Electronic warfare confounds pilots off battlefield
Electronic warfare in the Middle East and Ukraine is affecting air travel far from the battlefields, unnerving pilots and exposing an unintended consequence of a tactic that experts say will become more common.
Planes are losing satellite signals, flights have been diverted and pilots have received false location reports or inaccurate warnings they were flying close to terrain, according to European Union safety regulators and an internal airline memo viewed by The New York Times. The Federal Aviation Administration has also warned pilots about GPS jamming in the Middle East.
Radio frequency interference — intended to disrupt the satellite signals used by rockets, drones and other weaponry — spiked after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and has grown even more intense this fall in the Middle East. The interference can involve jamming satellite signals by drowning them out with noise, or spoofing them — mimicking real satellite signals to trick recipients with misleading information.
The radio interference has so far not proven to be dangerous. But aircraft systems have proved largely unable to detect GPS spoofing and correct for it, according to Opsgroup, an organization that monitors changes and risks in the aviation industry. One Embraer jet bound for Dubai, United Arab Emirates, nearly veered into Iranian airspace in September before the pilots figured out the plane was chasing a false signal.
“We only realized there was an issue because the autopilot started turning to the left and right, so it was obvious that something was wrong,” crew members reported to Opsgroup.
Airplanes can typically fly safely without satellite signals, and large commercial aircraft have at least six alternative navigation systems, pilots said. Business jets such as Dassault Falcons, Gulfstreams and Bombardiers appear to be more susceptible to signal spoofing, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency said.
The strain on aviation could be a harbinger of far-reaching economic and security problems as the weapons of electronic warfare proliferate. Financial markets, telecom companies, power providers, broadcasters and other industries around the world rely on satellite signals to keep accurate time. One study from Britain said that a five-day disruption of satellite signals could cost the country $6.3 billion.
Satellite signals have long been known to be susceptible to jamming and spoofing. They transmit from orbit, more than 12,000 miles above Earth, and are so weak that their power compares to that of a lightbulb.
But many experts had dismissed spoofing attacks as too complicated and expensive for all but highly-trained experts, according to Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin.
Prices have fallen quickly. Today, an enthusiastic amateur with a few hundred dollars and instructions from the internet can spoof satellite signals. Governments, too, have been more willing to overtly interfere with signals as part of their electronic warfare.
Russia has disrupted GPS signals to misdirect Ukrainian drones and throw precision-guided shells off their targets. Ukraine also jams Russian receivers but lacks the same level of sophistication. Jamming is common in conflict zones. Spoofing, until recently, was rare.
“I have never seen this level of spoofing,” said Martin Drake, a technical expert for the British Airline Pilots’ Association who recently retired after 42 years as a pilot.
The interference has been felt up to 190 miles away from battlefields and “appears to go well beyond simple military mission effectiveness,” according to Eurocontrol, Europe’s primary air-traffic-control manager. The worst-affected regions include the skies above the Black Sea area from Turkey to Azerbaijan; the Mediterranean Sea extending from Cyprus to Libya; the Baltic Sea near Poland and Latvia; and the Arctic near Finland and Norway.