HOW TO END THE WAR IN UKRAINE
The first year of the Russian invasion of Ukraine saw dramatic swings in military fortunes — and has revealed that, when it comes to its military and its economy, Vladimir Putin’s Russia is but a pale shadow of the Soviet Union.
Russia occupied one-fifth or about 46,000 square miles of Ukraine during the first six months of its invasion beginning in February 2022, but the stunning Ukrainian counter-offensive in the fall liberated 63 percent or around 29,000 square miles of that territory. Since then, both sides have been preparing for a potentially decisive showdown in the first half of 2023.
The war now is in the initial stages of what appears to be a large Russian offensive designed to conquer all territories the Kremlin illegally annexed last September. The numbers the Russians have amassed — 320,000 troops in Ukraine and another 150,000 in training with 2,000 tanks and 400 aircraft — look impressive ... on paper.
Russia’s armed forces are stuck trying to implement — unsuccessfully — a version of Soviet military doctrine and have proven incapable of modern warfare with its network-centric combined arms operations. Even when it learns from its failures, the Russian military adopts solutions that betray the limits of its organizational capacity. The Russians have used “human wave” attacks in which expendable troops are sent to take a position regardless of cost, and when the Ukrainian defenders reveal their locations by firing, “waves” of more experienced troops attempt to advance as well.
The Russians have been able to capture the town of Soledar, north of the key transport hub of Bakhmut, and have continued to make incremental gains in a determined attempt to encircle that city. The small progress has come at a tremendous cost of thousands of troops.
Even supposedly elite troops under poor tactical command suffered catastrophic losses in repeated unsuccessful attempts to take Vuhledar — another strategically important town — by frontal assaults on entrenched Ukrainian positions. The Russians lost hundreds of men and several dozens of tanks and armored equipment there. Overall, Russian casualties are estimated to exceed 130,000 killed and 295,000 wounded, while the Ukrainian ones are roughly half that number in each category.
Russia’s resources, as formidable as they are, are not limitless, and Russia’s command has shown that it can neither mobilize them efficiently nor deploy them effectively on the battlefield. While still deadly and dangerous, the Russian military is less than the sum of its parts.
Russia’s dogged pursuit of its original war aims to dismember and subjugate Ukraine has by now revealed to the global West (the United States, Europe, Australia, Japan, among others) that Putin will not stop while he retains power in Moscow, so Russia must be halted by military means. The Ukrainian battlefield successes have persuaded the West that Ukraine can reverse Russia’s gains as long as it is provided with the necessary equipment, ammunition and aid. When the West decided to deliver Western main battle tanks, it committed to helping Ukraine not merely to avoid defeat, but to achieve victory.
With its GDP at about 2 percent of the world’s total and its kleptocratic system of government, Russia is no match for the global West, which accounts for 60 percent of the world economy. The West has the economic institutions, technological know-how and logistical organization to give Ukraine all the equipment, ammunition and financial aid it needs, as long as there is political will to do so.
The Russians know this, so their strategy is to undermine that will in the hopes that Ukraine will eventually be forced into concessions. This strategy is very difficult because it requires both racing to achieve results — before Western aid makes prospects of success very low — and, at the same time, delaying so that anti-war sentiment in the West, propelled by Russian disinformation campaigns, can corrode support for Ukraine.
The Ukrainians, meanwhile, are stalling for time because they need to receive and integrate the Western weapons for their counteroffensive, but in doing this, they risk a Russian breakthrough that could work to their disadvantage.
Under the present circumstances, peace negotiations are impossible. Both sides believe they have the potential to achieve more favorable outcomes on the battlefield, and are unwilling to countenance any concessions. Two key Russian demands — for Ukraine to “demilitarize” and for it to become “neutral” — cannot be satisfied because deterring future Russian revisionism requires Ukraine to maintain both internal capability in the form of a large army and external support in the form of an alliance. Peace cannot be negotiated while Russia insists on these terms.
For peace to have any chance, Putin’s war expectations must be reduced and the uncertainty about the war’s trajectory must be resolved on the battlefield. This requires the West to signal unwavering support for Ukraine as well as supplying all the required weapons, ammunition and logistical support right now. Anything else gives Putin hope that continuing the war could produce a collapse in Western support, which would prolong the war and vastly increase the number of casualties on both sides.