Digging deeper into Syrian morass
What exactly does the president expect to achieve by introducing special forces to “train, advise and assist” opposition forces in the fight against the Islamic State and Assad? It would be great to hear an explanation.
T he decision by President Obama to introduce special operation troops into the morass that is the Syrian civil war carries considerable risk while offering little chance to significantly alter the status of the conflict. That makes it a bad move.
The Obama administration has made previous policy blunders involving Syria.
In August 2011, then Secretary of State and now presidential candidate Hillary Clinton stated, “The transition to democracy in Syria has begun and it’s time for Assad to get out of the way.” This was followed with a statement from the president, “For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.”
The policy statements that Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad had to go carried the implicit message that the United States would back the rebel uprising. It left no diplomatic maneuverability that would allow Assad to stay in a bifurcated country during a transition period.
In the four years since, the civil war has raged on and an estimated 200,000 people have died. The United Nations estimates the conflict has displaced 6.5 million people.
When the Obama administration had an opportunity early in the conflict to arm and support moderate factions with the goal of creating a secular government to replace Assad, the president failed to act. In due course, the more ruthless Islamic radicals became the dominant force in the rebellion. The Islamic State arose and spread across swaths of neighboring Iraq.
Yet the failure to act then cannot be repaired by acting wrongly now. The administration has already seen one major failure in recently trying, and failing, to train thousands of Syrian rebels to take on the Islamic State.
Consider what Syria has become. Russia has now weighed in militarily, ostensibly to defeat the likes of the Islamic State and al-Qaida, but in reality intent on protecting what remains of Assad’s domain, with Russian planes attacking moderate rebel groups backed by the United States.
The most effective force against the Islamic State has been the Kurds. But NATO member and U.S. ally Turkey view the same Kurdish forces as a national security threat.
Iran has long been fighting a proxy war in defense of its Shiite brothersin-arms in the Assad regime. Sunni Saudia Arabia, meanwhile, has been funding Sunni rebels, its weapons and money ending up in the hands of Islamic extremist fighters, even as it gives lip service to stopping the spread of the Islamic State.
It is a conflict without borders, without clarity among enemy and foe, and without any clear exit.
What exactly does the president expect to achieve by introducing special forces to “train, advise and assist” opposition forces in the fight against the Islamic State and Assad? It would be great to hear an explanation.
At best, Kurdish and Syrian rebels assisted by highly trained U.S. troops, and the more precise air-attack targeting they can provide U.S. war planes, may produce some military victories. It is hard to imagine it meaningfully changing the course of the civil war, however.
A lot could go wrong. U.S. soldiers could be killed or captured. Russia and U.S. forces could come in conflict. The nation could witness the spectacle of a captured U.S. soldier in an Islamic State video production, threatened with beheading, or beheaded. That would call for a stepped-up U.S. military response. On the other hand, U.S. involvement could simply grow incrementally, as it has in foreign conflicts before.
The better course is to continue the air support for and arms supply to those opposition forces in which we have some reasonable degree of faith. If the Russians want to own this mess, let them. In time, they will be looking for a diplomatic escape and they hold sway over Assad to help make it happen.
As for deploying our soldiers, please reconsider, Mr. President.