Question lingers after ambush: What were we doing in Niger?
As the mystery deepens about the deaths of four U.S. soldiers in an ambush by extremists in Niger, President Donald Trump has disavowed responsibility and put the onus on the military. It’s the same sort of cowardly dodge he attempted when a member of the U.S. Navy SEALS died in a botched raid in Yemen in January.
It won’t wash. Like his predecessors — presidents who were strong enough to actually acknowledge their heavy responsibility — Trump is commander in chief, in charge of putting the armed forces in harm’s way. Ultimately he and his Pentagon will have to provide a full accounting not only of the operation but also of how it fits into a broader strategy for countering terrorists in Africa.
In the past four years, the U.S. military has expanded its presence on the continent to train local forces and help them battle extremists so that the United States could avoid larger deployments. The Pentagon is further intensifying that focus as the Islamic State seeks new havens after being routed from Syria and Iraq.
One of the largest concentrations of U.S. forces in Africa is in Niger, a hub for regional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations. It is home to 800 to 1,000 U.S. troops.
For the first 12 days after the attack there on Oct. 4, Trump was silent. When he finally spoke, in answer to a reporter’s question, he started an unseemly public argument with the widow of one of the victims, Sgt. La David Johnson. Now, as contradictory accounts about elements of the ambush are trickling out, frustrated members of Congress are demanding answers about how a shadowy mission in a remote region of Africa ended so calamitously.
In the current telling, the U.S. soldiers — a 12-member Army Special Forces team — were patrolling with 30 troops from Niger when the ambush took place. The Americans immediately told commanders they were under attack, then called for help an hour later. That prompted the dispatch of Niger ground forces and French Mirage jets, which
Sen. John Mccain, who heads the Senate Armed Services Committee, and other senators are complaining that the Pentagon has not fully informed Congress about what it’s doing in Africa.
arrived about two hours later, as the fighting was tapering off. But the rescue units did not retrieve all 12 Americans, inexplicably leaving four behind, out of radio contact. They were initially considered missing in action by the Pentagon, which suggests that they may have been alive when the helicopters left without them.
While the bodies of three dead Americans and the team’s Nigerian interpreter were found hours later, it took two more days for U.S., French and Nigerian troops to find the body of the fourth soldier, Johnson, in woods near the ambush site.
Pentagon officials said the operation was similar to dozens of train-and-assist reconnaissance missions, in which contact with enemy forces was considered unlikely. U.S. forces in Niger operate under strict rules that forbid them to go on missions that could involve enemy encounters. Some news reports, however, suggested that the soldiers were part of a larger mission to track down a suspected militant leader.
This raises many questions: Was the mission changed after the Green Berets left their operating base? Were they given bad intelligence or did they misinterpret what they were told? Why did the soldiers wait so long to call for help? Why did it take so long to locate the body of Johnson? The location of the ambush was “inherently dangerous,” Gen. Joseph Dunford Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters this week.
That so many questions have been raised and left unanswered raises yet another serious question: What exactly is the true mission of U.S. troops in Africa?
U.S. officials say their troops have a light footprint in Niger, but experts say local populations often view the foreign military presence in Africa — France has an even bigger operation — as heavy-handed, provoking a backlash against local and Western governments.
Congress has funded advise-and-assist missions since before the Africa command was established in 2008, as al-qaida and other extremist groups spread into northern Africa. Under threat, Niger welcomed such assistance and is a major recipient of counterterrorism assistance in Africa.
Still, Sen. John Mccain, R-ariz., who heads the Senate Armed Services Committee, and other senators are complaining that the Pentagon has not fully informed Congress about what it’s doing in Africa. He recently threatened to subpoena Pentagon officials about the Niger fiasco, before Defense Secretary Jim Mattis agreed to meet with him.
While the Pentagon has described the Niger operation as a noncombat, train-andassist mission, it needs to explain whether Trump’s decision to loosen the rules on counterterrorism operations, giving more decision-making authority to lower-level officers, changed the nature of engagement and put more troops at risk. The president himself has shown little interest in Africa.
The lack of clarity about the Niger operation is one more reason for Congress to replace the 2001 law authorizing military force against al-qaida with legislation to address current threats, such as the Islamic State; limit U.S. interventions; and ensure regular congressional oversight. After dragging its feet, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee finally scheduled a hearing on it, which was held Monday.