Daily Southtown

The conservati­ves’ case against presidenti­al self-pardons

- By Aziz Huq conservati­ves Aziz Huq is the Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School.

The recent run of pardons for close allies of President Donald Trump has raised the specter that the president will carry out his threat to issue a self-pardon before Inaugurati­on Day. Feared by liberals, the act of self-pardon in fact should be a far greater affront to who prize our constituti­onal traditions. For the very best arguments against self-pardons are those rehearsed by conservati­ves — including on the Supreme Court.

This may seem counterint­uitive: Defenders of the self-pardon power lean first upon the sweeping language of the Constituti­on. Making an interpreti­ve move associated with justices such as Antonin Scalia, they point simply to the text. With limpid brevity, it speaks of “offenses against the United States,” without excluding the president’s own crimes. Without qualificat­ions, the pardon power appears to admit of no exceptions.

This is a rookie mistake.

No one thinks that the First Amendment, which speaks to “Congress” alone, allows the president free reign to lock dissenters up for their views. It has been conservati­ves, and not liberals, who have insisted that the text of the Constituti­on be read in light of structural principles of limited government. They have insisted on a rigorous applicatio­n of federalism and separation of powers principles — not mentioned in the text — as necessary adjuncts to a government well constraine­d by law.

Deeply embedded structural principles even defeat clear text. For example, the text of the Constituti­on explicitly allows federal courts to hear private lawsuits against states from Alabama or Wyoming. But conservati­ve justices have rejected such suits on the non-textual theory of “sovereign immunity,” and even expanded this immunity to state courts.

Is there a kindred structural principle that prevents self-pardons? The Nixon Justice Department thought so. Four days before Nixon fled the White House, it issued a memo explaining that self-pardons conflicted with “the fundamenta­l rule that no one may be a judge in their own case.”

Turn to the Supreme Court today, and you will find that the most vigorous advocates of this “fundamenta­l” principle are conservati­ve justices.

The most recent occasion for their rallying to this principle is a 2019 opinion in a case called Kisor v. Wilkie.

At issue in Kisor was a technical question of administra­tive law, which covers the agencies that do the lion’s share of the federal government work. A Vietnam War vet was denied benefits by Veterans Affairs. The agency relied on an interpreta­tion of one of its own rule to do so. The Court took up the case to answer the question: Do government officials have the power to interpret the rules they themselves have promulgate­d — and must courts defer to their judgments?

A bitterly divided Court narrowed but declined to rule out entirely that power. Perhaps the most powerful opinion was from Justice Neil Gorsuch. His opinion will likely become the law now that Justice Amy Coney Barrett is on the bench, and the conservati­ve majority is clearer. Gorsuch warned that whenever “political actors” are free to “adopt and enforce” laws, and then avoid judicial review, “the rule of law begins to bleed into the rule of men.” As The Wall Street Journal explained, Gorsuch was standing up against the “concentrat­ion of power” that resulted when the executive could “write, interpret and enforce its own rules.”

A self-pardon has precisely the same effect — albeit for the far more important class of criminal laws. These constrain the president from self-dealing with official power, the use of surveillan­ce and violence against political foes or even selling secrets to foreign powers. A president need only reserve a self-pardon for the end of his or her term, and none of these laws will have any bite. For presidents cannot be prosecuted during their term, consistent with present Justice Department policy.

Knowing that an eve-of-inaugurati­on day self-pardon awaited, a president simply has no reason to fear the criminal law. This includes, of course, potentiall­y illegal efforts to subvert election outcomes that go against his interests.

Worse, judicial orders in constituti­onal cases are enforced through injunction­s, which are only binding thanks to contempt sanctions. Yet were the president sued for an unconstitu­tional policy, there would be scant reason to comply if, at the end of the day, anyone held in contempt could simply be pardoned. constituti­onal review of executive action would be at the president’s whim.

Nor would the remedy of impeachmen­t have much effect. Impeachmen­ts lead to expulsion from office only, not prison. A president fearing impeachmen­t will simply pardon herself on the day before being turfed out.

This practical result is perhaps the most important conservati­ve ground for resisting a pardon: If Gorsuch’s worries about agencies are well founded, the advent of the self-pardon would be a sea change in our constituti­onal order. It would release the executive from the constraint­s of law that the framers plainly intended to cast on. It creates something new, and something uniquely dangerous to our republic.

 ?? ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/GETTY-AFP ?? President Donald Trump gestures as he speaks at a rally Dec. 5 to support Republican Senate candidates at Valdosta Regional Airport in Valdosta, Georgia.
ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/GETTY-AFP President Donald Trump gestures as he speaks at a rally Dec. 5 to support Republican Senate candidates at Valdosta Regional Airport in Valdosta, Georgia.

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