Rivera’s approach: Selectively aggressive
The enduring lesson from theWashington Football Team’s loss to theNewYork Giants on Sunday isn’t about one player or situation. It isn’t about theNFC East standings or jockeying for draft position. It isn’t even really, deep down, about the decision to go for two.
The game shed light on coach Ron Rivera’s thought process in crunchtime. This was rare. The team’s struggle to remain competitive this season has limited chances to see the true, three-dimensional nature of “Riverboat Ron,” a misleading nickname for a selectively aggressive coach.
Consider this. In Carolina, from2011 to 2019, Riverawent for it on fourth down less than the league average. Yet, when he went for it in score-neutral situations, he converted 78% of the time, the second-best rate in the NFL. In otherwords, Rivera picked his spots.
In the 20-19 loss to theNewYork Giants, Rivera made four important crunchtime decisions that illustrate this broader philosophy:
Fourth-and-1at the NewYork 48-yard line, 11:58 left in the first quarter. No score. Washington goes for it.
Though Rivera didn’t address this decision after the game, he has often expressed confidence in his short-yardage unit. It almost always features running back Peyton Barber, whom the coach has called “a hammer,” and the gambles have mostly worked. Washington has attempted10 fourth-down conversions this season, the secondmost in the NFL, and converted seven of them.
In this case, the decision aligned with numbers fromEdjSports, an analytical company that consults with NFL teams. Historically, teams facing fourth-and-1 nearmidfield have converted about 70% of the time, and in a simulation of this specific game, the oddswere similar. EdjSports uses predictive models to help teams anticipate in-game decisions, and any fourth down is particularly important because they have an outsize influence on win probability.
EdjSports “stress tests” each situation. For example, co-founder Frank Frigo said, even ifWashington had theNFL’sworst rushing team and the Giants its best rushing defense, the modelwould still advise to go for it.
“We’re on board with [this call],” Frigo said. “That one’s pretty clear.”
On the field, Barber plowed up the middle and converted. This gaveWashington a 3% boost in “game-winning chance,” EdjSports’ metric.
Fourth-and-4 at the NewYork 40, 1:20 left in the second quarter. Washington trails 13-3. Washington goes for it.
Thiswas perhaps the second-most controversial decision Rivera made, behind only the final 2-point conversion attempt. Itwas originally fourth-and-9 and Washington punted, but then the Giants
incurred a running-into-the -kicker penalty, and Rivera accepted to make it fourth and four. The coach decided to go for it.
“Wewere capable ofmoving the ball,” Rivera explained. “I just felt thatwe had to score a touchdown to put ourselves in position to be competitive in the second half.”
In themodel, the decisionwas awash. The difference between his optionswere within fractions of a percent. In the charts EdjSports builds for NFL coaches, they color-code game situations for quick reference; green is go, red is don’t go and yellow is coach’s discretion. This decisionwas yellow.
“We always tell themwe don’twant to be robots telling them what to do,” Frigo said.
Players said Rivera had told them repeatedly during the trip that they came here to win. Thismight seem like usual coach-speak, but for a struggling team, Rivera sees the message ofwanting to win as integral to the culture change he’s preached.
WhenKyle Allen found wide receiver Dontrelle Inman for the first down, Washington gained 7.3% in game-winning chance— even beforeWashingtonwent on to score a touchdown just before half.
Fourth-and-4 at the NewYork10, 8:59 left in the fourth quarter. Washington trails 13-10. Washington kicks a field goal to tie it.
This decisionwas another yellow. If Rivera had gone for it, he could have increased his expected game-winning chance, but he alsowould have assumed more risk. The coachwent for it in a somewhat similar situation inWeek1 against the Philadelphia Eagles, but this time, considering other factors— the longer distance, the road venue— he played it safe.
Yet the kickwasn’t a guarantee. Dustin Hopkins had missed his first attempt of the afternoon, a 47-yarder, wide right. But Rivera trustedHopkins, who made the 35-yarder, and bet his offense could go ahead on another drive.
2-point conversion attempt, 36 seconds left in the fourth quarter. Washington trails 20-19.
Thiswas Rivera’smost controversial decision. But he and his players sawgoing for it as the only logical choice. Tight end Logan Thomas told his teammates before their final drive that theywould go for it after they scored a touchdown, and later, in the locker room, Rivera reiterated that this assertivenesswas part of his “philosophy.”
“The onlyway to learn towin is to play to win, and that’s what Iwant those guys to understand,” he said, adding,“We have to do certain things to win football games, and if taking a gamble is part of it, that’s what I’m doing.”
This time, the model recommended
kicking the extra point. Frigo iswary of leaning too heavy on the numbers late in games— this is where themodel has the most uncertainty— but he still thought this call “was pretty clear.” Washington would have had 39% game-winning chance if they kicked off tied and 62% if they did so leading by one— both percentages lower than expected because the Giants had two timeouts and the chance to drive for their own score— and themodel suggestedWashingtonwould need to be a little more than 60% confident it could convert the 2-point conversion to justify going for it. That is considerably higher than the historical 2-point conversion rate of 48%.
Frigo added, though, that he believed Rivera’s decisionwas “not a huge error.” He said few coaches truly followanalytics, that their guts sometimes make statistically optimal decisions and get “it right for the wrong reasons.”
In the end, Frigo understood Rivera’s rationale. The coach said hewent for it because he believes overtime favors the home team and because he’s trying to build something unquantifiable in his players. This decision might have been less than ideal in terms of winning Sunday, but to Rivera, it held real value.
“I’m trying to get our players to understand [this is] howwe’re going to do things,” he said.“We’re going to do things to the max. We’re going to play to win football games.”