O’s Syrian Hell
How the ‘worst-case scenario’ came to pass
WHILE the Republican National Convention was dominating headlines, the Obama administration’s management of the Syria crisis went from bad to worse.
Secretary of State John Kerry last week announced an agreement of military and intelligence cooperation with Russia in Syria to fight ISIS and the Nusra Front. No sooner had the deal been announced than NATO member Turkey, from whose Incirlik airbase the US conducts anti-ISIS operations, almost succumbed to a military coup that could’ve sent the country into chaos.
And on Sunday, former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta described the current situation in Syria as “the worst-case scenario” for American interests.
Specifically, he told CBS, the worst-case scenario “is that [Bashar al-] Assad continues to remain in power,” “that the Russians continue to have a presence there” and continue to attack moderate Syrian forces and, finally, that ISIS would benefit from the mess.
Those headlines — partnership with Russia as NATO and US allies come under increasing pressure — capture the essence of President Obama’s Syria policy.
To understand the president’s decisions in Syria, one must look to his signature foreign-policy initiative: the deal with Iran. Since Syrian dictatorAssad is Iran’s strategic ally, Obama long ago decided he wouldn’t back the effort to topple him.
Before the rise of ISIS in Syria, regional allies had urged Washington to bolster the American alliance against Iran. But they misread Obama.
Allies in Europe and the Middle East watched in confusion and disbelief as the president constantly privileged Russian and Iranian interests in Syria over their own. Meanwhile, the Syrian disas- ter grew worse, the body count rose and refugees flooded out of the country in larger numbers.
As the crisis deepened, the White House subtly but unmistakably shifted the goalposts. By 2013, the administration had made it known that the president regretted his initial call on Assad to “step aside.”
By that point, Obama had frustrated allies by insisting that any initiative had to get the support of Russia, which backed Assad. The administration brushed off complaints with a constant mantra: The only solution in Syria was political, not military, even as Russia and Iran were pouring in support to Assad precisely to impose a military solution.
Obama even went as far as publicly recognizing what he called Iran’s “equities” in Syria — shorthand for Iran’s ability to maintain its bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to supply it with missiles aimed at Israel. The White House then put our priorities in Syria in line with Russian and Iranian interests.
First, Obama entered into a partnership with Russia, which shielded Assad against a military strike over his use of chemical weapons. Then the president said the new priority was to fight terrorism (which means only ISIS and al Qaeda, and not Iranbacked terrorist groups fighting with Assad) and to provide humanitarian aid to Syrians. In both initiatives, Russia — Assad’s protector — was elevated to principal partner.
This decision has had catastrophic repercussions.
In September 2015, Russia intervened directly in Syria, knowing the White House wouldn’t stand in the way. Russian President Vladimir Putin saw a golden opportunity to set up a military base on NATO’s southern flank, enabling him to project power both in the Middle East and Europe.
But Obama only doubled down by deepening military and intelligence cooperation with Russia in Syria, swatting aside objections from the Pentagon, the State Department and the intelligence community.
In so doing, the president is entrenching Russia’s presence on the border of NATO, the institution founded to counter Russian expansion.
What’s more, since the Russian enterprise in Syria is in full partnership with Iran, its success is Iran’s success. Stated differently, just as Russia now has a base bordering NATO member Turkey, Iran will also cement its presence in Syria — on Israel’s borders.
The latest agreement with the Kremlin, announced by Kerry, makes the US a partner in Russia’s war to save the Assad regime — the logical endgame of Obama’s policy.
Critics of the president’s Syria policy have often accused him of being too passive. This is a mistake. The White House has been ac
tively shaping the Syrian theater, both diplomatically and militarily. Only it has done so in a manner that has undercut and endangered US allies and interests. The worst-case scenario is what Obama will leave behind.