Sorry, America. India will never be your ally.
Narendra Modi, once denied a U.S. visa, was given the full red-carpet treatment at the White House this week. The Biden administration spared no effort to welcome the Indian prime minister at a state dinner, only the third under the current president.
After Mr. Modi addressed Congress for a second time, it might look as if India is pivoting to the United States. But don’t be naive, my dear American friends. India will never be your ally.
And this won’t change whether Mr. Modi or one of his rivals wins next year’s election. India’s collective memory of the indignities of colonization creates wide public supportfor an independent path.
India’s policy of nonalignment began with a refusal to be entangled in the Cold War. Today this has morphedinto aggressive multilateralism. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar says India should benefit “from asmany ties as possible.”
So if you’re expecting monogamy, prepare to be disappointed. India has reserved the right to flirt with Russia, Iran — and even China — if its national interests dictate sucha need.
After the 9/11 attacks, Washington asked New Delhi to dispatch troops to Afghanistan. The Indian military vetoed the request. When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, thenPrime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee withheld military support despite pro-U.S. Indian media urging him to get “on the right side of history” — a phrase often used today inthe context of the Russian-Ukraine conflict. Resisting pressure from the George W. Bush administration was a brave move — and, as it turns out, themorally superior one.
These days, New Delhi similarly refuses to toe the U.S. line on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. India’s import of cheap Russian oil continues to break records. Anyone who wants to see Indian leaders stand up and publicly assail the Kremlin — one of their main suppliers of weaponry and a valuable source of raw materials— is in for a long wait.
India has criticized the U.S. decision to block Iranian and Venezuelan oil from the open market. The government in New Delhi has actively worked to bring Iran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral forum created by Russia and China in 2001. In May, India hosted the SCO foreign ministers amid border tensions with China and continuing antagonism with Pakistan. A fortnight later, unapologetic about the seeming contradiction, Mr. Modi and President Biden were hugging and laughing for the cameras at a meeting of the Quad, a loose security partnership that also includes Australiaand Japan.
Of course, India’s growing cooperation in the Quad raises hackles in Beijing. And yes, India’s issues with China are grave. Just three years ago, India lost 20 soldiers in a mountain clash with Chinese troops along their common frontier inthe high Himalayas.
Butdon’t think for a moment that India will take its cue from America on China: New Delhi wants to manage the relationship on its own terms. Indians have held 18 rounds of talks with the Chinese to resolve the border dispute. Meanwhile, India remains a key participant in the Beijing-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. As a founding member, India holds the secondlargest number of voting shares after China, which at 30 percent effectively enjoys veto rights.
There’s no question the United States and India have much in common. They are both open and argumentative societies. Diversity is the strengthof both nations.
Even so, it’s not the romance of shared values that is bringing the two countries together. It’s the reality of geopolitics.
India will agree that there is a strategic and urgent need to contain the spread of China, which is already throwing money at smaller countries in South Asia — Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan — to buy influence. China is also flexing its muscles in the Indian Ocean — New Delhi’s strategic backyard — and thebroader Indo-Pacific region.
But let’s not confuse strategic cooperation for a long-term alliance. In a multipolar world, India will look to be a pole, not an exclusive partner.