The return of the Second Fleet

announced a new Atlantic Command as well, which will be embedded within the larger Second Fleet.

Both will be based in Norfolk, Va., and the efficiencies of combining them will allow far better allied participation in U.S. military efforts in the Atlantic Ocean. Look for British, French, German, Italian, Spanish and other advanced warships from Europe to be calling in U.S. ports and operating extensively with our forces from the Arctic down to the Caribbean and well into the deep Atlantic. Both commands will be headed up by a single 3-star vice admiral, with staff officers from across the 29 nations of the NATO alliance.

• Third, the new Second Fleet/NATO command will be responsible for specific operations to thwart Russian attempts to dominate the northern portions of the Atlantic.

This means conducting broad area surveillance, including the use of oversea long-dwell drones; deploying manned maritime patrol aircraft such as Boeing’s new P-8 Poseidon to track Russian submarines; using undersea monitoring systems, which are essentially listening posts on the deep seabed; undertaking at-sea combat training exercises with destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers; and integrating landbased air on both sides of the Atlantic from their homes in the U.S., U.K. and Iceland. There will also be extensive operations under the surface of the sea by nuclear and diesel submarines, especially in the Arctic Ocean.

All of this means more tension closer to U.S. shores. Alongside the dangerous military operations in Syria, where U.S. and Russian forces are literally within rifle shot of each other, the waters of the North Atlantic will become a zone of serious potential conflict.

For example, when opposing submarines operate in close proximity to each other, they can literally hear the torpedo doors of the other boat opening. This can be construed as a “hostile act,” and possibly lead to a defensive overreaction. Such situations can escalate quickly.

While there are some protocols in place between the U.S. and Russia (the 1972 Incidents at Sea agreements), they are increasingly ignored — witness the series of close encounters at sea and in the air in the Baltic and Black Seas between the U.S. and Russian fleets. It is high time we dusted off those agreements and opened a serious conversation with Russia about better observance of them from both sides.

The real danger here is twofold. First is the very real possibility of an inadvertent incident caused by young officers in high-performance aircraft or driving advanced submarines and destroyers misinterpreting their leaders’ intent and acting too aggressively. The U.S. is on a hair-trigger already with Russia given profound disagreements over Syria, Ukraine and intrusion into the 2016 election. Accidents can lead to profoundly dangerous outcomes.

But there is a second, deeper danger: the natural tendency of military planners and operators to “train the way we will fight.” This means deliberate detailed planning of how to conduct a “fourth battle of the Atlantic” as one 4-star admiral called it.

Once those war plans are developed, the Navy — led by the newly resurrected Second Fleet — will conduct training, secure resources, and generally become a significant fighting force. While this is necessary given the geopolitics of the moment, the return of the Second Fleet should be accompanied by an effort to reduce the chances of tactical conflict with Russia wherever possible.

And at the broadest strategic level, the U.S. and its allies need to continue to search for meaningful ways to reduce tensions with the Russian Federation across the range of disagreements they face. Otherwise, the chances of the Second Fleet going into combat will continue to rise.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and its allies need to find ways to reduce tensions with the Russian Federation across the range of disagreements.