Seoul more likely target than U.S.
Kim could use arsenal if Washington tries to help
Given the overheated rhetoric that has emanated from both Pyongyang and Washington over the past year — “annihilation of the imperialists” versus “fire and fury” — the risk of armed conflict with North Korea no doubt has been rising. But war, if and when it comes, may not take the form that the United States expects.
American hawks contemplate a preventive aerial bombing campaign, launched at a time of our choosing, to take out Kim Jong Un’s nuclear arsenal. Probably many of North Korea’s conventional offensive capabilities would be targeted as well, to mitigate the risk of retaliation against South Korea’s capital, Seoul, and other population centers. Kim and his advisers surely are aware of this scenario and are hardly likely to allow it to unfold.
Instead, if the pressure on North Korea continues to ratchet up, Kim will probably seize the initiative by mounting a ground offensive with his million-man army before a U.S.-led air campaign decimates it.
He could order just a limited advance of his troops, seizing territory and surrounding Seoul rather than fighting for the city street by street. Same would go for the small American military contingent in South Korea — currently about 30,000 troops — which would be contained rather than directly confronted. At this point, Kim would call for a negotiated cease-fire, as well as the end of sanctions and other efforts to get him to give up his nuclear weapons.
As to those North Korean nukes, they would be held in reserve.
Kim would make it abundantly clear that a continuation of the war would result in escalation that would include irradiating Seoul — he might even hint at having an atomic weapon secreted away in a ship container sitting in the Port of Oakland or some other American harbor. He does not need to be able to put a nuclear warhead on a long-range missile. A merchant vessel will do just fine as a covert delivery system.
Against this threat, it would take an exceptionally steely resolve to call Kim’s bluff and send the enormous number of U.S. troops required to push back the North Koreans. Any hope of taking the campaign further, to oust Kim and his regime, would surely see him use his weapons of mass destruction.
China might intervene to prevent regime change before any nuclear exchange occurred — but this is hardly a happy prospect for American strategists. Beijing’s involvement against U.S. and U.N. forces in the Korean War guaranteed that it would devolve into a bloody, protracted stalemate. A replay would be most distasteful.
In the American policy discourse about North Korea, both the left and the right recognize that there are no good options. Liberals, as well as many centrists and even a significant number of conservatives, have thus committed to a strategy based on economic sanctions and diplomacy. The problem is, sanctions generally don’t work, and never have against Kim, or his father or grandfather before him.
As to negotiations, the American insistence on forcing Kim to make nuclear concessions before sitting down to talk — to “earn its way back to the table,” as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has so infelicitously put the matter — is a nonstarter. This leaves only the hawks and their hope that a vigorous preventive campaign might catch Kim off balance and de-fang him before he can strike telling, costly blows of his own.
For his part, Kim is undoubtedly committed to continuing to develop the North’s nuclear capabilities — as he made clear in his New Year’s Day message. He can tough out sanctions, and has shown some aptitude for rhetorical mud-wrestling with President Trump. If and when it looks like U.S. policy is moving toward military action — and there will be endless public discussion of such a move — Kim will have ample time to launch his limited conventional military campaign before being hit by a preventive strike.
As noted above, this is a viable option for Kim, one that allows him room to seize the initiative when it comes to the use of force. He will not simply lob a missile or two at the United States, inviting a pummeling and his own overthrow in return. But he can take limited action, then use his nuclear arsenal to deter American counter-intervention.
Can anything be done to make such an outcome less likely? There is one chance: open negotiations with the North without any preconditions. These talks can be direct or mediated by Moscow, which offered last week to act as facilitator. Given the Trump-Putin bromance, a Russian role in crisis resolution could be most welcome.
How might the matter play out? A true deal of the century would see Kim freeze his nuclear weapons and missile programs in return for an end to sanctions and a guarantee that the United States will never seek the overthrow of the Pyongyang regime. Not perfect, but good. Very good, compared to the alternatives.