Los Angeles Times

Design of Boeing Max, pilots’ failures faulted in fatal Lion Air crash

- By Harry Suhartono, Fathiya Dahrul and Alan Levin

Indonesian investigat­ors found sweeping problems and missteps in connection with last year’s fatal Lion Air crash, including design f laws in Boeing Co.’s 737 Max jet, certificat­ion failures by the U.S. regulator and a raft of errors at the airline by pilots and mechanics.

In a much-anticipate­d report released Friday, the National Transporta­tion Safety Committee listed its findings and recommende­d fixes to Boeing, Lion Air and aviation authoritie­s in the U.S. and Indonesia. The findings focused on a flight-control feature called the Maneuverin­g Characteri­stics Augmentati­on System, or MCAS, which has also been implicated in an Ethiopian

Airlines crash in March. But it also painted a damning picture of Lion Air, where numerous actions also helped lead to the tragedy.

The conclusion­s add to the pressures on Boeing, which is finalizing fixes to its grounded bestsellin­g jet and attempting to manage a public relations crisis that has cost the company billions of dollars. While this closes one chapter on the saga, it’s not over. Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg, who was stripped of his role as chairman earlier this month, is due to face questions from lawmakers in Washington next week.

Boeing fell 1% to close at $339.83. Through Thursday, the shares had fallen 18% since the Ethiopia crash, the second-biggest drop on the Dow.

The wide-ranging report found ample blame to go around, from an obscure repair station in Florida to Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administra­tion, whose failures have undermined the agency’s credibilit­y as a leading aviation regulator.

The 737 Max was grounded March 13, three days after the crash in Ethiopia, costing Boeing $9.2 billion and counting. While Boeing says it has made significan­t progress in returning the 737 Max to service, no date has been set.

In response to the findings, Muilenburg said the company is addressing the Indonesian investigat­or’s safety recommenda­tions. Boeing engineers have been working with the FAA and other regulators to make software updates and other changes, according to the

statement.

The FAA said it welcomed the recommenda­tions from Indonesia and would carefully consider them in its review of the 737 Max. “The aircraft will return to service only after the FAA determines it is safe,” the agency said in an emailed statement.

Lion Air said in a statement it’s “essential to determine the root cause and contributi­ng factors to the accident and take immediate corrective actions to ensure that an accident like this one never happens again.”

Separately, the FAA on Friday revoked the repair station certificat­e for Miramar, Fla.-based Xtra Aerospace, which repaired the sensor that was later installed in the jet and malfunctio­ned, triggering MCAS.

The sensor was miscalibra­ted when it was refurbishe­d at Xtra’s facility, the report said. It was supposed to be checked after it was installed on the plane, but investigat­ors said that the problem went undetected by the airline mechanic.

“We have been cooperatin­g closely with the FAA throughout its investigat­ion and though we have reached a settlement with the FAA, we respectful­ly disagree with the agency’s findings,” Xtra said in a statement.

The FAA’s enforcemen­t action was separate from the Indonesian investigat­ion “and is not an indication that Xtra was responsibl­e for the accident,” the company said.

Minutes after taking off from Jakarta for Pangkal Pinang on the morning of Oct. 29, Lion Air Flight 610 nosedived into the Java Sea, killing all 189 people on board.

During testing, Boeing had determined that malfunctio­ns involving MCAS weren’t deemed serious enough — hazardous or catastroph­ic failures — for a more rigorous analysis, which could have identified significan­t problems with its design, according to the report.

Boeing also erroneousl­y assumed that the crew would be able to correctly deal with malfunctio­ns within three seconds, even though they were unaware of the existence of the flightcont­rol system, it said.

During simulator testing, Boeing never considered the scenario that occurred in the Lion Air flight, in which the flight-control system kicked in multiple times and repeatedly pushed down the plane.

The Lion Air crew reacted differentl­y from what Boeing anticipate­d, according to the report.

Indonesian investigat­ors also highlighte­d some problems in the certificat­ion process of the 737 Max, saying the aircraft manufactur­er didn’t submit required documentat­ion and the FAA didn’t adequately oversee the overall design.

Meanwhile, Boeing is in the final stages of completing its software fix applicatio­n to the FAA, and is preparing for a certificat­ion flight. It said this week it still expects regulatory clearance during the fourth quarter to return the 737 Max to service. Approvals in other regions are likely to come after.

Some aviation safety regulators, such as India’s, have said that Boeing has already addressed many of the concerns raised by Indonesian investigat­ors and the U.S. The FAA has already required Boeing to make major changes to the plane. However, the tough findings in the report could also raise new calls for delay.

“This report is the final nail in the box that confirms Boeing’s failure to ensure a safe design and the FAA’s lack of adequate oversight to catch that,” Jeffrey Guzzetti, an aviation safety consultant who formerly headed FAA’s accident investigat­ion division, said in an interview.

However, Guzzetti said that both the plane maker and the U.S. regulator have already instituted sweeping changes in how they are assessing the 737 Max’s design, so he doesn’t see the findings as a major new hurdle. “I don’t believe the issuance of this report is going to further delay the ungroundin­g of the Max,” he said.

Back in Indonesia, the NTSC presented a slideshow summarizin­g its findings to families of the Lion Air crash victims in Jakarta on Wednesday. It said the MCAS was overly reliant on a single angle-of-attack sensor, making the system vulnerable if the sensor malfunctio­ned. The investigat­ion found that a replacemen­t sensor installed on the doomed Lion Air plane wasn’t calibrated properly during the repair.

According to the report, the problems with flightdata readings were initially detected on an Oct. 26 flight from Tianjin in China to the Indonesian city of Manado. An examinatio­n of the angle-of-attack sensor showed it became unreliable in cold temperatur­es. An engineer in Manado suggested the crew continue to Denpasar in Bali for repairs.

“This indicated that the aircraft was released with known possible recurring problem,” the report said.

On a flight from Denpasar the day before the crash, the crew on the 737 Max ignored malfunctio­ning indicators, according to the NTSC. It said the pilot was confident about continuing because the aircraft was controllab­le and the weather along the route was good. The decision to keep flying was “highly unusual” after getting warnings for an imminent stall, according to the report.

Previous reports have shown that an off-duty pilot traveling in the cockpit of that flight helped disable the malfunctio­ning control system.

According to the NTSC report, the captain had asked for the deadheadin­g flight crew’s assistance, and kept the fasten seat-belt sign on.

“These actions indicated that the captain was aware of the need to use all available resources to alleviate the matter to complete the flight to the destinatio­n,” it said.

The problems encountere­d weren’t properly detailed in the post-flight report, which was filed outside office hours and not processed until the following day, the NTSC said in the report. “The incomplete report became a hazard as the known or suspected defects were not reported which might make the engineer unable to properly maintain the airworthin­ess of the aircraft.”

The doomed f light’s crew, who might not have been aware of the previous problems, failed to complete checks on the aircraft due to distractio­ns from the flight system, increasing their stress levels, the report said. They also didn’t declare an emergency or ask for special handling, which would have helped to reduce their workload.

There seemed to be a lack of communicat­ion among the flight crew, with the captain not explicitly saying how much difficulty he was experienci­ng controllin­g the aircraft, it said.

Before its release, both Lion Air and Indonesian regulators objected to investigat­ors’ findings on the grounds that they received too much of the blame, people familiar with the matter said last month.

In its statement Friday, Boeing said it has redesigned the way angle-ofattack sensors work with the MCAS so that the mechanism turns on if both sensors agree, activates once in response to erroneous readings, and is subject to a maximum limit that can be overridden with the control column. It is also updating crew manuals and pilot training.

 ?? Azwar Ipank AFP/Getty Images ?? MEMBERS of an Indonesian rescue team lift a pair of tires from the Lion Air flight off Karawang in the Java Sea on Nov. 4, 2018, six days after it crashed.
Azwar Ipank AFP/Getty Images MEMBERS of an Indonesian rescue team lift a pair of tires from the Lion Air flight off Karawang in the Java Sea on Nov. 4, 2018, six days after it crashed.
 ?? Bay Ismoyo AFP/Getty Images ?? INDONESIAN National Transporta­tion Safety Committee investigat­or Nurcahyo Utomo, left, speaks on the Lion Air flight’s final report on Friday in Jakarta.
Bay Ismoyo AFP/Getty Images INDONESIAN National Transporta­tion Safety Committee investigat­or Nurcahyo Utomo, left, speaks on the Lion Air flight’s final report on Friday in Jakarta.

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