in joint operations and the use of information.

The moves indicate that the military has been concentrating its resources to ensure that every component will focus on preparation and winning wars, the observers said.

Modernization

important that they are likely to shape the next 50 years of the Chinese military. The power exerted by the PLA’s four previous top departments was handed over to the Central Military Commission; regional commands were merged and regrouped; new forces were set up; group armies were relocated; and military units stopped providing commercial services to the public, such as providing properties for rental.

For me, the impact of the reform is obvious: Last year, I wrote more stories about live-fire exercises and combatdrills than ever before, and I noticed that every branch of the military repeated the same phrases: “joint operations”, “combat capabilities” and, last but not least, “change”.

In the coming years, the reform will penetrate further into the military’s grassroots units, which will require every member of the PLA to be prepared for greater demands and higher standards.

I am positive that as the reform continues to unfold, a brand newPLA will arise. province, while the Rocket Force has commissioned a new type of strategic ballistic missile.

A sweeping anti-corruption campaign within the military did not ease up last year. According to the information available, at least seven high-ranking officers — including the former political commissar of the PLA Air Force and the former commander of the People’s Armed Police Force — were placed under internal investigation after being accused of corrupt activities.

More than 50 senior officers at the rank of major general or higher — including Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, the former vicechairmen of the Central Military Commission — have been convicted or placed under disciplinary probes since Xi took office in 2012.