Yucca Mountain licensing is a waste of time and money

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy applied to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a license to construct a geologic repository for the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste (including spent nuclear fuel) at Yucca Mountain. The application hearing process has been idle since Sept. 30, 2011.

Proponents of the project repeatedly call for resuming and finishing the suspended licensing proceeding. One former Energy official opined in December 2021: “The remaining costs of concluding these hearings and getting a final (commission) decision on the adequacy of Yucca Mountain as the nation’s high-level waste repository are minuscule when compared to the sunk costs already incurred and the costs of starting over.” But sunk costs are economically irrelevant — they are gone and cannot be recovered. The relevant question is how much it would cost going forward to complete the licensing proceeding and issue a decision on the application. And, it turns out, these costs are not minuscule by any measure.

More than a year before submitting the license application, the Energy Department already expected a long and costly licensing proceeding. In May 2007, it estimated it would need $2.9 billion (adjusted to 2023 dollars) for “all activities associated with the licensing process,” over the period 2007-2017, or about $290 million per year. In 2016, the commission estimated it would need about $418 million (in 2023 dollars) in addition to Energy’s costs. Even if the estimated licensing costs are reduced to reflect funds spent before the Obama administration terminated work on Yucca Mountain, the cost of completing the licensing proceeding would likely be at least $2.4 billion and probably exceed $3 billion (again, in 2023 dollars).

Further, the department’s 2007 cost estimate was calculated before May 2009 when the commission’s licensing boards admitted nearly 300 contentions (challenges) for adjudication in the hearing. This was (and still is) an unprecedented number, marking the Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding as the most complex and resource-intensive one in the commission’s history.

One hundred ninety-four Nevada contentions raised significant questions on whether the application complied with safety regulations. The NRC found all to be well supported by facts and qualified expert opinions. They range from scientific errors in the total systems performance assessment (the model used to calculate radioactive dose to the public) to programmatic issues such as inadequate quality assurance. A “win” on any one of these safety contentions will lead the commission to deny the license application.

The U.S. already has more spent nuclear fuel (approximately 92,000 tons) than Yucca Mountain can legally contain (70,000 tons). So, it is not as though licensing Yucca Mountain would solve the high-level radioactive waste disposal problem.

Walking away from Yucca Mountain offers important advantages: n $2.4 billion or more will be saved. n Ending the program would allow agencies to search for an acceptable alternative using consent-based siting — the approach successfully used in Finland, France, Sweden and other countries.

The Yucca Mountain site itself is so n flawed that restarting the licensing process would be a serious, distracting waste of time and resources. Walking away would save time and resources.

For our nation to make progress disposing of its nuclear waste, it is time to walk away from failure and try something new.