The Middletown Press (Middletown, CT)
Lack of mandates makes it difficult to secure a school district
As we await the release of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission’s final report in the wake of the Dec. 14, 2012, school shooting, let’s talk about the basics of school security.
They are: 1. Secure your front entry, 2. Secure your classroom doors with locks that work from the inside, 3. Secure the glass with laminate glazing, 4. Train teachers and staff and, 5. Practice. Sure, there are additional security measures such as door intercom/buzz-in systems, panic alarms, cameras, human security, fingerprint scanners and access control software, and the list can go on, but these all come after the basic foundation.
None of the things are standard or mandated statewide in Connecticut, or any state in the country for that matter. This leads to the huge inconsistences that I saw statewide, addressed in a column in December, and why I continue to be so critical of the state Legislature, the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission and the School Safety Infrastructure Council created in the wake of the Sandy Hook tragedy.
What is happening in my hometown of East Haven is a good example of what happens when our state leadership fails to lead by passing mandated basics and our local leadership looks for the cheapest way.
On Jan. 22, 2013, about a month after the Sandy Hook shooting, I attended a Board of Education meeting at East Haven High School and spoke of the need for East Haven to secure their schools and write new policies. I have family that attends an East Haven school. But I also spoke with knowledge of the subject, having been a security consultant for over 18 years, let alone my career in law enforcement in total spanning almost 40 years. It was here that I began my quest to secure East Haven schools, which continues today.
I ended my little speech with a warning that “if you don’t want to listen to me, find another security consultant that can help you soon or the schools will be subject to another Sandy Hook.” I was then told that the school superintendent, at the time, Anthony Serio, would contact me. I was never contacted by Superintendent Serio during the next eight months until he retired in August 2013.
In April 2013 Mayor Joseph Maturo announced that a task force had completed a new district-wide crisis manual for “crisis response preparedness measures; outside emergency contact information; crisis response kit; ongoing responsibilities; procedures for vulnerable areas; codes and evacuation procedures; lockdown procedures and communication to the parents” for the district.
The manual would also “require all principals to review the procedures with staff twice yearly; conduct practice drills with the staff and students also two times per year and to require teachers to review and practice emergency procedures with their individual classes also twice per year,” said Maturo.
The task force consisted of Deputy Fire Chief Chuck Licata, Police Capt. Joseph Slane, Superintendent Anthony Serio and Assistant Superintendent Erika Forti with input from each school principal.
When I read the statement I immediately contacted Fire Chief Douglas Jackson and Police Chief Brent B. Larrabee because I immediately became concerned with some of the processes stated and some of the language, such as the fact that only two drills per year would be conducted when the recently-passed school security law mandated three drills. I did meet with Chief Jackson in June 2013 and was told I could see the new manual and offer suggestions. I also talked to police Capt. Slane in July 2013, who also said I could offer improvements. I never received a copy of the manual.
In September 2013 I met with the new school superintendent, Dr. Portia Bonner, and the school district Finance Director Paul Rizza. This meeting was again not successful in bringing about an opportunity to work on the already completed plan for securing the schools. Mind you, by now I was offering my service or advice for free to my town.
On Sept. 9, 2014, I returned to the Board of Education. I again urged the board to work with me or someone in the security field. Over the last two years it had become obvious that if the school district, the Police Department or the Fire Department had written a plan and conducted the needed and now the required school security assessments, per the school safety law passed in 2013, the schools would not have continued to have the deficiencies I was able to see and was now pointing out to the board. I presented issues that I had observed first hand that threatened the security of our children on a daily basis. The list included locks that didn’t lock, doors being open without staff inquiring first, windows unsecured and in some cases completely open.
Even more troubling was that the district was now about to spend money through the new school security grants. The money in my view as a security consultant was about to be spent unwisely without any guidance from any security professional. Advice from a Police or Fire department is not the proper guidance for security matter. Each of those entities has its own agenda. School board Chairman John Finkle seemed to be open to my presentation.
The town is about to spend $159,610 of its money and $331,519 of state Security Grant money. What is East Haven getting for that money?
A biometry fingerprint reader for high school teachers to enter the rear of the school? A new security desk similar to the high school’s setup with some cameras? From my observations, not a system I would recommend. From what I’ve been told and from my own observations, the locks in the district remain a risk similar to the locks at Sandy Hook Elementar y.
Most schools built prior to 1970 have similar locks, and should be replaced with locks that lock from the inside, but the high school is of great interest because this school was built most recently but with locks that don’t lock from the inside. Who is responsible for that? Who advised the district? The Fire or Police departments?
I would bet that was who the district turned to. There is a reason for the change to newer and higher-functioning locks and security consultants have known this for some time. I testified in front of both the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission and the School Safety Infrastructure Council, and both recommended locks that lock from the inside, finally catching up to the industr y.
During the weeks leading up to the Dec. 9, 2014, Board of Education meeting, Chairman Finkle asked me to present a plan for what I was offering to do for the school district.
On Dec. 9, I again returned to the Board of Education to present the plan for a security assessment I was offering.
On Jan. 13, 2015, I returned to the Board of Education and expressed my disappointment with the ulterior motive rumors the board was hearing and the fact that the board now wanted to use the Request for Proposal (RFP) process for the services. I was not upset because I would lose an opportunity, I would be happy if any security consultant worked on correcting the issues I had identified. But I felt that the RFP route was a way to avoid working with anyone. I told the board that in the last few weeks I had viewed what I believe to be a copy of the crisis manual, which was badly written and would lead to failure in a real emergency, therefore a Sandy Hook in waiting.
First it is a manual that is written with heavy emphasis on administrative oversight and administration-initiated drills only. Surprising, because I would have thought those lessons would have already been learned years ago and even more so because every firefighter knows the lessons of the Our Lady of the Angels School fire of 1958. A total of 92 pupils and three nuns lost their lives, a fire that literally changed how fire drills were conducted. The reason for so many deaths was that the school relied solely on administration to call for an evacuation.
For instance, this manual is written is such a way that if a teacher encounters a person with a gun in a hallway, their sole responsibly is to contact an administrator. The manual does not give them the option to immediately call the school into a lock down, wasting valuable time. And without allowing training for staff-initiated drills, individual staff members and teachers are less likely to respond effectively during a crisis.
To fix this, the manual needs to be rewritten to allow for training in staff-initiated drills that include scenarios for all types of events, an active shooter not being the only threat a school faces. This allows teachers to learn better decision-making skills.
Second, as the manual is written, security officers at the school have no responsibilities for access control or during drills. Normal accepted security protocols would require security to see ID, and ensure that visitors have the proper clearance to enter.
Third, as written the manual calls for the same type of false sense of security policies that were in place for Sandy Hook Elementary School. The policy calls for teachers to lock their classroom doors and the doors are to remain locked during the school day. This type of policy just doesn’t work.
Teachers just don’t teach like this. It is clearly shown by the fact that on that fateful day and with the policy in place the janitor had to run around locking doors that should have been already locked, finally breaking his key on the 15th lock he tried.
Fourth, reverse lock down (evacuation) protocols and drills are critical and are not even addressed in the manual. This is where students and staff who are outside of the building during a crisis can return to the building.
There are many more issues with the manual but I choose not to get into further detail for fear that someone would attempt to exploit the deficiencies.
So why has it been so difficult to secure a school district? Public support for it wanes? Egos?
No, it’s the lack of leadership.