The Morning Journal (Lorain, OH)

What to expect of Cuba’s president

- By William M. LeoGrande American University School of Public Affairs

Cuba has a new president and for the first time in six decades, his last name is not Castro.

Cuba’s National Assembly has elected Cuba’s First Vice President Miguel Díaz-Canel to replace 87-year-old Raúl Castro, who took over as Cuba’s leader in 2006 after his brother Fidel Castro fell ill.

Raúl Castro stepped down in observance of the two-term limit for senior government and party officials that he himself mandated in 2011. In so doing, he opened the door not just for a new president but for a generation­al transition in Cuba.

This is one of the most important moments I’ve seen in 40 years of studying and writing on Cuba.

Díaz-Canel faces real challenges. Cuba’s economy is weak, relations with Washington are deteriorat­ing and internet expansion on the Communist island has produced a growing chorus of domestic critics.

The political rise of 57-yearold Díaz-Canel represents the final stage of a transfer of power away from the “historic generation” that waged Cuba’s 1959 revolution. The charisma of Fidel Castro, who died in 2016, was for decades a pillar of Cuba’s regime.

Díaz-Canel - a trained engineer who worked his way up from local party leader to first vice president - will have to earn his authority through performanc­e.

Those who have followed his career say Díaz-Canel is a seasoned, pragmatic politician. As a Communist official in Villa Clara in the 1990s, when Cuba suffered a prolonged economic depression, he rode his bicycle to work rather than take a car.

He appears ill at ease with large audiences but relaxed and congenial in small groups much like his mentor, Raúl.

As president, Díaz-Canel will still benefit from Raúl Castro’s experience and authority. Castro remains first secretary of the Communist Party - Cuba’s only party - until 2021.

This is arguably a post more powerful than the presidency. The party leadership makes all economic, social and foreign relations policies, which the president is obliged to carry out.

So I don’t expect any drastic changes in direction from DíazCanel - at least, not right away.

This political transition is still significan­t, though. For the first time, the leader of the Communist Party and the leader of the government are different people. Both Fidel and Raúl Castro held both positions simultaneo­usly.

Cuba must now sort out the lines of authority between party and state. As Díaz-Canel staffs government ministries with his own team, he will gain ever more control over how policy is interprete­d and implemente­d.

He will immediatel­y face some tough issues. Cuba’s economy is struggling, dragged down by the dual-currency system Fidel Castro adopted in 1994 to attract cash remittance­s from Cuban expats.

Raúl Castro has declared that currency reunificat­ion “cannot be delayed any longer.” But turning two currencies into one is a tricky business with unpredicta­ble consequenc­es.

Díaz-Canel will also face pressure to reinvigora­te the Cuban economy by pushing ahead with the controvers­ial economic reform program launched by Raúl Castro early in his tenure, which loosened restrictio­ns on private enterprise and enabled foreign investment in Cuba.

The pace of change has since slowed, frustratin­g Cubans. If Díaz-Canel opens up Cuba’s economy too quickly, he’ll alienate Communist Party conservati­ves. Going too slowly will anger reformers.

Another contentiou­s issue is freedom of expression. Public criticism of the Cuban regime has grown as more citizens connect to the internet. Last year, hard-liners launched a campaign vilifying critical bloggers, which Díaz-Canal supported.

Other prominent Cubans pushed back, though, and the campaign ended without any of the sites being closed down.

Raúl Castro has balanced conflictin­g factions with a delicate strategy he described as reform “without haste, but without pause.” Díaz-Canel must now demonstrat­e he, too, can manage these conflicts.

Finally, the new president has to deal with the mercurial U.S. administra­tion. President Donald Trump has largely outsourced Cuba policy to conservati­ve Cuban-Americans in Congress, led by Sen. Marco Rubio, a Republican from Florida.

In June 2017, Trump declared he was “cancelling” some Obama-era Cuba political reforms and re-tightening parts of the economic embargo.

In October, Trump further battered bilateral ties by downsizing the American Embassy in Cuba after U.S. government personnel suffered unexplaine­d health problems there. He also expelled 17 Cuban diplomats.

Recent Trump appointmen­ts do not bode well for the future of U.S.-Cuban relations. The incoming secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, was a vocal opponent of Obama’s rapprochem­ent with Havana. National security adviser John Bolton once deemed Cuba part of an “axis of evil,” falsely accusing it of developing biological weapons.

In December, I was in Havana, a city where the benefits of Raúl Castro’s economic reforms are most tangible. Cubans I spoke with there seemed ready for younger leadership.

But 80 percent of Cubans have always had a Castro as their president. So the anticipato­ry mood is leavened by trepidatio­n: People fear that instabilit­y may accompany this major political change.

If Díaz-Canel can deliver on the economy, he’ll be judged a success. If not, he will face a rising tide of discontent from a population impatient for change.

The Conversati­on is an independen­t and nonprofit source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts.

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