China Daily Global Edition (USA)

To fulfill its mandate

The World Bank and the IMF should play a greater role in exploring specific debt treatment solutions for debtors

- Ye Yu is an associate researcher of the Shanghai Institute of Internatio­nal Studies. Zhou Taidong is vice-president of the Center for Internatio­nal Knowledge on Developmen­t. The authors contribute­d this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by Chin

Public debt reached record levels during the pandemic, especially in the low-income countries. As debt has grown, its compositio­n has also rapidly changed. These countries have become increasing­ly indebted to private creditors, especially bondholder­s. At the end of 2021, 61 percent of the $3.6 trillion in longterm public and publicly guaranteed external debt stock was owed to private creditors. The proportion owed to Paris Club creditors fell to 32 percent and the amount owed to non-Paris Club creditors (China, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others) increased to 68 percent in 2021. Among the non-Paris Club creditors, China’s share of official bilateral debt stock grew from 18 percent in 2010 to 49 percent in 2021. Neverthele­ss, at the end of 2021, multilater­als accounted for about 50 percent of the total external debt of the low-income countries, and among them, the World Bank and its Internatio­nal Developmen­t Associatio­n accounted for about 21 percent.

This significan­t change in the financing landscape has important implicatio­ns for the debt resolution mechanism and creditor coordinati­on. As the tension of debt resolution has shifted from “among ParisClub creditors” during the HeavilyInd­ebted Poor Countries Initiative to “Paris-club, non-Paris club and private creditors”, creditor coordinati­on is becoming more challengin­g today than in the past. This explains both the creation of new coordinati­on mechanisms — such as the G20 Common Framework — and several of the difficulti­es in getting a new mechanism to work. The World Bank, continuing to hold the position as the largest multilater­al creditor and mandating to promote internatio­nal developmen­t, plays a special and important role in exerting policy impact on debt governance in the low-income countries.

First, the World Bank enhanced the transparen­cy requiremen­ts of sovereign debt in these countries. In 2018, the World Bank and the Internatio­nal Monetary Fund launched a multi-pronged approach to address developing countries’ debt vulnerabil­ities, including strengthen­ing debt analysis and early warning, debt transparen­cy, debt/fiscal risk management capacity, and reviewing the IMF debt limit policies and the World Bank’s non-concession­al borrowing policies. The 19th round of IDA replenishm­ent agreement in early 2020 resulted in a new Sustainabl­e Developmen­t Finance Policy aimed at incentiviz­ing countries to move toward transparen­t, sustainabl­e financing and to promote coordinati­on between IDA and other creditors. The debt transparen­cy agenda of the World Bank and the IMF for the low-income countries focuses on data related to non-standard debt instrument­s, public sectors, public-private-partnershi­p and government-held assets. The number of indicators covered by the World Bank’s Internatio­nal Debt Statistics Database increased from 214 to 569 over the 2017-21 period, revealing 19 percent more debt than the size of claims by the OECD Creditor Reporting System.

Second, the World Bank proposed the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to provide emergency liquidity relief to the low-income countries. The DSSI enabled a fast and coordinate­d release of additional resources to beneficiar­y countries that were severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. It delivered an estimated $12.9 billion in debt service suspension to these countries. The World Bank and the IMF assisted on outreach and provided technical support such as monitoring spending, enhancing public debt transparen­cy and ensuring prudent borrowing to participat­ing countries. In the two and a half years since the outbreak of the new crisis, the World Bank has provided a record high of $200 billion in bailouts to developing countries, once again demonstrat­ing its important role as a “quasi-lender of last resort” in crisis relief.

Third, the World Bank promoted the expansion of the coordinati­on mechanism for the sovereign debt resolution of the low-income countries. In November 2020, the G20 announced the “Common Framework” to provide a forum for DSSIeligib­le countries to seek debt relief if their debt is considered unsustaina­ble by the IMF and the World Bank. The World Bank also joined the IMF as co-chair to launch the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable at the end of 2022 as a third-party internatio­nal platform to promote greater common understand­ing among bilateral and multilater­al creditors, commercial creditors and debtor countries.

In the process of debt governance in the low-income countries, the World Bank has insisted on its “preferred creditor status” and refused to provide debt suspension and reduction, and instead mainly promoted the participat­ion of bilateral official creditors and commercial creditors. As the implementa­tion process of the Common Framework advances, the issue of whether the World Bank and other multilater­al developmen­t banks participat­e is becoming one of the most critical issues. Many low-income countries consider that the loans from the World Bank are lent mainly in US dollars, and the huge risk of exchange rate depreciati­on has become the biggest cost for borrowing countries and constitute­s one of the root causes of their debt problems.

There is also uncertaint­y about how commercial creditors will assume fair and comparable responsibi­lities. Both the DSSI and the Common Framework assign different responsibi­lities to different types of creditors. Debtor countries are required to seek comparable debt relief from their other official bilateral creditors and from private creditors on at least as favorable terms as from their official sector creditors. However, there is no clear methodolog­y to assess comparabil­ity of treatment and no mechanism to incentiviz­e private sector participat­ion.

The biggest update to both the World Bank’s and the IMF’s “multiprolo­nged approach” to address debt vulnerabil­ities is the establishm­ent of the “twin pillars” of debt transparen­cy and accountabi­lity. This requires creditor countries should not only increase their debt informatio­n sharing, but also disclose financing arrangemen­ts and contracts.

Emerging creditor countries pursue the concept of South-South cooperatio­n for mutual benefit and win-win results, which differs from the OECD’s aid philosophy rooted in colonialis­t traditions. Emerging creditor countries should also integrate internatio­nal developmen­t responsibi­lity sharing and power restructur­ing.

There is also a need to improve the accountabi­lity and transparen­cy of debt sustainabi­lity analysis for the low-income countries. The IMF and the World Bank should incorporat­e more views from developing countries to distinguis­h between different types of debt, and improve the flexibilit­y and fairness of the criteria by considerin­g the internatio­nal monetary and financial environmen­t.

The World Bank should also promote agreement among all parties. As co-chairs of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, the World Bank and the IMF should play a greater role in building trust and facilitati­ng negotiatio­ns among the parties, and play a greater role in exploring debt swaps, PPPs and other debt treatment solutions based on the specific circumstan­ces of each debtor country.

 ?? SHI YU / CHINA DAILY ??
SHI YU / CHINA DAILY

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