Two outsider presidents bad at taking advice
Stuart Eizenstat, a key policy adviser in Jimmy Carter’s White House, spent a quarter-century producing a massive account of the Carter years designed to show the 39th president deserves more credit than he has received for making a lasting impact.
Carter’s leadership in crafting the Camp David agreement and the resulting Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty has been widely recognized, as have the Panama Canal Treaty and his emphasis on human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Eizenstat bolsters his argument by citing Carter’s role in expanding environmental protection, enacting the first comprehensive energy policy and starting the post-Vietnam defense buildup.
But his newly published, 902-page volume, “President Carter,” is so painstakingly honest, it also shows in excruciating detail how the former Georgia governor’s unpreparedness, rigid personality and disdain for politics in decision-making had a negative effect on his presidency.
It comes at an opportune time, when the country has a far less prepared and less knowledgeable president, who often shows he lacks Carter’s seriousness of purpose. It underscores the need for Americans to pick presidents with more experience and a better understanding of the job.
In varying ways, each of the last four presidents—Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump—came to office lacking significant knowledge or relevant experience after defeating more experienced rivals. All made serious mistakes while learning on the job.
Clinton and Bush, like Carter, had governed states with politics far different from the contentious partisanship of Washington. Obama had been an insignificant member of the Illinois and U.S. Senates for a few years each. Trump had never held office.
In each case, their campaigns benefited from Americans’ never-ending desire to change the status quo, born of the simplistic belief that the way to break government’s underlying gridlock is to put someone different in charge. Carter, Obama and Trump all contended their outsider status would produce needed changes.
In some ways, Carter and Trump—the two unlikeliest winners in post-World War II America—are opposites. Carter disdained political factors in always seeking the right policy prescriptions. Trump always considers the potential political impact, often acting instinctively without seriously discussing what would be the best policy. Both approaches are needed.
One of Carter’s biggest mistakes, Eizenstat emphasizes, was his disdain for Washington’s establishment, especially Congress, which he mistakenly likened to the parochial Georgia Legislature. He reached out only under pressure from staff members who recognized he needed the establishment to achieve his extensive goals.
One anecdote, attributed to communications adviser Gerald Rafshoon, illustrates Carter’s attitude. Urged by congressional aide Frank Moore to invite Democratic Sens. Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. of Texas and Fritz Hollings of South Carolina to play tennis with him on the White House courts, Carter “finishes playing and says, ‘Well, good-bye,’ and goes back into the residence, leaving them sitting there, expecting to be invited up for a drink.” When Moore asked about it, Carter replied: “You told me to play tennis with them. I played tennis with them.”
Eizenstat details many instances where Carter’s refusal to consider the political aspects of issues undercut his efforts, notably during his two-year struggle to enact an energy program and the 444-day Iranian hostage crisis.
In a different way, Trump misunderstood Congress, assuming initially that Republican members would line up behind whatever he supported, generating his anger over last summer’s Senate refusal to “repeal and replace” Obamacare.
More recently, when nearly total support from the docile GOP majority failed to produce his desired results, he blamed the Democrats, though they control neither house.
Carter’s White House staff largely lacked Washington experience, forcing him to revamp it within a year. Trump named a dysfunctional staff before replacing many with unquestioning loyalists, confident his experience negotiating real estate deals prepared him for the presidency.
For Trump, everything is political, much of it aimed at reversing Obama’s policies, adhering to campaign promises or undercutting the independent counsel’s investigation of his campaign’s potential collusion with Russia and his own obstruction of that probe.
Recent decisions threatening a trade war with longtime U.S. allies and directing the Energy Department to bolster failing coal and nuclear plants were driven by campaign promises, rather than potential economic benefits.
Politics has ruled non-economic decisions. Trump, who once called himself “very pro-choice,” solidified support from Christian conservatives with consistent efforts to curb abortion rights. He used his constitutional pardon power to help fellow conservatives like controversial ex-Sheriff Joe Arpaio and ideologue Dinesh d’Souza.
Carter learned a lot, Eizenstat shows, but was still ignoring political advice on the final weekend before he lost to Ronald Reagan. Trump may gain short-term from this week’s meeting with Kim Jong Un, but the long-term result of his emphasis on politically appealing atmospherics remains to be seen.