Afghan end game
No taboos on engaging Taliban for peace talks
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani issued on Wednesday an invitation, offering quite a few incentives, to the Taliban to join in negotiations, without preconditions, toward an eventual peaceful future for the country.
In principle, what he is doing is right. Everybody agrees that, while Mr. Ghani’s government remain protected by the U.S. and other foreign forces, the only end to the 17-yearlong epilogue to the 9/11 al-Qaida attack on the United States, which resulted in U.S. re-involvement in Afghanistan, is talks. These talks must perforce include the Taliban. Prior to 9/11, U.S. involvement had been in support of Taliban and other mujahideen forces’ actions against its earlier Soviet-backed government.
But the problem now is that, in spite of the support of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani’s government controls only an estimated 18 percent of the territory of the country, the rest loosely governed by the Taliban and others. The Taliban see the Ghani government as on its back foot and, in effect, as a receding force on the ground not worth negotiating with. In addition, the Ghani government is seriously divided, between Pashtuns, northerners and other independent warlords. The anti-Ghani elements are just as inclined to fight his government or among themselves as against the Taliban.
Mr. Ghani can thus say the right thing, and he did, at what appears to have been a foreign donors’ conference in Kabul with a reported 20 country attendees. But it leads to nothing in terms of bringing peace and talking turkeyabout the future of the country.
Deadlines can serve as an invitation to opposing parties simply to wait out the element issuing the deadline. At the same time, the U.S. has continued to dedicate troops, and to provide money and supplies for years to Afghan governments which, in principle, are eventually going to be able to sustain themselves in the face of the Taliban or whatever element threatens their existence.
It is far past time to admit that it hasn’t worked, and to cut losses in money and personnel, leaving the Afghans to work out their own destiny without our having continued to put our money and resources on any of the competing elements in that complex society. Across history its complexity and basic xenophobia chased out Alexander the Great, the British and the Russians, as examples.
U.S. departure wouldn’t be an admission of defeat. We can still watch the place with overhead surveillance to be sure that someone there isn’t cranking up another 9/11 attack against us. Leaving the Afghans to their own devices could be seen as an acknowledgement of their right to self-determination, a longtime basic American principle in international relations. We can also bring our soldiers home and save some money.