Afghan security overhaul falters
U.S., NATO leaders frustrated with slow pace of security reforms
KABUL, Afghanistan — Last year, the U.S. military spent more than $100 million to rebuild the Afghan army’s 215th Corps, which is battling resurgent Taliban militants in the southern province of Helmand.
Soldiers were to be recruited and trained, and armed with new equipment. A new commander, trumpeted as visionary and clean of corruption, was appointed to rebuild and reform the unit, which was a shambles just a year after taking charge of security in Helmand from the U.S.-led NATO coalition. Casualties were at a record high, the leadership was corrupt, and many of the soldiers existed only on paper.
But as winter set in, it became clear that the plan had not worked.
Over the course of the year, the Taliban gained more territory; the militants now largely control seven of 14 districts in Helmand and contest another five, according to local officials. Casualties among government forces in the province broke records again.
And that new commander? He was arrested on charges of stealing food and fuel intended for his beleaguered soldiers.
With large swaths of the Afghan countryside under Taliban control and several cities threatened, U.S. and NATO leaders are growing frustrated with the slow pace of security reforms that they see as necessary to battle the insurgency.
A major problem is the rampant corruption of the Afghan security leadership, which is profiting from the chaos even as soldiers die in record numbers.
“Most of that work was rapidly undone, because of corruption and inept leadership,” says Maj. Gen. Richard G. Kaiser, in charge of the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan, referring to efforts to reform the 215th. “When they went into the winter cycle, the 215th Corps was pretty low and we said we are not going to do this again.”
There is a breakdown of the regional consensus over the U.S. mission here. Russia and Iran, in addition to Pakistan, are increasingly accused of fostering ties with the Taliban and hedging their own bets.
“The American military has tried for 15 years to help Afghanistan build a professional army,” said Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired American general who commanded coalition forces in Afghanistan. “It has always assumed that its own goal of defeating the insurgency is shared by Afghan army leaders.”
But, he added, “this is often not so.”
Eikenberry said that for many Afghan commanders, the Taliban were just one concern in an uncertain political and economic environment.
“Others are ensuring the welfare of his family and supporters, staying aligned with political patrons, and avoiding combat so as to preserve his unit, which is a source of revenue,” he said, referring to commanders in general.
One senior Afghan official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to candidly express his concerns, described what he called a caste-based system within the ranks.
At the top, he said, is a class of often incompetent generals, many of them from the Communist or the civil war period who had strong political ties.
“We hear story after story of commanders who steal the fuel, sell it to the Taliban, who take the weapons we — you — pay for and sell it to the Taliban,” John Sopko, the U.S. special inspector general for Afghanistan, said in a recent speech. “The irony of it is, the terrorists are at the end of our supply chain.”