The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
What constitutes obstruction of justice?
Legal experts weigh in on finer points of Trump allegations.
WASHINGTON — The testimony by former FBI Director James Comey that President Donald Trump, before firing him last month, demanded loyalty, urged him to drop the investigation into his former national security adviser, Michael Flynn, and pressed him to “lift the cloud” of the Russia inquiry is fueling accusations that the president obstructed justice.
Comey’s prepared testimony, which the Senate Intelligence Committee released Wednesday, corroborates prior reports about how Comey’s strained relationship with the president evolved, which had already prompted Democrats to raise the specter of obstruction.
Q: What is obstruction of justice?
A: Several federal statutes criminalize actions that impede official investigations. While some examples of illegal ways to thwart the justice system are specific — like killing a witness or destroying evidence — the law also includes broad, catchall prohibitions. For example, Sections 1503, 1505 and 1512 of Title 18 have variants of language making it a crime if someone corruptly “obstructs, influences or impedes any official proceeding.”
Q: Could that cover asking the FBI director to drop part of an investigation, and later firing him?
A: In theory, yes. Such statutes were broadly drafted. Julie O’Sullivan, a former federal prosecutor who now teaches white-collar criminal law at Georgetown University, says the power relationship between a president and the FBI director could elevate a request to shut down a case into an act that amounts to impeding an official investigation.
Q: Did Trump have lawful authority to fire Comey?
A: Yes. But courts have ruled that otherwise lawful acts can constitute obstruction of justice if done with corrupt intentions. In a 1998 case, for example, a federal appeals court upheld the conviction of a lawyer who had filed legal complaints and related motions against a government agent who was investigating an illegal gambling operation. The court ruled that the defendant’s “nominally litigation-related conduct” was unlawful because his real motive was “to safeguard his personal financial interests.” Q: What would such a case entail, in theory? A: Obstruction of justice cases often come down to whether prosecutors can prove defendants’ mental state when they committed the act, legal specialists said. It is not enough to show that a defendant knew the act would have a side consequence of impeding an investigation; achieving that obstruction has to have been the specific intention.
Samuel Buell, a former federal prosecutor who led the Justice Department’s Enron task force and now teaches criminal law at Duke University, was initially skeptical about whether the mere firing of Comey could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Trump had improper intent. But subsequent revelations, he said, made the evidence much more robust.
“The evidence of improper purpose has gotten much stronger since the day of Comey’s firing,” Buell said. “Trump has made admissions about that. And we now have evidence that he may have indicated an improper purpose ... in his communications with Comey about the Russia investigation.”
Q: What impediments would there be to charging Trump?
A: O’Sullivan said it was not realistic to expect the Justice Department to charge the sitting president.
What about impeachment?
“Asking FBI to drop an investigation is obstruction of justice,” Rep. Ted Deutch, D-Fla., said on Twitter after the initial report of the Oval Office conversation about Flynn. “Obstruction of justice is an impeachable offense.”
Both U.S. presidents who were subjected to impeachment proceedings in the last century — Bill Clinton in 1998 and Richard M. Nixon in 1974 — were accused of obstruction of justice.
While it can be a murky task in court to interpret the obstruction statutes, said David Sklansky, a former federal prosecutor who teaches at Stanford, impeachment proceedings are different. They are a “quasi-judicial, quasi-political process,” he said; the House and Senate determine for themselves whether standards are met.
In other words, as a practical matter, the Constitution’s standards for impeachment and removal of a president — if he has committed “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” — are met by anything that a majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate are willing to vote for.
That makes prognostication an exercise in vote counting, not legal analysis.