Technology

categories where we have export controls, including semiconductors, are down by over 90% since Feb. 24,” she said. “So that is crippling.”

The restrictions halt direct technological exports from the United States and dozens of partner nations to Russia. But they also go beyond traditional wartime sanctions issued by the U.S. government by placing limitations on certain hightech goods that are manufactured anywhere in the world using U.S. machinery, software or blueprints. That means countries that are not in the sanctions coalition with the United States and Europe must also follow the rules or potentially face their own sanctions.

Russia has stopped publishing monthly trade data since the invasion, but customs data from its major trading partners shows that shipments of essential parts and components have fallen sharply. According to

data compiled by Matthew C. Klein, an economics researcher who tracks the effect of the export controls, Russian imports of manufactured goods from nine major economies for which data is available were down by 51% in April compared with the average from September to February.

The restrictions have rendered the old-school bombing runs on tank factories and shipyards of past wars unnecessary, Klein wrote.

“The democracies can replicate the effect of well-targeted bombing runs with the right set of sanctions precisely because the Russian military depends on imported equipment,” he said.

Russia is one of the world's largest arms exporters, especially to India, but its industry relies heavily on imported inputs. In 2018, Russian sources satisfied only about half of the militaryrelated equipment and services the country needed, such as transportation equipment, computers, optical equipment, machinery, fabricated metal and other goods, according to

data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development compiled by Klein.

The remainder of equipment and services used by Russia were imported, with about one-third coming from the United States, Europe, Japan, Taiwan, Australia and other partner governments that imposed sanctions together on Moscow.

U.S. officials say that in concert with a wide variety of other sanctions that ban or discourage commercial relations, the export controls have been highly effective. They have pointed to Russian tank factories that have furloughed workers and struggled with shortages of parts. The U.S. government has also received reports that the Russian military is scrambling to find parts for satellites, avionics and night vision goggles, officials say.

Technology restrictions have harmed other Russian industries as well, U.S. officials say. Equipment for the oil and gas industry has been degraded; maintenance for tractors and heavy equipment made by Caterpillar

and John Deere has halted; and up to 70% of the commercial airplanes operated by Russian airlines, which no longer receive spare parts and maintenance from Airbus and Boeing, are grounded, officials say.

But some experts have sounded notes of caution. Michael Kofman, director of Russia studies at CNA, a research institute in Arlington, Virginia, voiced skepticism about some claims that the export controls were forcing some tank factories and other defense companies in Russia to shutter.

“There's not been much evidence to substantiate reports of problems in Russia's defense sector,” he said. It was still too early in the war to expect meaningful supply-chain problems in Russia's defense industry, he said, and the sourcing for those early claims was unclear.

Maria Snegovaya, a visiting scholar at George Washington University who has studied sanctions on Russia, said that the lack of critical technologies and maintenance was likely to start being felt widely across Russian

industry in the fall, as companies run out of parts and supplies or need upkeep on equipment. She and other analysts said that even the production of daily goods such as printer paper would be affected; Russian companies had bought the dye to turn the paper white from Western companies.

“We expect random disruptions in Russia's production chains to manifest themselves more frequently,” Snegovaya said. “The question is: Are Russian companies able to find substitutes?”

U.S. officials say the Russian government and companies there have been looking for ways to get around the controls but have so far been largely unsuccessful. The Biden administration has threatened to penalize any company that helps Russia evade sanctions by cutting it off from access to U.S. technology.

In an interview last month, Raimondo said the United States was not seeing any systematic circumvention of the export controls by any country, including China, which aligned itself with Russia before and during

the invasion of Ukraine. Companies were making independent decisions not to engage with Russia, despite the country “trying very hard to get around” the global coalition of allies that had imposed export controls, Raimondo said.

“The world knows just how very serious we are, and our allies are, about prosecuting any violation,” she said. “There will be real consequences for any companies or countries that do try to get around the export controls.”

Chinese trade data also suggests that most companies are following the restrictions. Although China has continued to buy Russian energy, Chinese exports to the country have fallen sharply since the invasion.

But Spleeters said Russia's military had used creative methods to get around past restrictions on technology imports — such as buying foreign products by way of front companies, third countries or civil distributors — and could turn to the same methods to circumvent sanctions.