Iran’s options in showdown with U.S. for noware all bad

After losing its top strategist, military commander and arch-terrorist, Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian theocracy is weighing responses.

One, Iran can quiet down and cease military provocations.

After attacking tankers off its coast, destroying an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia, shooting down a U.S. drone and being responsible for the killing and wounding of Americans in Iraq, Iran could now keep quiet.

It might accept that its strategy of escalation has failed to produce any quantifiable advantage.

The chances, however, for such a logical and passive readjustment by Iran are nil.

Iran believes Trump’s beefed-up sanctions have all but destroyed its economy and could now extend to nations trading with Iran.

If unchecked, American economic pressure could eventually topple the theocracy. In sum, a return to the status quo is unlikely.

Two, Iran can agree to reenter talks about its nuclear programand offer a few concessions.

Iran could concede that the prior agreement was designed to bank Iranian cash and nuclear expertise that would eventually lead to the country developing nuclear weaponry.

Yet a return to direct negotiations with Washington is also unlikely, especially since Iran once enjoyed a lopsided gift from the United States.

Three, Iran can escalate its military operations and its use of terrorist surrogates. The death of Soleimani is Iran’s most grievous setback in decades, and Iran seeks vengeance. The theocracy will view his death not just as a strategic loss, but as a humiliation that cannot stand.

In reaction, Iran could strike American bases and allies in the region. The possibilities are endless. Iran could also unleash its terrorist appendages to stage attacks on American and Israeli assets throughout Europe and the U.S. Yet this choice is also unlikely. A strike against the U.S. or its overseas military installations would result in a devastating response. The theocracy knows that in hours, U.S. air power could take out all of Iran’s oil refineries, power stations and military bases while suffering few if any causalities.

Given U.S. oil independence and the global adjustments to existing sanctions on Iranian oil, the near-permanent loss of Iran’s oil would not greatly damage the world economy.

Waging an all-out war with the U.S. would be suicidal, and Iran knows it.

Four, Iran can continue its periodic attacks on U.S. allies and on troops and contractors in the region. The strategic aim in such endless tit-for-tat would be to wear down the patience of the U.S. public in an election year.

Given the quick criticism of Soleimani’s killing from Trump’s progressive domestic opponents, and given the Obama administration’s past appeasement in response to Iranian provocations, Tehran might conclude that a hit-and-pause strategy is preferable.

It could incite Trump’s political opponents to brand him a warmonger who acted illegally by “assassinating” Soleimani. Iran’s hope would be that Trump would lose the support of the antiwar members of his base in key swing states.

Iran might hope for a President Elizabeth Warren or President Bernie Sanders. Either one would likely resurrect the flawed Iran deal and ignore Iranian aggression in Syria and Iraq.

Iran’s goal might be something like re-creating the melodrama of the 1979-1981 hostage crisis or Saddam Hussein’s rope-a-dope strategy. Tehran hopes for American strategic ossification that could prove politically toxic.

But that scenario, too, is unlikely. As long as Trump replies with air power disproportionate to any Iranian attacks, he, not Tehran, governs the tempo of the confrontation.

Iran created the current crisis. It has choices, but for nowthey are all bad.