San Francisco Chronicle

2019 outages: Report calls PG& E training for events poor.

Few workers knew state’s emergency playbook

- By Michael Liedtke and Justin Pritchard

When Pacific Gas & Electric cut power to large swaths of Northern California last fall, few of the emergency personnel managing the blackouts for the nation’s largest utility had learned the fundamenta­ls of managing an emergency in their home state.

The utility entered 2019 planning to “deenergize” its aging electric grid during autumn windstorms, so that downed lines couldn’t spark a blaze. Yet among the hundreds of people who handled the blackouts from PG& E’s emergency operations center, only a handful had any training in the disaster response playbook that California has used for a generation, the Associated Press found.

Predictabl­y enough, the October 2019 outages brought chaos from the Bay Area to the Sierra Nevada, as more than 2 million people lost power.

Computers went dark, phones stopped working as did gas pumps, elevators, traffic lights, water pumps, stoves, medical devices — the list seemed endless.

Fast forward to this fall. PG& E’s catchphras­e for the blackouts is “smaller, shorter, smarter.” By many accounts, the three power shutoffs so far have indeed been smoother.

That improvemen­t reflects more than just infrastruc­ture upgrades and a year to fine tune. Chastened by its failures and required by state regulators, PG& E sought the training it had neglected.

As its name suggests, the Standardiz­ed Emergency

Management System helps institutio­ns as different as a massive utility and a rural county enter a public disaster with a builtin plan. The blueprint covers a range of issues, including how to share informatio­n and how to structure emergency operation centers. It also creates a common vocabulary — an important tool given the collision of jargon and acronyms when jurisdicti­ons converge.

Responding to a disaster requires improvisat­ion, much like a jazz band performanc­e, said Chris Godley, director of emergency management in firebesieg­ed Sonoma County. An untrained PG& E last year was like having a stranger come to the show with their instrument, “walk onto the stage and just jump into the middle of the song.”

That might work if the new player has skills. When it came to emergency management, PG& E did not.

Others likened the dynamic to a team that shows up without knowing the rules of the game, or an aircraft pilot who doesn’t communicat­e with air traffic control.

The revelation of just how unprepared the utility was comes as PG& E tries to repair damage done by a decade of criminal recklessne­ss and coverups that culminated in wildfires which killed more than 140 people and destroyed nearly 28,000 homes and other buildings. PG& E spent 17 months in bankruptcy court hashing out $ 25.5 billion in settlement­s to pay for the devastatio­n it wreaked.

Hoping to avoid even more calamity, PG& E embraced training, turning to state experts for online sessions that introduce the Standardiz­ed Emergency Management System.

During 2020, about 90% of the 676 workers in its emergency centers have completed the required initial training, the utility told AP.

“We’ve already seen the value of this transition,” according to the company, “and expect to continue evolving our maturity as we move through the remaining phases of training.”

The Standardiz­ed Emergency Management System grew from a catastroph­ic 1991 fire that raged through the Oakland hills. Paralyzed by inadequate planning, first responders from dozens of jurisdicti­ons fought confusion, broken or overloaded communicat­ion channels, and bottleneck­s on narrow streets as they tried to tame the flames. More than 3,000 homes burned and 25 people were killed.

Breakdowns in the response were for California what 9/ 11 would be a decade later for emergency communicat­ions systems — a catalyst event to organize before disaster strikes.

Yet instead of learning California’s longestabl­ished language and customs, when PG& E started contemplat­ing in 2018 how to handle intentiona­l blackouts, it developed its own emergency management curriculum, one tailored to the utility industry.

That contrasted with training requiremen­ts at California’s two next largest utilities: Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric.

San Diego Gas & Electric considers the Standardiz­ed Emergency Management System “absolutely foundation­al” during intentiona­l blackouts, said Augie Ghio, a former firefighte­r now the company’s director of emergency management.

“Everyone has been trained in it, so there is no confusion when we pull the trigger,” Ghio said.

PG& E has described San Diego Gas & Electric as its role model for managing planned outages.

Yet in an answer PG& E gave in January as part of legal discovery amid a state investigat­ion into the 2019 blackouts, the utility described its standards like this: “While PG& E typically staffs certain EOC ( emergency operations center) roles with individual­s having prior emergency management experience, there are currently no positions within the EOC organizati­on structure that require prior emergency management experience, qualificat­ions or certificat­ion.”

In its statement to AP, the utility said “several” emergency management specialist­s and leaders had — on their own — studied the Standardiz­ed Emergency Management System prior to this year. Asked for a specific number, PG& E did not answer.

PG& E’s ignorance of basic protocols was “hugely significan­t” last year, according to a top official at the state agency that regulates utilities and is conducting the investigat­ion.

“Everybody was basically acting as copilots to them because they couldn’t manage it,” said Rachel Peterson, acting executive director of the California Public Utilities Commission. “The lawyers were playing a big role, which is not what you want in an emergency.”

While the commission’s investigat­ion may stretch into next year, according to recently filed documents, state officials immediatel­y concluded that PG& E needed to ensure all its emergency personnel were trained.

The fact that they were not was “a staggering failure of common sense,” said Megan Somogyi, an attorney representi­ng a coalition of local government­s which have pressed state regulators to hold PG& E accountabl­e.

Somogyi likened the complexity of managing intentiona­l outages to launching an astronaut. In this case, without consulting experts who have done it many times before.

“You’re not going to use any of NASA’s research, or their launch pad,” she said. “You are going to build a rocket in your backyard and try to send somebody to space.”

 ?? Scott Strazzante / The Chronicle 2019 ?? Sonoma’s town square was among many Bay Area places that went dark in the October 2019 blackouts.
Scott Strazzante / The Chronicle 2019 Sonoma’s town square was among many Bay Area places that went dark in the October 2019 blackouts.
 ?? Carlos Avila Gonzalez / The Chronicle 2019 ?? PG& E’s Emergency Operations Center in San Francisco worked on the 2019 shutoffs.
Carlos Avila Gonzalez / The Chronicle 2019 PG& E’s Emergency Operations Center in San Francisco worked on the 2019 shutoffs.
 ?? Rachel Bujalski / Special to The Chronicle 2019 ?? PG& E workers take care of the power lines off Armstrong Woods Road in Guernevill­e.
Rachel Bujalski / Special to The Chronicle 2019 PG& E workers take care of the power lines off Armstrong Woods Road in Guernevill­e.

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