Why a stout theological creed won’t save evangelical chruches
It’s time to bury the myth that liberal theology is causing the decline of mainline churches in America — and with it, the twin falsehood that because of their conservative creed evangelicals will own Christianity’s future.
For many years now, it’s been treated as common knowledge in some circles that the liberal beliefs of mainline churches have been the instruments of their decline. As the story goes, if you want to know why the Episcopalians, Lutherans and others have suffered precipitous drops in members since the 1960s, you need look no further than their acceptance of society’s changing sexual mores and women’s equality.
Conservative churches and their strict, unbending doctrine, we’re told, are why they have held onto, and have even grown, their numbers.
How different the picture looks in this fractious summer of 2016.
As Robert P. Jones documents in his important new book, “The End of White Christian America,” white evangelicals also are shrinking now when measured as a proportion of the population.
The Southern Baptists have reported membership declines nine years in a row. Overall, white evangelicals have dropped from 21 percent of the population in 2008 to 17 percent in 2015.
It’s important to count white evangelicals as separate from black evangelicals, as is Jones’ practice, because the groups are different politically and culturally.
And don’t expect white evangelicals’ numbers to shoot back up in the coming years. Their strength appears especially anemic among young adults, as evidenced by the fact that only 10 percent of Americans under 30 are white and evangelical. That’s the same figure, by the way, as for white mainline Protestants.
“The numbers point to one conclusion: white Protestant Christians — both mainline and evangelical — are aging and quickly losing ground as a proportion of the population,” writes Jones.
In view of the data, one might conclude that churches that reject the revolution also are unnecessary, at least in the minds of the younger Americans who hold the key to churches’ fates.
Can’t conservative theology at least be credited with staving off evangelical decline for a while? Probably not, Jones says. More likely, demographic factors such as birthrates were the main reasons for evangelical strength through the ’90s. Evangelicals were having more children than people in United Methodist and United Church of Christ churches and other mainline congregations.
White evangelicals have since become more upwardly mobile; more evangelical women have entered the workforce, and family sizes have tapered off.
Those who feel competitive with conservative Christians might be tempted to savor the moment. But as Jones is quick to note, this is no time for dancing on anticipated graves. If you’re a mainliner, what is there to celebrate? A shared grim experience?
A victory shout might seem more in order for religiously unaffiliated Americans, who have surged to the point where they are now close to a quarter of the population and outnumber every religious category. But here, too, restraint is warranted.
As for evangelicals themselves, it’s time to stop touting the superiority of their theology. If they need evidence for the beauty and truth of their doctrine, church membership numbers are no longer the place to look.
They never were.