Who gets to have nuclear weapons — and why
Given North Korea’s nuclear lunacy, what exactly are the rules, formal or implicit, about which nations can have nuclear weapons and which cannot? It is complicated. In the free-for-all environment of the 1940s and 1950s, the original nuclear club included only those countries with the technological know-how, size and money to build nukes. Those realities meant that up until the early 1960s, only Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States had nuclear capabilities.
During the ColdWar, the Soviet Union and the United States adhered to an unspoken rule that their losing Axis enemies of WorldWar II — Germany, Italy and Japan — should not have nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union and the United States also informally agreed during the ColdWar that their own dependent allies who had the ability to go nuclear — including Eastern Bloc nations, mostWestern European countries, Australia and Canada— would not. Instead, they would depend on their superpower patrons for nuclear deterrence.
By the 1970s, realities had changed again. Large and/or scientifically sophisticated nations such as China (1964), Israel (1967) and India (1974) went nuclear. The rest of the world apparently shrugged, believing it was inevitable that such nations would obtain nuclear weapons.
The next round of expansion of the nuclear club, however, was far sloppier andmore dangerous.
Some nations let on that they were developing nuclear weapons and were stopped by pre-emptive military strikes, such as Iraq and Syria. Others, including South Africa, Ukraine and Libya, were persuaded to halt their nuclear projects.
Pakistan was the rare rogue that managed to hide its nuclear enrichment, shocking the world by testing a bomb in 1998. Pakistan rightly assumed that once a nation proves its nuclear capability, it is deemed too dangerous to walk it back through disarmament.
Nonetheless, until the official nuclearization of North Korea in 2006, the nuclear club remained small (eight nations) and was thought to be manageable. Why?
First, those nuclear countries that were relatively transparent and democratic (Britain, France, India, Israel and the United States) were deemed unlikely to start a nuclear war.
Second, the advanced but autocratic nuclear nations (China and Russia) were thought to have too much at stake in globalized trade and national prosperity ever to start a lose/lose nuclear war.
Third, any unstable rogue nuclear nation (Pakistan) was assumed to be deterred and held in check by a nearby nuclear rival (India).
The nuclear capability of dictatorial North Korea (and likely soon, theocratic Iran) poses novel dangers far beyond the simple arithmetic of “the more nuclear nations, the more likely a nuclear war.”
Neither North Korea nor Iran is democratic. Neither is a stable country.
More importantly, their flagrant violations of nonproliferation accords and their perceived aggressiveness will prompt relatively powerful regional neighbors — such as Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Taiwan — to consider developing nuclear capability.
The club then could get big quickly.
Not all of these wouldbe nuclear powers are democratic. But they do share a single pro-American outlook.
A frustrated America may feel that China and Russia have encouraged rogue countries such as Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear weapons programs, selfishly assuming that missiles in those countries would be pointed at theWest and not eastward. So now the United States is in a paradoxical position. It wants to stop all nuclear proliferation. But America also assumes that the next nuclear powers (for a change) would be pro-American — a payback of sorts to China and Russia for allowing their rogue friends to develop nuclear capabilities.
Yet amid the chaos, until 2006 there were implied rules for the eight-member nuclear club. Now, after North Korea’s unhinged threats, those shared assumptions about nuclear poker are null and void. And no one quite knows what to expect next.