Los Angeles Times

The GOP’s lurch to the right

- RONALD BROWNSTEIN Ronald Brownstein is a senior writer at the National Journal. rbrownstei­n@nationaljo­urnal.com

It was 19 years ago this week that Bob Dole, as the recently chosen 1996 Republican presidenti­al nominee, faced the same question that Donald Trump has presented his rivals today: whether to support ending the Constituti­on’s guarantee of automatic citizenshi­p for all children born in the United States.

At the national convention that nominated Dole and Jack Kemp for the ticket, the party’s platform called for revoking the provision in the 14th Amendment that ensured citizenshi­p for all U.S.-born children, regardless of their parents’ immigratio­n status.

Dole had remained vague on that plank during the convention. But in an appearance before the National Assn. of Black Journalist­s on Aug. 23, a reporter asked him about it: “For generation­s, white children of white immigrants, regardless of their status, enjoyed citizenshi­p. Now that the new immigrants are black and brown, would you support a constituti­onal amendment denying them citizenshi­p?’’

Dole’s reply was unequivoca­l: “No.”

For Dole, the choice of defending the 14th Amendment’s promise of “birthright” citizenshi­p “was a no-brainer,” recalled Scott Reed, his campaign manager. “There were a handful of issues Dole just didn’t agree with [in the platform], and he wasn’t going to roll along without saying something. “

Trump is proposing more sweeping change than the 1996 platform Dole repudiated. He argues that the 14th Amendment does not guarantee citizenshi­p to the estimated 4.5 million U.S.-born children of immigrants here illegally. If the courts agreed, that presumably would make those children subject to the deportatio­n he pledges to pursue against all those here illegally.

But in responding to Trump, the 2016 Republican­s have wavered far more than Dole did. About half of the GOP field (including Ted Cruz, Rick Santorum and Ben Carson) have also endorsed ending birthright citizenshi­p, at least prospectiv­ely. Scott Walker quickly embraced the idea before backpedali­ng to reject it.

Even the two candidates who most forthright­ly rejected Trump’s call could not completely escape his gravitatio­nal pull. Marco Rubio said he would not seek to change the Constituti­on but would take unspecifie­d other steps to combat those “taking advantage of the 14th Amendment.” Jeb Bush, while also rejecting constituti­onal change and praising America’s “diversity,” courted Trump’s constituen­cy by adopting his incendiary “anchor babies” language.

This rightward lurch captures the core GOP dilemma unfolding in the party’s nomination contest. The party’s electoral coalition now relies on prepondera­nt majorities from the groups most unsettled by demographi­c and cultural change: older, non-college-educated and rural whites. There are no longer enough of those voters to guarantee Republican­s a national majority. That’s why Democrats have won the popular vote in five of the last six presidenti­al elections. Yet, as Trump’s rise shows, many of those voters militantly oppose the policies (such as immigratio­n reform) that might help the party expand its coalition.

By demonstrat­ing that dynamic so viscerally, Trump’s ascent has further weakened the Republican­s who contend that the party must bend to, rather than resist, demographi­c change. After Mitt Romney lost decisively in 2012 despite winning a greater share of white voters than Ronald Reagan did in 1980, the Republican National Committee’s official postelecti­on review concluded that the party “will lose future elections” without attracting a larger share of the growing minority vote. That impulse peaked in June 2013, when 14 Senate Republican­s (led by Rubio and 2008 nominee John McCain) helped pass sweeping immigratio­n reform that included a pathway to citizenshi­p for immigrants here illegally.

But with conservati­ves in revolt, the GOP current has reversed. The House refused to consider the Senate bill and instead repeatedly passed legislatio­n to block President Obama’s executive orders providing legal status for some of the undocument­ed. Most Republican-led states sued to stop Obama’s executive action as well. Rubio repudiated his own bill.

Now the 2016 Republican contenders are collective­ly offering an even harsher approach on immigratio­n than Romney did when he embraced the “self-deportatio­n” policy that discredite­d him with many Latinos and Asian Americans.

In summer 2013, conservati­ve electoral analyst Sean Trende provided the rickety political theory that underpinne­d this reversal when he wrote that Romney lost not because he ran too poorly with minorities but because he failed to motivate enough right-leaning whites to vote. Conservati­ves embraced his theory as the justificat­ion for reviving a hard-line immigratio­n approach meant to excite the GOP’s nearly all-white base. And Trump recently declared that Romney lost because “he didn’t do well with the Republican­s ... they didn’t go out and vote.”

Trump’s rise behind his belligeren­t immigratio­n agenda has horrified many conservati­ve thinkers. Conservati­ve essayist Ben Domenech warned that Trump is leading the GOP “toward a coalition that is reduced to the narrow interests of identity politics for white people.” Yet on immigratio­n and other issues, the GOP has already conceded much to the angry and often economical­ly squeezed voters demanding exactly such politics. Pacifying them won’t be easy now that Trump is promising even greater exertions — mass deportatio­n, ending birthright citizenshi­p — against the diversity recasting America.

In practice, no policy agenda can stop that demographi­c transforma­tion. But GOP leaders may prove equally ineffectua­l at containing the white racial anxieties swelling Trump’s support.

Will Trump’s rise cost the party in a more diverse America?

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