Islamic State ideology spreads like herpes — through close contact

True enough — ISIS is like herpes. That’s why public health protocols likely can teach us more about fighting the so-called Islamic State than our current counterinsurgency strategies out of the Pentagon, which rely on military intervention.

Let’s face it, the Western coalition’s counterinsurgency strategies have not worked well at all. After billions of dollars have been spent, and thousands of heroic soldiers have given their lives, the bloodthirsty Taliban still controls more than 40 percent of Afghanistan. In Iraq, Islamic State grew out of a vacuum: Now ISIS 3.0 is on the horizon. We need to make a change.

There are three stages of tackling this Islamic State virus: prevention, treatment and recovery. Prevention aims at protecting vulnerable and at-risk youth, while treatment and recovery deals with those who have been recruited. Just like the doctor orders — we need to get our shots.

Similar to a sexually transmitted disease, the virulent ideologies of the Islamic State and its knockoffs spread through intimate, one-on-one contact, as opposed to a widely dispersed airborne pathogen like Ebola. To contain the spreading infection of extremist violence, we need to isolate and inoculate against dangerous and destructive ideologies. That means monitoring ideologically infected individuals and groups by keeping a close watch on their public and private postings on social media.

Indeed, there is an evolving understanding among diplomats and policy engineers of exactly how hateful ideas (like those espoused by the superpowers of terror) and evil philosophies spread and gain traction within different communities. New research has shown how Islamic State “thought” is replicated and spread through human populations, more or less like a nasty virus. It has a viral coefficient that we can track and measure.

The Islamic State’s ideas are transmitted through close social and emotional bonds; tight, closed friendships. Islamic State recruiters tickle recruits from multiple angles. They use a variety of social media platforms to locate vulnerable and at-risk youth.

Employing Twitter and Facebook accounts, they seek young people with identity grievances. Once a link is established, they move their communications over to the encrypted messaging apps Telegram and WhatsApp. This is where they close the deal.

Many believe that the lone-wolf phenomenon means a terrorist acting strictly on his own. Research shows quite the opposite: potential recruits are massaged a number of times a day through social media outbursts. Radicals have crafted their messaging through trial and error, making it stronger and more seductive because of the constant feedback loops.

So it is with the Islamic State’s propaganda: It is transmitted over a long time and through repeated interactions. This explains ISIS’s strategy behind its media output and its use of fanboys. Fanboys’ obsession with extremist ideologies spreads a contagion.

And just like sexually transmitted diseases, many ISIS supporters are ashamed to admit that they are infected, that they subscribe to the Islamic State’s online communities. They will only talk about their secret interests and aims with someone they know and can trust, someone who has similar interests in extremist groups. No one else would really know they were terrorist recruits.

Over the past two weeks, TV and Internet news has been full of tanks and soldiers moving through Raqqa in

Syria, with the talking heads declaring the downfall of the Islamic State. Yes, most Islamic State fighters have been killed, captured or run off. People in Raqqa are getting a decent night’s sleep for the first time in years. But it’s premature to think the Islamic State is washed up and done with. In fact, ISIS 3.0 is doing rather well on the battlefield the Islamic State cares most about — the information battlefield.

Stopping the Islamic State requires a strategy of specifically targeting hot spots to control the disease of extremist violence. For example, Tunisia is the leading exporter of ISIS and most of its foreign fighters come from one neighborhood in Tunis. The same pattern holds true in many other places. The first place to look to stop new recruits is among known contacts and networks around existing foreign fighters.

Preventing ISIS and ISIS-like cells from spreading requires a strategy that includes government, civil society and private sector technology companies working on identifying those hot spots. Research shows that certain narratives work best to inoculate these vulnerable youth against Islamic State propaganda. For example, a defector’s tale of disillusionment shatters the image of unity and determination ISIS attempts to portray and takes on the emotional and identity grievances that make these youth vulnerable.

We need a whole range of actors to tackle the treatment and recovery of those who have been infected. But first, we need to accept that the old strategies aren’t working and we must change.