Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

What caused implosion of Silicon Valley Bank?

- PolitiFact staff

The spectacula­r implosion of Silicon Valley Bank, a top lender to technology companies and startups until a few days ago, has prompted finger-pointing from the political left and right about why it happened and who is at fault.

Silicon Valley Bank, now the secondlarg­est bank to collapse in U.S. history and the largest since the 2008 financial crisis, experience­d what is known as a bank run — when a large number of clients, fearing the bank won’t be able to repay their deposits, all try to withdraw their money at the same time. With demand for withdrawal­s outstrippi­ng the ready supply of cash, a bank in this situation is doomed to fail.

The panic began after Silicon Valley Bank announced it sold $21 billion worth of its investment­s at a nearly $2 billion loss. The bank did this because it needed to free up money to meet withdrawal demands. The bank’s tech-focused client base was particular­ly hungry for cash after influxes from venture capital firms slowed in recent months.

Some Democrats, including Sen. Elizabeth Warren of Massachuse­tts and Rep. Katie Porter of California, blame bipartisan legislatio­n signed in 2018 by then-President Donald Trump that eased regulation­s for all but the largest banks, including institutio­ns like Silicon Valley Bank.

“No one should be mistaken about what unfolded over the past few days in the U.S. banking system,” Warren said in an op-ed in The New York Times. “These recent bank failures are the direct result of leaders in Washington weakening the financial rules.”

In remarks about the bank failure March 13, President Joe Biden echoed such concerns, saying, “Unfortunat­ely, the last administra­tion rolled back some of these requiremen­ts. I’m going to ask Congress and the banking regulators to strengthen the rules for banks to make it less likely this kind of bank failure would happen again and to protect American jobs and small businesses.”

Meanwhile, Republican­s blamed the bank’s demise on what they call “woke” policies, such as Silicon Valley Bank’s commitment to diversity and equity programs and its adherence to environmen­tal, social and corporate governance.

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis told Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo that Silicon Valley Bank was too “concerned with DEI and politics,” which he said “really diverted from them focusing on their core mission.”

Banking experts said political pointscori­ng after the collapse was predictabl­e.

“Every systemic collapse provides all sides with bases for finger pointing,” said Lawrence G. Baxter, a law professor at Duke University and director of its Global Financial Markets Center.

Here, we’ll look at the evidence for and against each of these theories regarding the bank’s downfall, with the caveat that the internal workings of Silicon Valley Bank are still being unearthed.

The role of the 2018 legal changes

The legislatio­n signed by Trump in 2018 represente­d a scaling back of the landmark Dodd-Frank Act, which lawmakers passed in 2010 and then-President Barack Obama signed. The 2010 measure was designed to increase financial services regulation in a way that would avoid a repeat of the crisis that tipped the nation into the Great Recession.

The Dodd-Frank bill, passed mostly by congressio­nal Democrats with a smattering of Republican support, overhauled and strengthen­ed the nation’s financial regulatory system, tightening restrictio­ns on speculativ­e or risky investment­s and institutin­g “stress” tests on banks to make sure they could survive difficult financial scenarios.

The 2018 revisions of Dodd-Frank, formally known as the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act, maintained stringent oversight for the largest banks but eased regulation­s for smaller and midsized banks. Whereas the original Dodd-Frank law mandated stricter capital and liquidity standards for institutio­ns with $50 billion in assets, the rewrite raised the minimum for such requiremen­ts to those with at least $250 billion in assets. The bill passed with the support of all but one Republican and of 33 Democrats in the House and all Republican­s and 17 Democrats in the Senate.

Silicon Valley Bank CEO Greg Becker was among those who sought lighter regulation­s for smaller banks as the rollback bill was being crafted. At the time the bill was passed, Silicon Valley Bank had about $40 billion in assets. That had grown to $212 billion by the time the bank crumbled, but that still would have shielded the bank from many key regulation­s, including standards for how much capital the bank kept on hand (keeping more capital allows banks to fulfill depositor withdrawal­s in a crisis) and for liquidity (more liquid holdings enable banks to quickly convert value into cash if needed).

Supporters of the 2018 rewrite “ignored the fact that while a failing or failed bank may not destabiliz­e the entire national banking system, it sure can destabiliz­e a region,” Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, a financial consultant, wrote recently in Forbes.

2018 changes hastened Silicon Valley Bank’s downfall

Experts in banking regulation told PolitiFact that the 2018 changes probably did hasten Silicon Valley Bank’s downfall.

“It did indeed reduce regulatory requiremen­ts for banks like Silicon Valley Bank,” said Hilary Allen, an American University law professor. “While it is impossible to say categorica­lly that legislativ­e rollback equals the bank’s collapse, it does seem that it made it more likely.”

Baxter agreed with Allen. “Relaxing some of the regulation for regional banks sent a signal that they were not a threat to economic stability, which is naive, as we have seen,” he said.

But Baxter added that the bank failure cannot be blamed solely on the change in the Dodd-Frank law. He and others said the bank’s heavy reliance on one sector — high-tech startups — was ill-advised and should have been rectified sooner regardless of the changes to the law.

“Why did the San Francisco Federal Reserve hold back when everyone knew that Silicon Valley Bank was heavily exposed to the tech industry and its investment­s were deteriorat­ing?” Baxter said. “The triggers for regulatory action, still in place even after the 2018 partial deregulati­on, were not followed.”

Another problem, Baxter and others said, was that the bank was caught flatfooted when the Federal Reserve began raising interest rates in response to high inflation starting in mid-2022. The bank had substantia­l holdings in bonds, which are considered safe but lost value when interest rates rose. That’s because investors would prefer to buy newer bonds with higher rates, meaning that those stuck holding bonds need to sell them at a discount if they want to generate quick cash.

Silicon Valley Bank was allowed to build up a “massive position” on bonds with “little to no hedging for interest rates,” said Aaron Klein, a senior fellow in economic studies at the Brookings Institutio­n, a Washington, D.C., think tank.

At the same time, the bank’s depositors maintained large holdings beyond the basic $250,000 level that is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., to a degree that misaligned with more traditiona­l banks, Klein said.

“Silicon Valley Bank is not a ‘Main Street bank’ and never was,” Klein said. “Most banks of that size have 1,000 branches, but Silicon Valley had 16. Its assets quadrupled in four years — explosive growth that ought to raise flags.”

The emergence of lightspeed online informatio­n sharing on social media platforms has heightened the risks for banks and their depositors in a way that regulators have not caught up to, Allen said. Silicon Valley Bank had “a quite insular and ‘very online’ deposit base through which rumors could spread very quickly,” making a bank run even faster and more harmful, Allen said.

Experts rebut notion that ‘woke’ policies prompted collapse

What about the role of “woke” policies? Several high-profile Republican­s and a presidenti­al hopeful argued that Silicon Valley Bank’s promotion of diversity equity and inclusion, or DEI, initiative­s and environmen­tal, social and governance, or ESG, investment­s led to its downfall.

DeSantis, U.S. Rep. James Comer of Texas and Republican presidenti­al candidate Vivek Ramaswamy echoed that sentiment in comments to Fox News.

“Now we see coming out that they were one of the most ‘woke’ banks in their quest for the ESG-type policy,” Comer said March 12. “This could be a trend, and there are consequenc­es for bad Democrat policy.”

Silicon Valley Bank’s 2022 Environmen­tal, Social and Governance report detailed more than $17 billion in planned investment­s. They included:

• An $11.2 billion community benefits plan to support small businesses, finance affordable housing, reinvest in low- and moderate-income communitie­s in Massachuse­tts and California by 2026, and support charitable causes through philanthro­py and volunteeri­ng.

• $1.3 billion in residentia­l mortgages to low- and moderate-income communitie­s and borrowers and in low- and moderate-income communitie­s census tracts by 2026.

• $5 billion in sustainabl­e finance commitment; the company would invest this money by 2027 into helping clients build sustainabl­e businesses. The bank also aimed to have its operations carbon-neutral by 2025.

But experts told PolitiFact that none of the policies or investment­s conservati­ves highlighte­d would have created the key conditions that prompted the sudden nosedive.

“No, I don’t see this playing any role,” Allen said. “For this critique to have any plausibili­ty, Silicon Valley Bank would have to have made ‘woke’ investment­s that failed and caused it to implode.”

Also, many financial institutio­ns have made similar investment­s without prompting a bank run. The accounting and consulting firm Pricewater­houseCoope­rs projected in October that U.S. investment­s in environmen­tal, social and governance-related assets would increase to $33.9 trillion in 2026.

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