U.S. should keep out of Venezuela
When I served as commander of U.S. Southern Command, my first four-star assignment, I visited every country and territory in Latin America — except Venezuela. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez had destroyed relations with the U.S., cratered the country’s economy and polarized its electorate.
Death by violence soared, hitting levels 10 times that of the U.S., and 50 times higher than Western Europe. The nation’s abundance of oil became a curse, as corruption depleted the output of rich fields that hold the largest reserves in the world. And drug smuggling became endemic. It was a sorry state of affairs for a country that inherited the legacy of Simón Bolívar, the great liberator.
When Chávez died of cancer in 2013, there was a brief moment of hope that his passing would usher in a more rational set of policies under his successor, Nicolás Maduro. Instead, the downward spiral accelerated, and today a country that should be the most prosperous in the region — a “Dubai on the Caribbean” — is in the throes of a massive refugee crisis.
Close to 4 million Venezuelans, of the pre-crisis population of just over 31 million, have fled the country. Refugee centers in the surrounding countries are overflowing, and Colombia and Brazil in particular are struggling to cope. And relations with the U.S. have even gotten worse, with Maduro recently claiming the U.S. is preparing an invasion and attempting to ferment a coup to overthrow his government. He also claims Washington backed the supposed assassination attempt by drone strike Aug. 4.
What can the U.S. do in the face of this political, economic and — above all — humanitarian crisis?
First, the Trump administration needs to avoid anything that smacks of unilateral U.S. military action. What I learned over the course of years at Southern Command is how deeply ingrained the concern over historic U.S. interventionism is across the region.
Even nations that today are strong partners and allies — Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia — are cognizant of our long record of intrusions in their societies. They are hypersensitive to the U.S. military in particular and anything else that smacks of U.S. political or economic bullying. Therefore, in addition to passing on any opportunities to back military coups (and the CIA is probably being frequently approached), the White House should seek to work multilaterally, preferably through the Organization of American States and the United Nations.
Second, we should increase our intelligence collection. Southern Command often is the poor sister among the nine U.S. combatant commands in terms of access to Defense Department resources. Satellite focus time, aircraft and naval surveillance missions, human intelligence and cyber espionage are all prioritized to Central Command (for Iran and Syria) and Pacific Command (for North Korea and China). That is normally a reasonable precedence, but given the level of instability and the refugee flows, it is time to increase the priority for Southern Command’s Miami-based intelligence organization. We should also enlist Colombia — no ally has better intelligence on the ground in the region, particularly in Venezuela.
A third sensible approach would be stepping up interagency cooperation, especially in preparation for potential massive humanitarian crises. This means not only the Pentagon, but also the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Using Guantánamo Bay as a staging area for humanitarian operations makes sense, and the Defense Department already has formal contingency plans to do just that. There are prestaged refugee housing areas, supplies and plenty of experience.
While Americans tend to think of the base as a detention center, it also has enormous strategic value for regional logistics and disaster relief.
Fourth, we should encourage Brazil and Colombia to join forces politically and militarily as the basis for a multinational refugee-control force. The civil capability of the countries in the region is quickly being overwhelmed, and there is an appropriate role for the military to play in terms of search and rescue, crowd control, medical response and providing basic food and shelter. We should hope that other nations in the region (both in northern South America and the Caribbean) would join in. At that point — when it is a legitimate regional response — it would make sense for the U.S. to participate. Doing so sooner simply gives the Maduro regime a tasty talking point about “Yanqui aggression.”
Finally, we are going to need a long-term strategy that resolves the bubbling cauldron of anger in Venezuela, which is verging into civil-war territory. That means patiently supporting other regional actors in forcing the Maduro regime to the negotiating table with the opposition.
Ideally, over time, the people of Venezuela would be able to go to the ballot box legitimately and choose the kind of leadership they need and deserve: one that is respectful of human rights, allows for verifiable and corruption-free democratic elections, and uses a free-market approach to exploit the vast resources of the nation. We are a long way from that outcome, but a steady, patient U.S. strategy in the region may get us there.