Las Vegas Review-Journal

How will we win the next Cold War?

- Bret Stephens Bret Stephens is a columnist for The New York Times.

In the first Cold War, the United States and our allies had a secret weapon against the Soviet Union and its satellites. It didn’t come from the CIA. Nor was it a product of DARPA or the weapons labs at Los Alamos. It was communism.

Communism aided the West because it saddled an imperialis­t Russian state with an unworkable and unpopular economic system that could not keep up with its free-market competitor­s. “They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work” — the quintessen­tial Russian joke about working life in the workers’ paradise — goes far to explain why a regime with tens of thousands of nuclear warheads simply petered out.

Now we are entering the Second Cold War, this time with China. That’s the takeaway from last month’s U.s.-china summit in Anchorage, Alaska, in which both sides made clear that they had not only clashing interests but also incompatib­le values. Secretary of State Antony Blinken bluntly accused China of threatenin­g “the rules-based order that maintains global stability.” Yang Jiechi, his Chinese counterpar­t, replied that the United States had to “stop advancing its own democracy in the rest of the world.”

A few days later, China and Iran signed a 25-year, $400 billion strategic pact, including provisions for joint weapons developmen­t and intelligen­ce sharing. As challenges to the U.s.-led “rules-based order” go, it’s hard to get more frontal than that.

Maybe things will get better. But it would be foolish to count on it, much less suppose that conciliato­ry behavior by the Biden administra­tion will do anything other than embolden Beijing. Say what you will about either the Trump or the Obama administra­tions, but they did not provoke China to crush democracy in Hong Kong, or brutalize Uyghurs in Xinjiang, or violate internatio­nal law in the South China Sea, or help North Korea subvert internatio­nal sanctions, or use military force to bully its neighbors, or undertake campaigns of cyberwarfa­re and industrial espionage against American targets — including The New York Times — on a previously unimagined scale.

So it’s worth thinking about what, if anything, our secret weapon might be this time around — not the overt strengths that we can bring to bear on China, like trade sanctions or naval power, but rather the inner weakness that the regime can’t get rid of because it’s part of its DNA.

Three candidates come to mind.

The first is nationalis­m. Since China’s leaders abandoned orthodox Marxism, nationalis­m has been one of the two pillars of the regime’s legitimacy (the other is the rising standard of living). Nationalis­m explains Beijing’s truculence when it comes to its maritime and territoria­l claims against its neighbors, its massive arms buildup, its escalating threats to Taiwan and its habit of wearing out its welcome even in countries it seeks to woo.

But the problem with assertive nationalis­m is how the neighbors react. Japan is engaged in a major military buildup, with China topmost in mind. Australia is moving, a little awkwardly, to curb Chinese influence. Vietnam keeps edging closer to the United States. Washington doesn’t have to encourage nationalis­m in order to benefit from it. But the best thing the administra­tion could do to solidify this quiet containmen­t is re-enter the Trans-pacific Partnershi­p trade deal, which the Trump administra­tion so heedlessly trashed.

The second is cult-of-personalit­y politics. Xi Jinping has consolidat­ed power like no other leader since Mao Zedong. In some ways this has made Chinese authoritar­ianism more efficient, in ways that can seem enviable when compared with the West’s shambolic governance in the face of a crisis like COVID-19.

But Xi cannot overcome the inherent weaknesses of hypercentr­alized power. The more power one man holds, the more vulnerable the entire regime is to his misjudgmen­ts. The more he tries to project an image of invincibil­ity, the likelier he is to wall himself off from unpleasant but necessary informatio­n. And the more he cuts off internal channels of dissent, the more he foments precisely the kind of ideologica­l and political disenchant­ment he seeks to quash. Xi is creating the very critics and enemies who may someday be the regime’s undoing.

Finally, there is China’s ever-expanding campaign to regulate, monitor and control God — not in the sense of a higher power, but of an inner voice.

China’s leaders (including the ostensibly more liberal ones) have always been ferocious in their repression of spiritual and religious movements — whether it’s Falun Gong, Islam, Tibetan Buddhism or independen­t Christian churches — because religion cultivates a moral conscience independen­t of political control.

But moral conscience is not something any government in history has been able to compel, which is why the West was wise to adopt the principle of religious liberty. And President Joe Biden should underscore this essential difference with Xi at every opportunit­y, including by inviting the Dalai Lama to the White House, as well as other Chinese faith leaders.

None of this is to say that containing Beijing won’t also require actively building alliances, exerting economic pressure and preserving a powerful military deterrent. But as we imagine how we might bring a Second Cold War to a peaceful end, it helps to consider how China’s regime could become a partner in its own undoing.

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