A Jan. 6 timeline of chaos, pleas for help
Pentagon’s account of attack on U.S. Capitol reveals clashing plans and lack of leadership.
WASHINGTON — From a secure room in the Capitol on Jan. 6, as rioters pummeled police and vandalized the building, Vice President Mike Pence tried to assert control. In an urgent phone call to the acting Defense secretary, he issued a startling demand.
“Clear the Pence said.
Elsewhere in the building, Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (DN.Y.) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco) were making a similarly dire appeal to military leaders.
“We need help,” Schumer said in desperation, over an hour after the Senate chamber had been breached.
At the Pentagon, officials were discussing media reports that the mayhem was not confined to Washington and that other state capitals were facing similar violence in what had the makings of a national insurrection.
“We must establish order,” said Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a call with Pentagon leaders.
But order would not be restored for hours.
These new details from the deadly riot during the congressional certification of Joe Biden’s presidential election victory are contained in a previously undisclosed document prepared by the Pentagon for internal use; it was obtained by the Associated Press and vetted by current and former government officials.
The timeline adds another layer of understanding about the state of fear and
Capitol,”
panic while the insurrection played out, and lays bare the inaction by then-President Trump and how that void of leadership contributed to slowing the response by the military and law enforcement. It shows that intelligence missteps, tactical errors and bureaucratic delays were eclipsed by the government’s failure to grasp the scale and intensity of a violent uprising by its own citizens.
With Trump disengaged, it fell to Pentagon officials, a few senior White House aides, congressional leaders and the vice president, holed up in a secure bunker, to manage the chaos.
At 4:08 p.m. that day, as the rioters roamed the Capitol, and after they had menacingly called out for Pelosi and yelled for Pence to be hanged, the vice president
was calling acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller from the bunker and demanding answers.
In the one-minute call, Pence said the Capitol was not secure and asked military leaders for a deadline for securing the building, according to the document.
Government leaders had discussed using the National Guard just three days earlier. On the afternoon of Jan. 3, Miller and Milley gathered with other Cabinet members to talk about Jan. 6. They also met with Trump.
In that meeting, Trump approved the activation of the Washington, D.C., National Guard and told Miller to take whatever action was needed as events unfolded, according to the information obtained by the AP.
The Guard’s role was
limited to working traffic intersections and checkpoints around the city, based in part on D.C. officials’ restrictions. Miller also authorized Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy to deploy the D.C. Guard’s emergency reaction force from Joint Base Andrews if necessary.
The Trump administration and the Pentagon were wary of a heavy military presence, in part because of criticism over National Guard and law enforcement’s sometimes heavyhanded efforts to counter unrest after the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis in May.
On the morning of Jan. 6, crowds started gathering at the Ellipse near the White House before Trump’s speech. According to the Pentagon’s plans, acting Defense Secretary Miller
would be notified only if the crowd swelled beyond 20,000 people.
Before long, it was clear the crowd was far more in control of events than the troops and law enforcement there to maintain order.
Trump, just before noon, told supporters at the rally of at least 10,000 people to march to the Capitol. By 1:15 p.m., they were on the move.
As the mob reached the Capitol grounds, some immediately became violent, busting through weak police barriers and beating up Capitol Police officers who stood in their way.
At 1:49 p.m., then-Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund called Maj. Gen. William Walker, commanding general of the D.C. National Guard, to request assistance.
Around 2:10 p.m., the first rioters were beginning to break through the doors and windows on the Senate side of the Capitol.
Sund called Walker again and asked for at least 200 guardsmen, or “more if they are available.”
Inside the Pentagon, senior Army leaders were huddled around the phone for what they described as a “panicked” call from the D.C. Guard. As the gravity of the situation became clear, McCarthy bolted from the meeting, sprinted down the hall to Miller’s office and interrupted a meeting.
Shortly after 3 p.m., the Army secretary gave “verbal approval” to activate 1,100 Guard troops to support the police, and to develop a plan for their deployment.
Over the next 90 minutes there was a struggle to execute that plan as the Army and Guard called all troops in from their checkpoints, issued them new gear, laid out a new plan for their mission and briefed them on their duties.
At 3:19 p.m., Pelosi and Schumer were calling the Pentagon for help and were told the National Guard had been approved.
At 3:48 p.m., frustrated that the D.C. Guard hadn’t fully developed a plan to link up with police, McCarthy dashed from the Pentagon to D.C. police headquarters to help coordinate with law enforcement.
Trump broke his silence at 4:17 p.m., tweeting to his followers to “go home and go in peace.”
By about 4:30 p.m., the military’s response plan was finalized, and Walker had approval to send the Guard to the Capitol.
Dressed in full riot gear, the Guard began arriving at the Capitol at 5:20 p.m.
At 8 p.m. the Capitol was declared secure.