Little has changed on the Korean Peninsula

TSeoul he most obvious lesson of the Singapore summit is that “complete denuclearization” is mission impossible. North Korea has not done a thing to make it happen. The North Koreans clearly have a very different view of “denuclearization” from that of President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. They claim they have shown good faith by blowing up the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, and they are attaching demands to make sure North Korea remains a nuclear power, as enshrined in the country’s constitution.

It was to appease the North Koreans, to make a show of understanding, to promote the dream of inter-korean reconciliation that the United States and South Korea canceled the annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian military exercises that were to have been staged in August. They were conducted mainly on computers in which American and South Korean commanders and their subordinates honed their skills at working closely with each other.

Cancellation of war games that were to have lasted only two weeks may not matter that much in the defense of the South, but what about subsequent exercises, including Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, last held after the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics? If the North Koreans still fail to show serious signs of getting rid of their nukes and missiles, and the facilities with which to make them, will those exercises happen as scheduled or will they too be canceled in the vain hope that this time, maybe this time, the North Koreans will follow through on Kim’s stated “willingness” to give up his nuclear program?

That’s a critical question at the opening of a new act in the great Korean drama in which the expression “the more things change, the more they stay the same” could not be more relevant. In this act, we see the return of China to center stage. The Chinese, always viewed with suspicion, resentment, fear and bitterness by the North Koreans, are now ingratiating themselves to the North to a degree not seen since Chinese troops rescued their regime from annihilation by the Americans and South Koreans in the Korean War.

President Xi Jinping, having spurned Kim Jong Un for more than six years, has now seen Kim three times. The fact that Kim was accompanied by his wife on visits to Beijing shows the sense of warmth and family that Xi wanted to inculcate in a state seen by China as very much a satellite, a supplicant, a dependency surviving on Chinese largesse, notably oil.

China, which does huge business with South Korea, would no doubt like Kim to refrain from upsetting the Americans and South Koreans with nuclear and missile tests, but China will not do much to get Kim to surrender his vaunted nuclear program. At the same time, you can bet that Kim will order his media to attack the Americans and South Koreans at the least sign of resumption of war games.

That’s not to say Trump was wrong to meet Kim and sign a pro forma statement promising nothing. Nor was Trump necessarily mistaken in flattering Kim by describing him as an “honorable” man who “loves his people.” If such honeyed words are of any use in winning Kim’s cooperation, why not?

But seriously, cancellation of Ulchi Freedom Guardian has grave implications for the defense of South Korea. “One time is not a big thing,” says Steve Tharp, a retired U.S. Army officer with many years of experience focusing on North Korean issues. He warns, however, that permanent cancellation of exercises will definitely compromise South Korean forces and the Americans here to support them.

“Eventually, the skills are going to start degrading. Over time, it will have a bigger effect.” In pursuit of reconciliation, the United States and South Korea cannot let that happen while North Korea does nothing to live up to its side of the deal — if indeed there was really any deal at all.