Marines eye limited goals in Afghanistan
Old efforts to establish rule of law have so clearly failed that they are no longer under consideration
Old methods to establish rule of law are no longer considered.
TCAMP SHORAB, Afghanistan he last time U.S. Marines were in Helmand province, they had a sweeping mission and the resources to carry it out. Tens of thousands of Marines flooded the southern villages here, and they had tens of millions of dollars in cash to throw into projects that would bolster local support. They spearheaded some of the bloodiest battles of this long war, losing 349 dead in the process, but they succeeded in turning much of what had been prime Taliban and opium territory over to the Afghan government.
Then, following the Obama administration’s deadline to have combat forces out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014, they went home.
Now they are back in Helmand with a changed mission, looking at an overwhelmingly changed map. Within two years, Helmand, Afganistan’s largest province, all but returned to the hands of the Taliban. Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital and a haven for tens of thousands of refugees from the fighting, has been surrounded for more than a year, and in that time has been infiltrated by insurgents at least three times.
The performance of the Afghan forces, left on their own, was catastrophic, with 60 to 70 soldiers dying each week.
After days of traveling and talking with Marines and their Afghan allies, it is clear there is little glory. Instead, the new mission is a treacherous grind in temperatures well over 100 degrees — described as a “hair dryer in your face” — to achieve expectations lowered to the most basic.
The mission is no longer about complete control of Helmand. Old efforts to establish local governance and rule of law here have so clearly failed that they are no longer in the picture. The Marines are simply trying to keep Lashkar Gah from falling to the Taliban, and to help the Afghan forces come out of their barracks and put up a fight.
There is no withdrawal deadline this time, and no clearly defined strategy to end the war — other than hoping to persuade the Taliban to give up and eventually talk of peace.
Task Force Southwest, consisting of about 300 Marines and some sailors, has taken up quarters in a corner of what had been a British base and is now the headquarters of the Afghan army’s 215th Corps.
Many of the senior U.S. officers have served in Helmand before. The last time Brig. Gen. Roger B. Turner Jr., commanding general of the task force, was in Helmand, in 2011, he was leading a regimental combat team responsible for four southern districts. There they established about 175 outposts. His current deputy, Col. Matthew S. Reid, was in Helmand then, too, leading clearance operations in Garmsir district, establishing about 50 outposts across a 30-mile stretch. Now most of the areas they cleared and held have been retaken by the Taliban. Many of the tribal elders and government leaders Turner worked with have been killed. For weeks after arriving in April, he struggled with the burden of that past.“You carry that baggage with you — of the places we fought and sacrificed, and to see it rolled back,” he said. “Dwelling on the past is just not useful, because we have a job to do going forward.”
Reid said he was not surprised by the reversals. “It went back to what, I think, you could have reasonably predicted it would have — because, fundamentally, we weren’t here long enough,” he said. “It’s a generational fix.”
Capt. John D. Quail, a U.S. operations officer, sat next to the Afghan army corps’ operations chief, Lt. Col. Abdul Latif. They discussed the dots covering the map on the wall in front of them, representing Afghan presence.
“It is easy for us to take Nawa, but difficult to hold,” Latif said about a Taliban-controlled district bordering the provincial capital. He looked at his gold watch now and then as the session ran deep into lunchtime. “We need at least 300 police, but they cannot provide that,” he added. “They have a lot of guys on paper, but in reality not enough guys.”
The Marines are essentially gearing up for an occupation of the province’s crucial areas by an Afghan force that has close to zero local soldiers in its ranks. Most of the soldiers come from Afghanistan’s north and east.
As one Marine officer put it: “It’s like sending the New York or Massachusetts Guard to control Texas cowboy country in the 1800s.”
For the Marines, the new mission is close to no action — a lot of talking over maps with little good news on them. Outside those sessions, though, is a reminder the risk could be all around. Young Marines, called “guardian angels,” keep watch outside offices and outposts for potential green-on-blue attackers — Afghans who snap, or are recruited by the insurgents, and turn their weapons against their allies.
During a recent visit with the police advisory unit, Sgt. Maj. Darrell L. Carver warned that the Taliban wanted a “catastrophic” attack to sow mistrust between the Americans and the Afghans they are advising.
“All it takes,” he said, “is for a couple of you to drop your jaw.”