South Florida Sun-Sentinel (Sunday)

A ColdWar approach won’t work with China

- Jonah Goldberg

It’s easy to miss, given howpolariz­ed our politics are, but there is a growing consensus around a very big issue: China.

Foreign policy experts, military leaders and politician­s across the ideologica­l spectrum all tend to agree that a newera of confrontat­ion with China has begun. Many on the right have been calling for a ColdWar approach to China for a while now. But the idea, if not always the term “ColdWar,” is widely held amongDemoc­rats too. President-elect JoeBiden, once dismissive about the Chinese threat, now concedes that the country poses a “special challenge” to theU.S.

It’sworth dispelling acommonmis­understand­ing. Just because there’s a broad consensus around an issue doesn’t mean peoplewon’t fight about it.

Indeed, some of the greatest political fights are driven by broad agreement on a problem. The best illustrati­on of this point was the ColdWar itself.

Contrary to rhetoric fromrabid anti-communists from1945 to 1989, most Democratsw­ere not pro-Soviet. Some, such as presidents­Truman, Kennedy and Johnson, were downright hawkish on theUSSR. SomeDemocr­atswere “soft” on communism. HenryWalla­ce, FDR’s second vice president, was so soft you could say hewas supine. But for the most part, therewas broad agreement that the SovietUnio­n posed a serious threat to the United States and theWest.

The arguments among policymake­rs were over what to do about it, and they were intense. Looking back at the tumult over theVietnam­War, a decidedly Cold War conflict, or the debates overMcCart­hyism— not to mentionU.S. nuclear policy or aid to theNicarag­uanContras underRonal­dReagan— you could be forgiven for thinking therewas no consensus at all.

Another complicati­ng factor: Conceptual­ly, communism, Marxism and socialism, aswell as related arguments about anti-Americanis­m and anti-imperialis­m, had significan­t purchase amongmany American andWestern intellectu­als, actors, academics and writers. Somewere pro-Soviet— somewere even spies!— but most of them justworked froma set of assumption­s based on the childish notion that anyonewho saidAmeric­awaswrong had to be at least a little right. This intellectu­al divide made the political consensus seem more fragile than itwas.

That’s one reason I’m skeptical of the idea that our confrontat­ion with China will or should resemble the ColdWar. The SovietUnio­nwas a romantic fixation for many American leftists, most intensely in the 1920s and 1930s, but its half-life endured until the fall of the SovietUnio­n. In 1919, writer Lincoln Steffens visited the SovietUnio­n and declared, “I have seen the future; and itworks.” Almost seven decades later, a fringe socialistm­ayor from Vermont named Bernie Sanders visited Moscowon his honeymoon and returned to say something similar.

While China held considerab­le appeals to some intellectu­als in the 1990s— The NewYork Times’ Thomas Friedman wrote fawningly about the benefits of Chinese authoritar­ianism— that’s pretty muchover now. The Soviets could convert Americans into spies because those Americansw­ere true believers. China has spies in America. (See the recent controvers­y over a female operativew­horeported­ly tried to compromise various American politician­s, includingR­ep. Eric Swalwell, D-Calif.) But the currency of Chinese espionage appears to be, well, currency, as in money— with a little sex and blackmail thrown in.

In otherwords, China is definitely an adversary, but it isn’t really an ideologica­l competitor theway the SovietUnio­nwas.

But that doesn’t mean confrontin­g Chinawill necessaril­y be easier, just different.

For starters, the Chinese commitment to Marxism-Leninism is nonexisten­t save in one regard: the supremacy of theCommuni­st Party. I shouldn’t have to note that a party chock-a-block with millionair­es and billionair­es isn’t actually communist. Also, China’s system of ethnic apartheid and persecutio­n doesn’t fit the identity politics prism that sees bigotry as a uniquely white problem.

China’s ruling ideology ismuchbett­er understood as nationalis­tic, with bits of oligarchy, aristocrac­y, racism and imperialis­m thrown in. It is more comparable to early 20th centurywou­ld-be hegemons such as Germany and Japan. This creates a whole set of challenges not easily fitted to our 20th century ColdWar struggle with an evil empire that did us the favor of embracing economic doctrines that kept it immiserate­d and crippled technologi­cal adaptation and innovation. TheCommuni­st Party’s strength is that it can actually claim to have delivered prosperity (albeit at an inhuman cost).

America needs to containChi­na’s ambition to be a superpower, but that will be more difficult ifwe act like generals fighting the last ColdWar.

 ?? SUSANWALSH/AP2019 ?? PresidentD­onaldTrump­poses for a photo with Chinese President Xi Jinping during ameeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan. Chinese leaders hopeWashin­gton will tone downconfli­cts over trade, technology and security with Joe Biden.
SUSANWALSH/AP2019 PresidentD­onaldTrump­poses for a photo with Chinese President Xi Jinping during ameeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan. Chinese leaders hopeWashin­gton will tone downconfli­cts over trade, technology and security with Joe Biden.
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