Putin needs a permanent reality check
One year on, Russia’s war on Ukraine has upended many of the established norms of international affairs, including a country’s right to sovereignty and territorial integrity. The year 2022 will likely be seen as a pivotal moment in history, when the norms of a U.S.-led international rulesbased order were challenged by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire for a new security arrangement built on historic grievances, revanchism, and great power rivalry. What the American response will be to his imperial aggression will have implications for decades to come.
Prior to his invasion, Putin appeared to be in a strong position politically and strategically. He had cracked down on virtually all domestic opposition and exercised control over Russian media and messaging. His military was considered second only in fighting power to that of the United States. America, meanwhile, was struggling with internal political divisions, and its chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan led some allies to questions its international commitments. In Europe, Olaf Scholz had just replaced longtime German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Emmanuel Macron was up for reelection. In addition, Putin had signed a “no limits” partnership with President Xi of China, which he hoped would form an alternative, autocratic model to that of the American led rules-based order.
At the same time, Putin intensely resented the United States and NATO for what he felt was their responsibility for the 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union, “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” A particular focus of this resentment was a sovereign Ukraine. In 2008, Putin told then President George W. Bush that “Ukraine is not even a country,” and then in 2014 he seized Crimea and used Russian separatists to occupy parts of the Donbas. The Western response to those actions consisted mostly of condemnations and sanctions, but not much more.
For Putin, therefore, the conditions seemed favorable for making a move against Ukraine. He assumed Kyiv could be captured within three days and the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced by a pro-Russian government. A list of 700-plus collaborators was created, people ready to take on important roles around the country, and even uniforms were provided for a victory parade. Putin believed any Western response would be minimal, feeling that the countries of NATO and the EU were too divided to unite in action against Russia, and were too dependent on Moscow for their energy needs.
But as we know, Putin seriously miscalculated. He underestimated the strength of the Western-trained Ukrainian army and the determination of the Ukrainian people to resist Russian aggression. Zelensky took on a Churchillian role of rallying his nation and the world in defense of Ukraine. The United States, NATO, and EU responded by supplying intelligence, military equipment, and economic assistance. In Germany, Scholz declared that the invasion constituted a “Zeitenwende” (turning point) and initiated plans for a massive increase in defense spending. Both Sweden and Finland are now set to join NATO, adding 900 miles to the alliance’s northern flank. In addition, European countries have found alternative energy sources to reduce their dependence on Moscow.
Militarily, British Intelligence estimates reveal that Russian casualties number between 180,000 to 200,000. It is also believed that 97 percent of Russia’s military force is currently fighting in Ukraine and suffers from lack of training and equipment, as well as low morale. The anticipated Russian spring offensive has likely begun, but Moscow’s intent to capture additional Ukrainian territory is limited by its current lack of capability.
Russia, however, does still have resources to continue the conflict for likely a long time. It has, for example, a large population from which to mobilize additional troops and its air force remains largely intact. In addition, the United States has warned that China is considering sending lethal aid to Russia, a development that could impact the momentum of the war. Putin is also purchasing military equipment from other sources, including drones from Iran and artillery from North Korea.
Given Russia’s current challenges on the ground, now is the time for the United States and its allies to increase the amount and ramp up the speed of delivery of military equipment to Ukraine. Military experts argue that more tanks, deep strike artillery and rockets, lethal drones, and better air defense systems are vital to shift the battleground balance. In addition, aircraft such as MiG-29s and F-16s would enable Ukrainian pilots to control the skies over their territory. Such overwhelming force would allow Kiev’s spring counteroffensive to start pushing Russian troops from its occupied lands, about 16 percent of the country.
This will take time, analysts predict, perhaps two or three years, but is far preferable to a grinding stalemate lasting even longer. Simultaneously, sanctions should continue to be strengthened against Moscow, financial assistance should increase to fund Ukraine’s economy, and intelligencesharing should intensify as the fighting grows. Putin’s preference would be for a long war, one waged for years. Indeed, he wants nothing more than to see the unity of the West unravel over time, opposition rise against the war within those countries or for a new, more favorable U.S. President or Congress in 2024.
Ukraine has been a reality check on Putin’s imperial fantasies, but he will not stop there. This month Ukrainian intelligence revealed evidence of Russian psy-ops and coup attempt in neighboring Moldova. There is no off-ramp that Putin will take, as he knows that anything less than what he considers or can spin as a victory — an X factor — would likely result in his removal from power. This is a historical moment for America and its allies to give Ukraine what it needs to win, rather than just enough so that it doesn’t lose. Putin needs a permanent reality check so that his ambitions to recreate a Greater Russia Empire remain unrealized.