Officials: Taiwan spy network active Mainland students on the island targeted for information, they say

Taiwan’s intelligence agencies have been persuading students from the Chinese mainland studying at universities in Taiwan to provide confidential information to Taiwan’s spy network by offering money, relationships and sex, security authorities said.

The intelligence agencies have been targeting the mainland and recklessly stepping up information collection and infiltration activities for some time, An Fengshan, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said on Sunday.

“Taiwan authorities should immediately stop all espionage targeting the Chinese mainland to prevent further damage to the increasingly complicated cross-Straits relations,” he said.

To prevent such activities, which endanger the development of both cross-Straits relations and national security, mainland security authorities recently launched an operation code-named 2018 Thunder, according to a report by China Central Television.

More than 100 Taiwan-related spy cases have been handled during the operation, including the arrest of a group of spies from Taiwan and their recruits, security authorities said.

Taiwan’s intelligence agencies prefer to target postgraduate or PhD exchange students with majors in politics, economics, science or military technology because of their potential access to key information, security authorities said.

The intelligence agencies An Fengshan, have also planted a large number of agents at universities. They approach students from the mainland and offer money for information.

In a case that was made public over the weekend, an 18-year-old exchange student from the mainland was targeted by a Taiwan spy calling herself Hsu Chia-ying at a party in 2011. She claimed to be a couple of years older than the student and an admirer of his talent.

The pair began to date and the relationship soon turned sexual. Hsu showed great interest in the mainland student’s major, which allowed contact with classified information related to national defense.

Hsu asked the student to report on what he had learned on a daily basis after he returned to the university on the mainland. She also wanted to know details about the laboratories at the university.

As a postgraduate student, the student had the opportunity to take part in projects in key State laboratories. When Hsu demanded more informa- tion, the student became suspicious. He wanted to end the relationship but Hsu objected, sending emails to his family and friends telling them that he had seduced her in Taiwan. Under pressure, the student continued to provide information to Hsu.

Hsu’s activities were discovered by security authorities in 2014. Her real name is Hsu Li-ting and she is actually 16 years older than the student. She is an agent of the Taiwan Military Intelligence Bureau, the authorities said.

The authorities said that, over three years, the student provided Hsu with about 100 pieces of information on science and technology related to national defense and was paid about 45,000 yuan ($6,590).

At the beginning, the Taiwan agents only ask students for nonconfidential information, such as academic documents, an officer of the Beijing State Security Bureau told CCTV, adding that they then offer money and later use the transactions to blackmail the students.

They also encourage the students to become civil servants in suggested posts. Once a student reaches a key position, the agents use blackmail to get more classified information.

Intelligence agents in Taiwan have also been using local foundations that fund students from the Chinese mainland to participate in academic exchange programs as recruitment tools.

Efforts by Taiwan’s intelligence agencies to target young people is an exploitation of the expansion of cross-Straits exchanges, security authorities said, calling the practice extremely vile.

After arriving in Taiwan in 2012, a postgraduate student surnamed Liu and her friend decided to take a tour during the holidays. Chen Hsiao-zi, a Taiwan resident whom she had just met, offered to help them plan the trip and be their tour guide. He also covered some of the costs during the trip.

Chen encouraged Liu to pursue a career as a civil servant or an official on the mainland.

He contacted her after she returned to the mainland, asking her to attend an aviation expo and take some pictures. He said his company would cover the expense and pay her. Liu became suspicious and chose to break off contact.

Security authorities later determined that Chen Hsiao-zi Taiwan authorities should immediately stop all espionage targeting the Chinese mainland.”

spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council is actually Chen Tai-yu, an agent of the Taiwan Military Intelligence Bureau. He had contacted several students from the mainland and tried to recruit students from several universities in Taiwan.

In another case, a university student was invited to an academic forum funded by a foundation in Taiwan in 2014. He was accompanied by Lin Ching-che who claimed to be a volunteer for the foundation.

Lin became friendly with the student after learning that the student’s university had access to classified information on science and technology related to national defense.

After the student returned to the mainland, Lin contacted him and asked him to provide academic Editoriiall>,

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documents on the aerospace industry, which were difficult to find in Taiwan. Lin also told the student that he would be paid for the documents.

The student believed it was a good business, as all the documents had been published and did not contain classified information. He received 15,800 yuan ($2,315) from Lin before he was stopped by security authorities.

The authorities found that Lin’s real name is Lin Chia-fu, who works for the Taiwan Military Intelligence Bureau. He had been posing as a volunteer at the foundation to get in touch with students from the mainland and lure them into spying.