Carrier captain justifies ‘red flare’
Faced with a “bureaucratic logjam” above him and a spiraling coronavirus outbreak aboard his aircraft carrier, Navy Capt. Brett Crozier told investigators he knew sending up a “red flare” would jeopardize his military career, but he did it to avoid catastrophe.
“My intent in sending the email ... was to bring a sense of urgency to a rapidly deteriorating and potentially deadly situation onboard the (Theodore Roosevelt) and avoid a larger catastrophe and loss of life,” Crozier said in a witness statement obtained exclusively by The Chronicle on Thursday.
“Although my method may have been imperfect, I reached out to those in my Chain of Command whom I believed were in the best position to provide immediate assistance to expedite the necessary decision and action,” he said. “Despite possible long term repercussions to my career, I acted in what I believed was in the best interest of the Sailors aboard TR.”
The Santa Rosa native’s 26page witness statement, recorded during the Navy’s investigation into the handling of the outbreak aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier, provides the first glimpse into Crozier’s thought process before he sent the letter that shook the Navy and military world to its core.
The 50yearold captain, subsequently stripped of his position and found unfit to command a Navy unit, discussed his decisionmaking process from an early March port visit in Vietnam to his final discussions with Thomas Modly, thenacting Navy secretary. Modly later resigned over the incident.
In addition to Crozier’s statement, The Chronicle reviewed thousands of pages of investigatory records and witness statements that showed that much of Crozier’s crew was fiercely loyal to the captain and suspicious of his firing. Some crew members questioned whether Navy brass did the bidding of President Trump, who had criticized Crozier early on.
“I feel (Crozier) was willing to fall on his sword to show that appropriate actions were not being taken . ... I think that he was relieved because of a political decision by Modly or possibly at the OSD/POTUS level,” said Roosevelt Executive Officer Capt. Daniel Keeler in his witness statement.
He likened Crozier’s dismissal to “dropping a nuclear bomb in the middle of an ongoing crisis.”
However, many of Crozier’s bosses were critical of his actions, saying his email was unnecessary because action was already under way to evacuate the crowded and infected warship. When asked how much trust he had in Crozier commanding a ship, Vice Adm. William Merz, commander of the 7h Fleet, was frank: “Zero.”
“Based on the regular and timely feed of information to him and his team, either he wasn’t listening, could not comprehend, or maliciously undermined the response,” Merz told investigators. “When he did act, he did so in a way arguably the most inappropriate possible and in spite of all other avenues being available. All fatal flaws — not fit for command.”
The Roosevelt saga began in March at the infancy of the pandemic and with few outbreaks among the military. On March 30, as dozens of sailors tested positive after the carrier docked in Guam, a frustrated Crozier wrote a letter saying more needed to be done to remove his 5,000 sailors from the ship or lives would be lost. He complained that pierside accommodations didn’t have proper social distancing, lacked individual bathroom facilities and had poor ventilation.
Over 1,200 sailors — more than 1 in 5 — would test positive for the virus, including Crozier, who spent a month in Guam isolation before he tested negative and returned home to San Diego. Several would be hospitalized and one would die from COVID19 complications. Days after The Chronicle exclusively reported on Crozier’s explosive email, he was relieved of his command, receiving a hero’s sendoff from his crew.
In April, Navy officials initially recommended Crozier’s reinstatement, but a deeper investigation led to a June decision to not bring Crozier back to helm the Roosevelt. Naval officials said only that Crozier would be “reassigned” and be ineligible for future command posts. Crozier has kept a low profile and not spoken publicly since the ordeal, but has been showered with international accolades.
Crozier gave his statement to investigators on May 8.
In midMarch, when the first three positive cases were found aboard the warship, Crozier described how he instituted “Bleachapalooza” — twice daily scrubbing with all hands — along with shutting down gyms, a barbershop and other operations. Infected sailors and those with close contacts were isolated in the aft of the ship. Crozier would later be criticized for prematurely releasing sailors from that quarantine zone, possibly spreading the virus among the rest of the ship.
However, his secondincommand, Keeler, called the aft berthing plan a “failure,” and said the spread was already taking hold in the rest of the ship.
“We had some true human suffering in aft berthing. Conditions were poor,” Keeler told investigators. Family members were complaining about sailors stuck in close quarters with sick colleagues, a lack of food and bleak conditions. “I regret attempting it and would not do it again.”
As more men and women got sick, conditions deteriorated and Crozier and his officers worked to get the bulk of the crew offloaded and isolated, with a limited number of sailors staying onboard. Testing capabilities were limited, Senior Medical Officer Capt. John York said, with the ship limited to 40 diagnostic tests a day.
As Crozier began discussions with Navy higherups, he
pushed for individual hotel rooms on Guam for isolation and told investigators he was concerned that the Navy was pushing unrealistic plans to fly sailors to Okinawa or house the sailors pierside.
Meanwhile, sailors were infecting one another in the gym and not getting enough to eat, leading some to order pizza from a base restaurant to eat, Crozier said. And the Roosevelt medical staff painted a dire picture based on studies of cruise ships with outbreaks. The carrier had tighter conditions and more communal berthing and bathrooms than stricken cruise ships. Crozier said even though his crew was younger and healthier than the average cruise passenger, he felt if nothing was done, five to six sailors from the crew could die in the near future.
On March 28, Crozier said he was told to expect a call from Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday, but the call was canceled.
“The phone call might have provided a more thorough understanding of wider Navy efforts to combat the virus onboard and with our crew, allowed me to communicate our desire to get Sailors into effective isolation quarters ashore, and instilled confidence that the situation was being rapidly addressed at the appropriate levels,” Crozier told investigators.
By March 30, Crozier was fed up. Navy heads were stuck debating inconsequential details, such as whether to put Social Security numbers on testing kits, he said.
“I believe everyone involved was well intentioned, but some up the chain of command were proceeding more slowly than I would have liked and getting unnecessarily wrapped up in the status quo of (plan) development,” Crozier told investigators. “From my perspective, even just one more week of routine planning would have resulted in another week of exponential growth in positive cases and greater risk to more Sailors. We wanted to stop the administrative bureaucracy ... so I sent up a red flare.”
After his dismissal, Navy officials insisted that Crozier was not being punished for sending an email asking for assistance, but for needlessly breaking the sacrosanct chain of command and for poorly managing the unfolding outbreak on his ship. The captain said he left Merz, commander of the 7th Fleet, off his email because he wanted to send it to flag officers in his chain of command “that I know.”
“(Merz’s) staff was still trying to bound the problem, and information flow there suggested they might see the email as a hindrance to normal staff work (versus) see it as a red flare,” Crozier told investigators. “In hindsight, there was no good reason for not including (Merz) and I suspect that he would have been as responsive as everyone else was.”
Crozier said he sent the email through unclassified channels because speed was of the essence and quicker to read than on a government smartphone. Top Navy officers have said this led to the memo being leaked and jeopardized sensitive plans with the Guam government to house sailors in hotel rooms.
“In hindsight, there was higher risk that the letter would end up in the open press by sending it on an unclassified network, but that was not my intent,” Crozier told investigators.
His crew overwhelmingly agreed with his decision to send the email, as his operations officer told investigators in his statement.
“After Capt. Crozier sent the email, we suddenly had an ability to get hotel rooms. All of a sudden we have progress,” he said. “I think 100% it had to do with the letter because magically, we had rooms available.”
Crozier was dismissed from command April 3 in Guam after an angry phone call from Modly, who was upset Crozier hadn’t “reached out to him personally about my continuing concerns,” Crozier said. On April 6, the captain said, Modly visited him in quarantine in Guam and said he relieved him of duty because “he lost trust and confidence in me.”
“However, based on incorrect comments he made to the press and onboard the (Roosevelt) to the crew earlier that day, where he said I sent the email to 20 to 30 people, and that I panicked as a leader and raised alarm bells unnecessarily,” Crozier said, “I think his decision was premature.”