Murder on the high seas: Slayer rule is on trial
The slayer rule may sound like a simple, common-sense proposition, but the scope of the rule vary greatly across jurisdictions.
Nathan Carman is in serious trouble. Last month, a federal prosecutor revealed an indictment charging Carman with “murder on the high seas.” The allegation is that Carman intentionally killed his mother on a boating trip to gain a greater share of his grandfather’s vast fortune. Yes, Carman is also suspected in his grandfather’s murder, but hasn’t been charged with that crime. If convicted of his mother’s murder, Carman would face mandatory life in prison.
Carman would also lose his $7 million inheritance from his mother. The boat set sail in Rhode Island and Carman was found in a lifeboat off Martha’s Vineyard, but his mother’s probate case is in Connecticut court where she lived. Connecticut, like nearly every state, has a so-called “slayer rule,” which provides that a killer cannot inherit from his victim. The slayer rule may sound like a simple, common-sense proposition, but the scope of the rule vary greatly across jurisdictions.
Carman’s case raises two basic questions: (1) should the slayer rule apply to unintentional killings as well as to intentional killings? and (2) should the slayer rule apply in the absence of a criminal conviction if the killing is established in probate court? Connecticut gets both these questions wrong: Connecticut’s slayer rule applies to reckless manslaughter and can be triggered only by a criminal conviction. As a result, Connecticut’s slayer rule is simultaneously under- and over-inclusive.
How can we know the “right” answers to questions like this? The first step is to understand the rationales for the slayer rule. From the case law and literature, we know that the slayer rule has two primary justifications: (1) no one should profit from their own wrongdoing (equity); and (2) a decedent would not want their killer to inherit (decedent’s intent). These justifications on their own cannot answer the questions posed above: whether a merely reckless killer should be disinherited or how sure we must be that a killing, in fact, took place. What is needed is empirical evidence about whether these rationales are actually advanced by applying the slayer rule in particular scenarios.
Let’s return to Carman. Before the trip, Carman reportedly made several alterations that rendered the boat unseaworthy. Carman put holes in the boat by removing the trim tabs, then filling the holes with putty and no backing. We know this because Carman filed an insurance claim for the sunken boat. A federal court denied the insurance claim because it held that Carman’s “incomplete, improper and faulty repairs” caused his loss.
The government believes that Carman acted intentionally in all of this, but what if the government is unable to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt? Maybe Carman is just an exceptionally unskilled boatsman and is convicted of reckless manslaughter only. Would it be equitable to allow Carman to profit from his recklessness? And would his mother want Carman to receive anything from her estate?
The survey in my forthcoming article includes a scenario where a husband’s recklessness killed his wife. It was close, but a majority of respondents did
think the wife would want to disinherit her husband or that it would be unfair for the husband to inherit. Thus, Connecticut gets this first question wrong by applying its slayer rule to reckless manslaughter in addition to intentional murder. To be fair, Connecticut’s slayer rule authorizes the court to make case-bycase exceptions, but it may be difficult to qualify.
Suppose instead of being convicted on a lesser charge, Carman is simply acquitted of murder. My survey respondents overwhelmingly agreed that an intentional murderer should not inherit even in the absence of a criminal conviction. This time, Connecticut clearly gets it wrong, and with no provision for exceptions. Connecticut requires a conviction, but there is a strong consensus that a conviction should be required to bar a killer under the slayer rule.
Connecticut is not alone. Slayer rules currently differ on a whole host of other controversial issues, including assisted suicide, the insanity defense, self-defense and elder abuse. The slayer rule is adrift. Correcting the two errors in Connecticut should be just the beginning of a nationwide recalibration of the slayer rule to better accomplish its goals.