Fort Hood’s investigators lacked skills, panel finds
The head of an independent team assigned to unravel the root cause behind systemic violence and sexual assaults plaguing Fort Hood has told lawmakers that the agents assigned to solve crimes on the post have for years lacked the experience and leadership to properly respond.
Christopher Swecker is a lawyer and 24-year veteran of the FBI who last year led the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee that investigated the post in the wake of 20-year-old Spc. Vanessa Guillén’s slaying. He testified Tuesday in the presence of top military leaders about his team’s findings.
Swecker said that during his team’s investigation, he learned the majority of Fort Hood’s Criminal Investigation Command was made up of apprentice agents with less than three years of experience who operated without much, if any, expert oversight.
As a result, the slew of criminal investigations at Fort Hood often went incomplete and paperwork proving that agents questioned potential suspects went undone. In addition, Swecker said, it appeared agents took a checklist approach to investigations, failed to use forensics to solve crimes and let expire phone-tracking programs used in investigating crimes or searching for missing soldiers.
“I wouldn’t lay the blame on the individual special agents, it’s more the system,” Swecker said, ex
plaining that Fort Hood agents who have any level of experience often leave the Central Texas training post for better advancement opportunities.
“They themselves are victims of a system,” he added, referring to the agents.
Swecker said Fort Hood’s investigation division was also severely understaffed. He said that for about two years leading up to Guillén’s death, which ultimately sparked investigations into the post, Fort Hood’s division was on average about 60 percent understaffed.
“In essence, we found that it was a training ground,” Swecker said. “There were simply too few journeyman-level agents to work the complex sex crimes cases, death cases, while still mentoring the large number of inexperienced and uncredentialed special agents who were constantly transferred in and out.”
Swecker’s statements to lawmakers Tuesday appeared damning because it could explain why it took Army leaders months to use forensics testing to find blood residue in the weapons room on the post where Guillén was last seen.
Authorities now believe a fellow Fort Hood soldier, Spc. Aaron David Robinson, killed Guillén with a hammer in that post armory on April 22. He remained working on post until July 1, when, local police say, he took his own life as they tried to detain him for questioning after the Houston woman’s dismembered remains were found near Leon River in Bell County.
Killeen police say they do not need to release body camera footage to the public, citing laws that allow video to be withheld if a suspect dies and therefore cannot be convicted of a crime.
Swecker’s testimony about the lack of experienced Fort Hood agents also could explain why it took investigators several weeks to find text messages and track Guillén’s phone, placing Robinson with Guillén just seconds before she was last seen on the post.
Maj. Gen. Donna Martin, commanding general of the U.S Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, was also called to testify to lawmakers.
Martin said the U.S. Army last year accepted the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee’s findings in full and that she was actively working to modernize the program and address its shortcomings.
Martin said those actions included a female mentorship program, another program to train soldiers to help recognize and prevent sexual assaults, and several other improvements to support crime prevention and enhance communication between military and local law enforcement.
“We can and we will do better,” Martin said Tuesday. “Since the report was released, Fort Hood has taken immediate actions on several of Fort Hood Independent Review Committee’s recommendations.
“I do not take this report lightly,” she continued. “Reforming CID is my top priority. I acknowledge the necessity of the task ahead.”
However, Rep. Jackie Speier, DCalif., said she was disappointed with Martin’s approach so far in responding to the findings of the Fort Hood investigation.
“I must tell you, I’m truly disappointed that is the extent of what you have gleaned from the report,” Speier said, contradicting Martin’s statements that Fort Hood’s investigators and Killeen police work together to solve violent crimes.
Speier said Killeen police, during the time of the Fort Hood investigation last summer, requested the two agencies work better together to solve crimes but received no response from Fort Hood.
At the start of the Guillén investigation, the Austin AmericanStatesman was repeatedly told by Fort Hood’s investigators and Killeen police each that the other agency was investigating her disappearance.
Guillén’s mother and sisters also expressed similar frustrations with the lack of communication among military and civilian authorities at and around the Central Texas post.
“I’m happy to report that that is being addressed currently,” Martin said about the lack of collaboration.
Army leaders on Tuesday also answered questions from lawmakers about how Fort Hood was now handling cases involving sex crimes.
Lawmakers asked Martin how many backlogged cases of sexual assault had yet to be properly investigated at Fort Hood, but Martin said she did not have that data on hand.
“Women who I have been hearing from feel like inaction is a signal, it’s a signal that their leadership doesn’t care,” said Rep. Veronica Escobar, D-Texas.
Investigators with the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee said leaders of the Fort Hood Sexual Assault and Harassments Program, or SHARP, told them that 3 out of 4 female soldiers between the ages of 18 and 32 are sexually assaulted or harassed within eight months of being stationed on the post.
“It was almost an initiation to be sexually assaulted or sexually harassed,” said Mary Counts, former FBI supervisory special agent who also investigated Fort Hood. “That was unbelievable to me. One, that this was happening, but two that this was known to people in the program that are supposed to prevent this kind of behavior.”
Investigators said it appeared the SHARP program failed to protect soldiers dating back as far as 2013.