China Daily Global Edition (USA)
Baltics lack clear view of initiative
The Belt and Road Initiative as a transcontinental frameworkofcooperation could not be a better platform for collaboration for shared goals. The 16+1 mechanism being a part of that framework should thus extend the focus from individual sites and mutual economic benefits of the stakeholders involved to broader and more useful collaboration.
Possible fields might include international security, environmental issues, the challenges of urbanization, including energy and transportation, communications, sanitation and water supply. The growing urban inequality, poverty and exclusion in fast growing agglomeration, too, needs to be addressed. Better understanding of different cultures seems crucial.
And the future of work and artificial intelligence are another area for serious discussions and solutions.
The establishment of a research network of scientific institutions from Central and Eastern Europe and China is the result of long-term efforts and the work of researchers from the partner institutions. It provides opportunities for scientific and research cooperation, interdisciplinary projects, exchanges of scientists and students.
Also, and perhaps more important, it is a platform for dialogue and collaboration on global issues and joint research projects in fields such as economics, management, medicine, commodity science, construction, geology, electro-mechanics, telecommunications, biology, chemistry and meteorology. This is a first step toward establishing broader cooperation among universities and academic institutions from China and the Central and Eastern European countries.
Academic cooperation is a crucial pillar of the relations between China and CEE countries in the context of theBeltandRoadInitiative.Thereis no better way to build trust and understanding than people-to-people contact. Besides, closer cooperation at the academic level should enable the flow of ideas, values, innovations and innovative thoughts to benefit from synergies, build mutual understanding between nations and to bring regions closer, concentrating on similarities rather than obstacles and impediments, contributing to the wealth of nations, civilization progress and a harmonious global community.
With three Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Serbia and Hungary) raising their cooperation with China to a comprehensive strategic level, the successful hosting of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing in May, and successful Chinese investments in strategic points linking the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (COSCO at Piraeus Port, HBIS at Smederevo steel mill — an intersection of pan-European corridors VII and X), contending strategic remarks from Belt and Road Initiative skeptics came as no surprise.
While such remarks should be worrying for Belt and Road Initiative communicators, their intensity is also a proof of the rising legitimacy of the initiative, particularly in CEE. It is a clear indication of future challenges and hurdles, but also a signal for strengthening the initiative’s resilience, especially in the strategic communication framework.
Serbia is specific — it is militarily neutral and not a European Union member. In May, Serbia established the “National Council for Cooperation with Russia and China”, a channeling and coordinating body for cooperation which allows higher transparency, better coordination between ministries, and faster contact with the administration.
Yet the success of Belgrade-Beijing cooperation lies in closing of the “say-do” gap. It has moved from sketches to implementation. Beyond well-known cases such as the building of the Pupin Bridge in Belgrade, other positive developments include the HBIS-run Smederevo steel mill plant on the Danube becoming Serbia’s largest exporter in July.
The China Communication Construction Company is moving ahead with plans to build the second part of the Belgrade-Adriatic highway, with the first progressing on schedule. Work on the Serbian part of the high-speed railway to Budapest is set to start. And the Belt and Road’s north-south and eastwest connections in Serbia are increasingly visible.
There is no doubt that the European Commission will closely scrutinize Belt and Road-related projects. And yet another factor will put the strength and motivation of the 16+1 (16 CEE countries plus China) mechanism to the test. Will EU members in the CEE support the Belt and Road Initiative strongly enough in the face of potential challenges, legal hurdles in particular, created by the EU? How resilient will be the CEE countries that are also EU members against the pressures exerted by Brussels and, possibly, Washington?
Official rhetorical support for the Belt and Road Initiative is important. But without political will, administrative capacity and foreign policy flexibility, it will have difficulties in meeting the objectives. And precisely these three factors will distinguish the “leaders” from the “laggards”, and contribute to a “multiple-speed” 16+1 mechanism. The author is president of the Center for Strategic Alternatives (Serbia), a founding member of the ChinaCEEC High-Level Academic Platform.
Even though we cannot talk yet about a multispeed 16+1 process, it is obvious that Central and Eastern European countries manifest different degrees of cooperation intensity with China, in accordance with their interests and objectives. There are many determinants of this distinction and most of them are correlated.
By analyzing the lists of implemented measures of the recent guidelines for cooperation between China and CEE, the number of coordinating bodies hosted by each CEE country and the pace of fulfilling the undertaken commitments, one can identify four groups: active participants such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Serbia; ambitious partners such as Romania, Latvia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Macedonia; the followers; and the laggards.
This is due not only to different interests, but also to fundamentals such as the European Union-United States-NATO stance, the “Russia factor”, the “Ukraine factor” and the migration issue. Since the start of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the CEE countries’ positions toward Russia and the US have become clearer.
At the same time the refugee crisis which accompanied the “Arab Spring” induced a more clear-cut position toward the EU institutions and integration process, as demonstrated by the critical attitude of the “Visegrád countries” (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia — all Euroskeptics) toward the EU. In many cases, there were complementary alternatives to the existent partnerships. For instance, Serbia pursues its goal of becoming an EU member but at the same time it is engaged in spurring cooperation with China and Russia.
There are also factors stemming from the EU membership for the 11 CEE countries taking part in the 16+1 mechanism (for instance, rules on state aid, state guarantees and public procurement) as opposed to the relative freedom of the five Balkan states of the 16+1 framework, which are in the EU waiting room. Besides, the companies of the CEE countries still have to understand the “spirit of doing business” in China and vice-versa.
Three main conclusions result from this brief evaluation. First, the heterogeneity of the group does not enable a unitary approach, which means the bilateral format is the main alternative of cooperation between China and the CEE countries, on a “case to case” basis. The 16+1 framework remains in an exploratory phase, even if its objectives have become clear enough through the successive guidelines of cooperation. Second, the economic cooperation might be significantly intensified if the “spirit of doing business” in the partner country/ region is understood. And third, there is no doubt the 16+1 platform clarifies what are the participants’ expectations from cooperation, and also how to overcome barriers, risks and possible misunderstandings in the process of joint actions. The author is a senior researcher at the Romanian Academy, Bucharest.
The 16 + 1 mechanism established in 2012 has produced spectacular results. Today, China’s presence in Central and Eastern Europe is increasingly visible in every respect. Also, business leaders, scientists and artists from the CEE countries are discovering China at high speed. For them, this is a huge market, a source of ideas and a generator of cultural impulses.
This dynamic cooperation should continue, because it is of mutual benefit. It will also help achieve the goals set out in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s concept of “building a community with a shared future for mankind”. The fact that the CEE countries are interested in intensifying cooperation with China is one side of the coin. The other side is that the European Union does not look at it any more favorably.
Until now, the 16 + 1 mechanism has remained a peripheral issue for the EU. But China-CEE relations havestartedcatchingtheEU’sattention. There are two reasons for that.
First, the economies of Western Europe are wary of Chinese companies operating in CEE. As long as such Chinese companies were selling textile products and running restaurants in CEE, it was not a problem for the EU. However, when China began exporting sophisticated products to CEE, which are usually cheaper than Western European products, the EU started considering them as a threat. Also, joint ventures by Chinese investors and CEE governments are creating companies that are ready to compete in Western European markets.
Second, better political relations between China and the CEE countries have made Western European countries change their views about China.Whendefiningarelationship with China, the EU insists on issues such as human rights, media freedom and democratic elections, which often leads to disagreement between Brussels and Beijing. The CEE countries do not have political disagreements with Beijing, or have minimized them.
This, Brussels believes, endangers the implementation of a Common EU Foreign and Security Policy. Germany and France are the most affected countries, because they have invested a lot in the definition of a common EU policy. That’s why we need to think about new strategies and tactics. The author is a researcher at the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.
TheBalticstatesfollow the one-China policy, although occasionally some events cause tension that put their position under doubt. There are four main ports in the Baltics: Klaipda in Lithuania, Riga and Ventspils in Latvia, and Tallinn in Estonia. From 2000 to 2013, the cargo volume in the four ports increased from 97 million metric tons to 132 million tons. At present, the Russia’s Kaliningrad transit via Lithuania, the transit of oil products from Belorussia via Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian ports, and more widely any transit via the three Baltic states are under threat.
Since Russia has developed its own ports in the Baltic Sea and increased the capacity of the railroad network in Leningrad Oblast, the railroads and ports of the Baltic states have lost a considerable volume of the Russian transit. According to Russia’s Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport, the capacity of goods and cargo in the ports of Northwest Russia should increase to 60 million tons by 2020.
An additional cargo of 25 million tons will be rerouted from the ports of the Baltic states. That would mean the Baltic ports will lose about 60 percent of the cargo they have today. Based on previous projections, the Baltic states are actively searching for alternative means of income. One of these is the transit transportation of Chinese, Kazakhstani, Iranian and Belorussian goods.
The transit and logistical potential of the Central and Eastern European countries has so far not been used to its full capacity, especially in terms of the railways and ports of the Baltic states and Poland. The ports of the Baltic states derive their strength from their geographical position — they are a link between Europe and Asia.
As part of the BeltandRoadInitiative and the 16+1 mechanism, China will dispatch its capital, expertise and employees to the Baltic states where at present there is the European Union’s economic domination, US military presence and influence, and which is a geopolitically important region for the United States. The US, like the EU, has a negative attitude toward the 16+1 mechanism.
Considering that investments in the Baltic markets are dominated by Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands and Russia, adding one more player would not be in the interest of the financial sectors of these countries. And for the implementation the Belt and Road projects, the European Commission demands that definite rules be introduced.
The lack of historical conflict between China and Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania means that they can put aside ideological considerations and take a pragmatic view of bilateral relations. But since the Baltic states don’t have a common vision when it comes to the 16+1 mechanism, there is no action plan that would clearly state the aims and objectives in relation to the initiative. The author is associated with Tallinn University, Estonia.