Lodi News-Sentinel

Why is the Bill of Rights so significan­t?

- JACK RAKOVE Jack Rakove is the William Robertson Coe professor of history and American studies at Stanford University and the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning “Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constituti­on.”

Every clause in the Bill of Rights has its own history, and each of those histories has two main parts. We need one story about the origins of particular rights, and another about their modern judicial interpreta­tion.

Tracing the origins of all these rights involves a set of laborious forays into legal history that pay special attention to the developmen­t of English common law and its American adaptation­s. Understand­ing the current and oft-changing interpreta­tion of the rights identified in the first eight amendments to the Constituti­on similarly requires mastering a vast corpus of judicial decisions and their scholarly interpreta­tions. Legions of law professors ply this trade, with a raft of law reviews ready to market their products.

But the very idea of having a bill of rights also has its own history. Today, many Americans remain ignorant or confused about which rights are actually cited in the Bill of Rights. And when pollsters ask them whether specific rights really should be protected, a depressing portion of Americans appear to have a low opinion of its actual contents.

But there is one thing we all know: If a specific right has been infringed, the Bill of Rights gives us the authority to litigate our claims. For every right there must be a remedy, and the most obvious remedy is to find a lawyer or an agency like the ACLU and go to court.

That idea dominates modern thinking about the implementa­tion of a bill of rights. But it was actually something of a novelty to its framers, most notably including James Madison, the leading author of our first constituti­onal amendments. When the American revolution­aries first drafted bills of rights in 1776, the year of independen­ce, they had other ends in view. But over the course of the next decade, they began to reconceive the constituti­onal “work” that bills of rights could actually do.

As Americans began moving toward independen­ce, they realized that they would need to write new constituti­ons of government to replace the old colonial charters. By 1780, 11 states had done this, and eight of these states wrote declaratio­ns of rights as part of this process. In six states, these declaratio­ns were companion documents enacted in conjunctio­n with the process of creating new government­s. In only two states — Pennsylvan­ia (1776) and Massachuse­tts (1780) — were the declaratio­ns of rights inserted in the text of the Constituti­on.

In the revolution­ary context of 1776, declaratio­ns of rights were not regarded as legal commands that government­s were obligated to enforce. Instead they stated general principles of republican governance that Americans were morally obliged to follow. The operative verb of these declaratio­ns was “ought,” not “shall.”

A decade later, when the movement that led to the great Constituti­onal Convention of 1787 was getting underway, some Americans began thinking of declaratio­ns (or bills) of rights in more advanced terms. By then, Americans had worked out a better basis for distinguis­hing the authority of a constituti­on as supreme law from the lesser authority of ordinary legislatio­n. A constituti­on, to be fully constituti­onal, had to be framed by a special convention elected for that purpose alone, and then ratified by some direct expression of the sovereignt­y of the people.

The same considerat­ion applied to bills of rights.

Before 1776, Americans believed the rights they claimed or enjoyed had multiple sources. There were natural rights, English common law rights their ancestors had carried with them, rights created by the very acts of colonizati­on, rights affirmed by colonial charters, and rights that could be establishe­d by a legislativ­e act, as in Thomas Jefferson’s celebrated Statute of Religious Freedom for Virginia.

But by the late 1780s, the idea of affirming the supreme authority of a bill of rights by entrenchin­g it in the text of a constituti­on presented a more attractive alternativ­e. Instead of appealing in complicate­d ways to multiple sources, Americans would have one commanding text to invoke, enacted through a special process that would make it supreme law. And that text would operate as a legal command, as the opening phrase of the First Amendment reminds us: “Congress shall make no law.”

That was the understand­ing Madison acted on in 1789, when he persuaded the First Congress that it was indeed duty-bound to propose a bill of rights. But Madison’s thinking about the protection of rights had other radical dimensions.

Before 1776, Americans would have said that the real purpose of a bill of rights was to protect the people as a whole against the concentrat­ed power of the monarchy. Madison instead came to believe that the real purpose was to protect minorities and individual­s against the dominant powers of the majority.

Before 1776, Americans would have said that the legislatur­e and the jury were the best institutio­ns for protecting rights. Madison instead concluded that the legislatur­e was the most dangerous institutio­n precisely because it derived its power from the support of popular majorities.

These were momentous developmen­ts, and unless we know this history, we will not understand the true significan­ce of the Bill of Rights.

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