11th Circuit: Big Tech Not Liable for Role in 2016 Pulse Nightclub Shooting
A federal appeals court in Atlanta has upheld a decision finding social media companies aren’t liable in the 2016 Pulse nightclub mass shooting for giving the shooter access to ISIS propaganda found to have inspired the attack.
In a 31-page decision issued on September 29, a three-judge panel on the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the trio of
Big Tech companies named in the case — Twitter, Facebook and Google — can’t be sued for their role in the shooting despite arguments they illegally aided and abetted the shooter under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
“We are deeply saddened by the deaths and injuries caused by Mr. Mateen’s rampage, but we agree with the district court that the plaintiffs failed to make out a plausible claim that the Pulse massacre was an act of ‘international terrorism’ as that term is defined in the ATA,” the decision says. “And without such an act of ‘international terrorism,’ the social media companies—no matter what we may think of their alleged conduct—cannot be liable for aiding and abetting under the ATA.”
The shooter, Omar Mateen, had declared allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS and a designated foreign terrorist organization, which later claimed responsibility. Upon review after the attack, Mateen was found to have used Facebook to write posts and make searches about ISIS — and was even found to have been searching for ISIS content as he was perpetuating the assault.
The survivors and estates of the victims making up the 62 plaintiffs in the case argued the social media companies were liable under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which make criminal aiding and abetting in a terrorist attack.
But, as the 11th Circuit points out, ISIS, despite claiming responsibility for the attack, was never found to have engaged in planning the massacre, or was even aware of his plans, therefore not liable under the Anti-Terrorism
Act. Instead, the court finds Mateen was “selfradicalized,” making a distinction between his attack and an act of international terrorism as defined under the law.