A WAR THAT WASN’T
ISRAELIS within missile range of the Gaza Strip went to bed with trepidation Wednesday night, unsure whether a full-scale war in Gaza was imminent. Israel’s Security Cabinet had convened for a midnight emergency session Wednesday, following Tuesday’s attack on Beersheba, Israel’s largest southern city.
By Thursday, though, it was business as usual. The government’s decision not to respond with a major military campaign shows both the limited options available on Gaza and the nature of Israel’s defense priorities.
The attack might have been seen as a casus belli. A missile had destroyed the home of a single mother and her three children; the family escaped with their lives only by using their bomb shelter.
Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman called for a powerful military response. Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot cut short his visit to the US and arrived with operative plans. Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders went into hiding, expecting a major response.
The IDF instead announced that it was safe to reopen schools and resume normal activity. The Security Cabinet instructed the army to increase fire at border demonstrations and take stronger measures against balloon attacks, but these are tweaks of existing policy, rather than a major escalation.
The decision was made by one man, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. And he’s not interested in a war in Gaza.
Israel and Hamas have been in a state of low-grade military conflict on the Gaza border for more than a decade. Israel has invaded three times to put a stop to missile attacks. Those campaigns ended in cease-fires and a period of relative calm — before another round of fighting began. Since last May, when Hamas began launching mass demonstrations along the border with Israel, things appeared to be moving toward a fourth round.
But even hawks like Lieberman understand the Gaza problem can’t be solved permanently by military action. His stated war aim was, tellingly, “four or five years of quiet.” Total victory would mean occupying Gaza, putting Israel in charge of 2 million impoverished, hostile Arabs; it would also likely mean significant civilian loss of life. Israel is a prisoner of that paradox.
Netanyahu came to this realization during the 2014 invasion of Gaza, in which 71 Israelis died, 66 of them soldiers. When the fighting ended, Israel found itself back where it started. People may want a glorious victory in Gaza, but managing the situation is the best they can hope for.
Over the years, Israel has spent a lot of time and money on tools for doing just that. The IDF has an Iron Dome system capable of bringing down most incoming rockets (although the Dome was unaccountably absent in Beersheba). It has techniques to detect and destroy Hamas infiltration tunnels. And it is now constructing a barrier along its entire Gaza land and sea border.
Hamas has shown ingenuity in the face of these obstacles. The IDF has no answer yet for its incendiary balloons, which have burned down large swaths of Israel’s southwestern agricultural fields and forests. Nor has it been able to end the Hamas-led demonstrations on the border. But these are tactics, not strategic threats. As Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas commander in Gaza, recently told an interviewer, “no one wants to fight a nuclear power with four slingshots.”
Hamas is too weak to be anything but a military annoyance. And Netanyahu is focused on the threat posed by Iran and its proxies in Lebanon and Syria. He doesn’t want the IDF tied down in Gaza, even for a brief period. He needs the military budgets and personnel for the northern war.
Yes, the prime minister would like to reach a deal with Sinwar: Israeli economic cooperation in return for a long-term cease-fire. But if Hamas wants to keep fighting, it is a problem that can be dealt with by technology, targeted killings and an occasional airstrike. Bibi is determined to keep himself, and his army, out of the Gaza briar patch.