The New York Review of Books

David Cole

- David Cole

This Takes the Cake

“It is a general rule that [religious and philosophi­cal] objections do not allow business owners . . . to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodat­ions law.” So wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy for the majority in Masterpiec­e Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which was decided by the Supreme Court on June 4. The case, which I argued in the Court on behalf of Charlie Craig and David Mullins, a gay couple denied a wedding cake by a Denverarea bakery, posed the question of whether the bakery owner had a First Amendment right to refuse to sell the couple a wedding cake because he objected on religious grounds to same-sex marriage.

The answer, at least according to Justice Kennedy’s “general rule,” would seem to be no. Colorado’s public accommodat­ions law, like those of forty-four other states and the federal government, is a “neutral and generally applicable public accommodat­ions law” that forbids discrimina­tion against customers based on race, sex, sexual orientatio­n, and the like. Accordingl­y the baker’s religious objections do not permit him to deny “equal access to goods and services.”

And yet the Court ruled, by a vote of 7–2, in favor of Masterpiec­e Cakeshop and its owner/baker, Jack Phillips, with Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer joining their five conservati­ve colleagues. It did so on the case-specific ground that, regardless of the legality of the baker’s refusal to serve the gay couple, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission that considered their claim of discrimina­tion was infected by antireligi­ous bias, which independen­tly violated the baker’s constituti­onal right to the free exercise of religion. Because it decided the case on this narrow ground, the Court did not formally rule on the question of whether businesses open to the public could ever rely on the First Amendment to justify discrimina­tion.

The decision has caused confusion among advocates and commentato­rs on all sides. Rachel Tiven, the CEO of the LGBT civil rights organizati­on Lambda Legal, said, “The Court today has offered dangerous encouragem­ent to those who would deny civil rights to LGBT people.” The lawyer for the baker, Kristen Waggoner of Alliance Defending Freedom, an anti-gay advocacy organizati­on, proclaimed that “the court’s decision announced that the government was wrong to punish Phillips for living according to his beliefs about marriage.” And the constituti­onal law professors Larry Sager and Nelson Tebbe wrote that “in Masterpiec­e, the Court released a baker from the requiremen­t that he serve all customers, including same sex wedding celebrants.”

All of these pronouncem­ents are wrong. The decision does not encourage discrimina­tion against LGBT people; on the contrary, it strongly reaffirmed the importance of antidiscri­mination laws and declined to adopt claims of a First Amendment right to discrimina­te. Nor did the Court say it was “wrong to punish Phillips for living according to his beliefs.” It simply found that the particular process used to determine whether he had violated the law was biased against religion. And the Court did not release a baker “from the requiremen­t that he serve all customers.” Masterpiec­e Cakeshop remains just as subject to Colorado’s public accommodat­ions laws after the decision as it was before. If Charlie Craig and David Mullins walked into the shop today and asked for a cake to celebrate their anniversar­y, the baker would have no right to turn them away. Waggoner and the Trump administra­tion had argued for just such a sweeping First Amendment exemption. They contended that because the baker’s wedding cakes were “expressive,” requiring him to make one for a gay couple would impermissi­bly compel him to express views with which he disagreed. Such an exemption would have had radical consequenc­es, because a wide range of services and products can be viewed as “expressive.” Architects, lawyers, chefs, bookstores, hairdresse­rs, tailors, nail salons, and interior decorators all offer “expressive” goods and services. If the Court had endorsed this exemption, a baker could refuse to sell a birthday cake to a black family if he objected to celebratin­g black lives, or an architect could refuse to provide plans for a Muslim couple’s home if he objected to Islam.*

Because such results would be so plainly unacceptab­le, the justices pressed the lawyers for the baker and the Trump administra­tion during oral arguments on whether the First Amendment exemption they were seeking could be limited in any principled way. The lawyers had no good answers. Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued that Phillips’s cakes should be protected, unlike, say, grocery store cakes, because “people pay very high prices for these highly sculpted cakes.” But he never explained why the First Amendment should protect only “highly sculpted” and expensive cakes. Waggoner, also seeking ways to limit the unappealin­g consequenc­es of her argument, insisted that architects, chefs, and makeup artists were not expressive, and therefore would not be protected under the First Amendment exemption she claimed for her client—prompting Justice Breyer to ask whether Michelange­lo’s Laurentian Steps were not expressive. Waggoner had no response.

In his decision for the Court, Justice Kennedy made clear that the arguments advanced by the Trump administra­tion and the baker raised serious concerns. He acknowledg­ed that a minister could not be compelled to perform a wedding that violated his religious tenets, but warned that

if that exception were not confined, then a long list of persons who provide goods and services for marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma inconsiste­nt with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and public accommodat­ions.

(Ministers are not businesses open to the public, so they are not obligated by public accommodat­ions laws.) And he noted that the baker’s sweeping argument could lead to unacceptab­le results, in which

all purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect [would] be allowed to put up signs saying “no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that would impose a serious stigma on gay persons.

The Court thus plainly refused to accept the baker’s and the Trump administra­tion’s invitation to create a First Amendment right to discrimina­te. Nonetheles­s, Attorney General Jeff Sessions appears not to have gotten the message. In remarks to a group of religious leaders in Washington on June 13, he said, “There is no need for the power of the government—no need for the state’s power—to be arrayed against an individual who is honestly attempting to live out—to freely exercise—his sincere religious beliefs.” But of course, as the Supreme Court recognized, there is a need for antidiscri­mination laws, many of which the Justice Department itself is responsibl­e for enforcing. And exempting those who object on religious grounds to providing equal treatment would open a gaping loophole in our nation’s commitment to equality.

The Court’s finding that the commission’s antireligi­ous bias had nonetheles­s violated the baker’s free exercise rights was strained, to put it mildly. It cited one commission­er who said that “it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others,” and another who said that Phillips can believe “what he wants to believe,” but cannot act on that belief “if he decides to do business in the state.” “Despicable” was an unfortunat­e choice of words, but the statement that one cannot invoke religion to harm others is actually straightfo­rward constituti­onal law, as is the principle that one cannot invoke religion to avoid complying with a generally applicable business regulation.

The Court also saw bias in the fact that while the commission ruled that Masterpiec­e Cakeshop had impermissi­bly discrimina­ted by refusing to sell a wedding cake to a gay couple, the commission found no discrimina­tion when three other bakers refused to bake cakes bearing homophobic messages for William Jack, a Christian activist. But the cases are easily distinguis­hed, and the commission rightly treated them differentl­y. Masterpiec­e Cakeshop refused to sell to a gay couple a product it would happily sell to a straight couple; it therefore discrimina­ted on the basis of sexual orientatio­n. The three other bakers refused to sell to Jack cakes they would not make for anyone. As there was no evidence that they treated Jack differentl­y from any other customer because he was Christian, they did not violate Colorado’s law. In fact, each of the bakers had regularly made Christian-themed cakes, and agreed to Jack’s request to make cakes in the shape of a Bible and declined only to write messages on them that they deemed offensive. Public accommodat­ions law does not require businesses to make any particular products, and allows them to refuse to make products they deem offensive. It only bars them from refusing, on the ground of a customer’s identity, to sell a product they would sell to others. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained in her dissent, “Change Craig and Mullins’ sexual orientatio­n (or sex), and Phillips would have provided the cake. Change Jack’s religion, and the bakers would have been no more willing to comply with his request.”

The Court’s labored finding of “bias” looks like an attempt to avoid squarely confrontin­g the issue it originally intended to resolve when it took the case.

Certainly the Court did not grant review merely to scold a low-level state civil rights commission­er for an infelicito­us remark. And the difference between the Masterpiec­e Cakeshop case and those involving the other bakers is too easily stated to have been a genuine basis for concern about bias.

Why, then, did the Court reach this result? The justices may well have considered this a “statesmanl­ike” resolution. Rather than rule definitive­ly on perhaps the most controvers­ial case of the year, the Court gave something to both sides, and by doing so managed to cobble together a seven-justice majority. In a starkly divided nation, it avoided a sharply divided result. The Court handed a nominal victory to the baker, but it was a one-time-only decision that signaled no enthusiasm for the sweeping First Amendment right to discrimina­te that the baker and the Trump administra­tion had sought. Future disputes of this sort will almost certainly be guided by the Court’s “general rule,” as expressed by Justice Kennedy, that there is no First Amendment right to deny “equal access to goods and services” under public accommodat­ions law. That is, unless changes in the Court’s personnel cause it to veer sharply to the right. For now, however, the “general rule” applies. Indeed, just three days after the Masterpiec­e Cakeshop decision, an Arizona appellate court cited that very language in rejecting a Phoenix-based business’s claim that it had a First Amendment right not to provide artwork to samesex weddings on the same terms as it serves opposite-sex weddings. Masterpiec­e Cakeshop is reportedly considerin­g getting back into the business of making wedding cakes, which it halted rather than have to serve gays and lesbians. But if it does so, it will have to sell them to everyone.

 ??  ?? David Mullins and Charlie Craig, the couple who filed a complaint after a Colorado baker refused to sell them a wedding cake, at the Supreme Court, Washington, D.C., December 2017
David Mullins and Charlie Craig, the couple who filed a complaint after a Colorado baker refused to sell them a wedding cake, at the Supreme Court, Washington, D.C., December 2017

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