Los Angeles Times

CIA releases Nixon, Ford briefs

Previously classified intelligen­ce offers a look behind scenes in tumultuous times.

- By David S. Cloud david.cloud@latimes.com

WASHINGTON — The CIA pulled the veil back Wednesday on long-classified foreign intelligen­ce briefings it gave President Nixon in the 1970s during both the height of his power and his fall from grace, a period of intense turmoil at home and abroad.

The release of 2,500 President’s Daily Briefs — about 28,000 pages in all — shed light on such historic events as Nixon’s opening to China, the invasion of Cambodia, the U.S.-backed overthrow of an elected leader in Chile, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and ultimately the first resignatio­n of a sitting U.S. president.

The release also covers briefings given to President Ford, who took over when Nixon resigned on Aug. 9, 1974, and served until January 1977. That period included the fall of Saigon and the end of America’s bitter war in Vietnam.

CIA Director John Brennan and Director of National Intelligen­ce James R. Clapper released the briefs and other documents at a symposium at the Richard Nixon Presidenti­al Library in Yorba Linda.

It’s difficult to gauge how much the intelligen­ce influenced Nixon’s thinking and decisions since he chose not to receive face-to-face briefings from CIA officials.

He relied on Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor and later secretary of State, to forward the written summary and other material each morning, leaving CIA officials discourage­d at their lack of access, according to a declassifi­ed 1996 agency history of the CIANixon relationsh­ip, also released Wednesday.

Nixon carried a grudge against the CIA for his loss to President Kennedy in the 1960 election, believing the agency had failed to debunk Kennedy’s false claim that the U.S. had fallen behind the Soviet Union in interconti­nental ballistic missiles.

Other than in formal or ceremonial meetings, Nixon never met privately with any of the three CIA directors who served under him. He had only a single telephone conversati­on with William E. Colby, director during the resignatio­n scandal.

“When you did brief him on something, he looked like his mind was on other things — he may have been thinking about Watergate, I guess,” Colby later told a CIA interviewe­r, according to the documents.

The CIA briefs ran about 10 pages a day, and often contained mostly news items and mundane political analysis from hot spots around the globe, a useful service in the era before 24-hour cable news and the Internet.

They contain several references to satellite surveillan­ce and other hightech intelligen­ce-gathering tools. But sensitive passages about covert operations and secrets stolen by undercover operatives are blacked out.

The papers still contain fascinatin­g tidbits.

Though Nixon called his 1972 visit to China “the week that changed the world,” his four-page intelligen­ce brief on the day of his arrival in Beijing contained only two paragraphs on the trip.

The material reveals how little the CIA’s China watchers knew about the communist leaders of the world’s most populous country, then just emerging from more than two decades of isolation.

“The pattern of appearance­s at the opening ceremonies during President Nixon’s trip to Peking suggests that Premier Chou En-lai is in a particular­ly strong position,” it read, referring to the Chinese official considered most open to better ties with the U.S.

The next day, the CIA summary had two paragraphs of analysis on reaction in the Soviet Union, which saw closer relations between Beijing and Washington as a threat.

“The Soviets are using their news media to cast President Nixon’s visit to China in an unfavorabl­e light,” the briefing read, noting that the USSR’s Communist Party newspaper “characteri­zed the trip as being predicated on common hatred for the Soviet Union.”

After Nixon flew home, the CIA reassured him that the visit had been considered a success in Beijing. “Chinese leaders are generally pleased with the presidenti­al visit as a whole,” that day’s briefing read, echoing headlines that appeared around the globe.

The election of leftist Salvador Allende as president in Chile in 1970 prompted Nixon to worry that the country could become “another Cuba” — a communist toehold in the Western Hemisphere.

For the next three years, Nixon and Kissinger used the CIA to clandestin­ely back Allende’s opponents in hopes of driving him from office or fomenting a coup. On Sept. 1, 1973, Allende was killed during a coup launched by army leader Augusto Pinochet, setting off decades of bitter dispute over the CIA’s role in Allende’s overthrow.

The daily briefs focus frequently on the broken Chilean economy and the growing strength of the opposition, but offer no details to confirm direct CIA support for the military putsch.

Developmen­ts in Indochina, where the U.S. was trying to extricate itself from the war in Vietnam and prop up failing government­s in neighborin­g Cambodia and Laos, received intense attention in the briefings.

An item on Feb. 4, 1974, reveals that even minute details about Cambodia’s communist rebels, the Khmer Rouge, were being reported to the White House.

“An intercept of February 1 indicates that a meeting of the standing committee of the Khmer Communist Party is being called for February 5 or 6 at an undisclose­d location,” the summary reported.

Among the most gripping reports are those describing the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Day after after day, Ford’s intelligen­ce brief recounted the collapse of South Vietnam’s U.S.trained army as city after city fell under the control of communist forces.

The CIA’s analysis proved wildly off base, however.

On March 28, 1975, an analysis sent to Ford predicted that the South Vietnamese government would hold out until “early 1976.” Communist troops captured Saigon a month later.

“The flag of the Viet Cong’s Provisiona­l Revolution­ary Government was hoisted over the presidenti­al palace at 12:15 today Saigon time, marking the end of 30 years of war in Vietnam,” the opening paragraph of Ford’s intelligen­ce summary read that morning.

Ford proved a far more avid consumer of CIA intelligen­ce than Nixon.

He became the first president to receive an oral briefing by a CIA official on the daily intelligen­ce summary — a practice most of his successors have followed, though with varying degrees of interest.

After Ford was sworn in on Aug. 9, 1974, his CIA briefing noted that Nixon’s announceme­nt the day before that he would resign had produced a rare day of global calm.

“The world in the past 24 hours has seemed to mark time as the U.S. succession process worked itself out,” the CIA said. “None of the potential trouble-makers has produced even a rumble.”

The release is part an ongoing CIA effort to declassify presidents’ intelligen­ce summaries. Last year, the agency released 19,000 pages of briefings from the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administra­tions.

 ?? Harvey W. Georges Associated Press ?? PRESIDENT NIXON, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, left, and vice presidenti­al nominee Gerald Ford in 1973, declined face-to-face CIA briefings.
Harvey W. Georges Associated Press PRESIDENT NIXON, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, left, and vice presidenti­al nominee Gerald Ford in 1973, declined face-to-face CIA briefings.

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from United States